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ILLUSION AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION

There is no such thing as objectivity. But there is fairness.
-Martin Martyl
INTRODUCTION

The text of a legal rule is often less important than the context of its interpretation
and application. If a dispute between an American buyer and a French seller were to come
before a French court, the buyer might be apprehensive not so much from any fearful
oddity of French law, but because the adjudicatory procedure arguably gave the French side
a "home court advantage." In some other countries, the integrity or independence of the
judiciary may also be a matter of concern. In an international transaction, the absence of
any reasonably neutral forum with compulsory jurisdiction makes the consequences of a
business deal gone sour much more disagreeable than in an otherwise similar domestic
transaction.
One response to the prospect of a biased or otherwise non-neutral court has been to
include a forum selection clause in the basic agreement at the time of signature. Typically
these clauses fall into two categories: (i) a jurisdiction clause that grants exclusive
adjudicatory competence to the courts of a third country;2 and (ii) an arbitration clause.3
Both alternatives have their obvious disadvantages. Third-country courts will often lack a
significant connection with the parties or the dispute, thus creating a risk that the chosen
court will refuse to hear the case on grounds of forum non conveniens. On the other hand
an arbitration clause, at least to the minds of some lawyers, will suffer from the alleged
tendency of certain arbitrators to "split the difference" between the parties rather than to
render a principled decision. Almost every practitioner has a horror story about some
arbitrator who made good on Solomon's threat to cut the baby in two. Business managers
understandably may be anxious about submitting to the jurisdiction of someone whose
identity they do not know and from whose judgment there is no appeal.
To some lawyers, a third alternative-their home court-would usually seem the
preferable option, assuming of course that they hold the bargaining clout necessary to force
it upon the foreign party. Fighting the battle on home turf will generally mean familiar
judges and well-known procedural safeguards. Furthermore, judges subject to the rigor of
appellate oversight, it is argued, will do a better job than unsupervised (and perhaps
undisciplined) arbitrators in applying precedent in a way that promotes fidelity to the
parties' shared expectations, thus enhancing commercial predictability.
Surprisingly, however, in international contracts forum selection clauses designating
American courts will often be less reliable than arbitration agreements. Three factors
explain this disparity in reliability. First, the United States is not a party to a single treaty
for the enforcement of either jurisdiction clauses or foreign judgments. Even the United

1. Quoted in THE U.U.A. WoRLD,Nov./Dec. 1992, at 26.
2. For example, a contract between an American and a German might provide that any future dispute will
be resolved by the High Court of London.
3. Arbitration's defining elements are threefold: (i) a private (rather than governmental) adjudicator, (ii)
empowered by the consent of the disputing parties, (iii) renders a binding decision. The arbitration clause might
provide that any dispute arising out of the contract will be settled under the rules of a relatively neutral arbitral
institution such as the International Chamber of Commerce or the London Court of International Arbitration. In
some cases, national arbitral institutions such as the American Arbitration Association might also be acceptable.
However, the non-American party may resist this option as too much American-style dispute resolution.
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Kingdom, one of our closest allies and trading partners, has refused to enter into a
judgments treaty with us for fear of the extraterritorial reach of our economic law. Second,
the Act of State doctrine generally precludes courts in the United States from calling into
question foreign governmental decrees (such as exchange controls) that interfere with
effective contract performance. Finally, contrary to what many lawyers assume, jurisdiction
clauses are not dispositive of the choice-of-court issue in most American jurisdictions.
Nothing requires the contract-designated judge to hear a case because the parties have
agreed to thrust jurisdiction on the court. In some instances, the court may be statutorily
or constitutionally unable to hear the case. Subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. Or
the foreign elements of the controverted event might lead a, court to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds.
By contrast, privatized dispute resolution pursuant to an arbitration clause benefits
from multilateral treaties of general application that bind almost one hundred countries to
enforce commercial arbitration agreements and the resulting awards. Second, the Act of
State doctrine normally will not constrain the scope or content of an arbitrator's decision.
Lastly, in arbitration the litigants will rarely have to worry about forum non conveniens or
subject matter jurisdiction; if they can cover the arbitrators' fees, the parties can almost
always find arbitrators to hear a dispute.
In the typical cross-border transaction, sophisticated business managers with access to
competent counsel bargain for a tailor-made contract (sometimes referred to as "one-off")
with a forum selection clause that permits the parties to reduce the prospect of biased or
inaccessible courts. In domestic transactions, however, forum selection clauses are found
frequently in standard form leases, loans, and installment sales. The clauses may designate
a court of a jurisdiction inaccessible to the consumer and which-insofar as the court may
have a bias-will be predisposed in favor of the dominant party. Therefore, the aggregate
social and economic consequences of predispute forum selection clauses will depend largely
on whether the controverted events arise in a domestic or international setting. In business

relationships with a cross-border dimension, arbitration and choice-of-forum agreements
can enhance significantly the prospect of fair and predictable dispute resolution. On the
other hand, in domestic consumer transactions, boilerplate forum selection. clauses'

frequently' defeat the very values that justify them in an international setting, by forcing
consumers into fora that to them are neither accessible nor impartial, or which give little
weight to fundamental public policies of the place of contract performance.
Most of the discussion in this Article deals principally with commercial and financial
disputes involving at least one private party. While similar issues arise in public inter-state
arbitration, the nature of the interests implicated differ dramatically between inter-state and
business dispute resolution. Moreover, forum selection in business transactions usually
occurs in the shadow of mandatory national court proceedings, changing significantly the
contexts in which disputes are submitted to arbitration.

This Article will propose an international choice-of-court statute to replace the
patchwork of American jurisdictional rules. Under this proposed act, courts in the United
States would stay litigation inconsistent with the parties' jurisdictional choice, and federal
courts generally would be required to hear international cases when designated by a valid

forum selection clause. In consumer transactions, the statute would apply only when
consumers are given an option to sue and to be sued at their domicile. Moreover, courts
would extend to jurisdiction clauses the same judicial scrutiny now applied to arbitration
agreements that operate in tandem with choice-of-law clauses in a way likely to defeat
fundamental public norms of the place of contract performance.
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I.

A.

PROCEDURAL AND POLITICAL NEUTRALITY

ContemplatingAlternatives

When a cross-border business deal turns sour, the high price of jurisdictional
uncertainty can include litigation before xenophobic judges of questionable integrity or

independence, with procedural traditions radically different from those applied at home.
Proceedings may unfold not in a variant of the language of Shakespeare, but in the tongue
of Molire, Demosthenes or Mohammed. A Boston merchant in a dispute with a French
manufacturer might find a French court procedurally non-neutral even if confident of the
judge's relative fairness. The same Boston merchant purchasing from an Iraqi seller might
worry about the political predisposition of a judge in Baghdad, as well as the unfamiliarity
of Iraq's civil procedure code.
Merchants, manufacturers, or bankers haunted by this specter of non-neutral foreign
courts often agree to the jurisdiction of a third-country tribunal in order to reduce the
prospect of adjudication in the adversary's home country. A typical jurisdiction clause
(sometimes called a prorogation agreement4) might provide that "any dispute arising out
of the present agreement shall be decided exclusively by courts in Stockholm," constituting
both a consent to suit in the chosen Swedish forum and a derogation of the jurisdiction of
otherwise competent courts. A truly neutral court, of course, might have no nexus to the
parties or the dispute, sometimes raising a risk that the contractually designated judge
would refuse to hear the case.
A related option available to an enterprise with substantial economic leverage lies in
a prorogation agreement designating its own home courts. Frequently such forum selection
clauses operate in tandem with a choice-of-law clause, providing that the contract will be
interpreted according to the substantive rules of the dominant party's own legal system.
Arbitration provides a third alternative mechanism by which to enhance political and
procedural neutrality.5 Business managers concluding a cross-border contract often agree
that controverted questions of fact and law arising out of their transaction will be settled
according to the rules of an international arbitral institution.6 A panel composed of
arbitrators with nationalities different from the parties, applying non-national procedures
in a common language, usually assures a less biased deliberation than proceedings before
one side's national judges.
B.

A CautionaryTale

The relative merits and drawbacks of arbitration as contrasted with court selection can
be illustrated by the following cautionary tale. As we shall see, the home court advantage
can go awry, and a jurisdiction agreement may not always deliver the expected adjudicatory
predictability.

4. The verb prorogate sometimes causes confusion because it covers not only submission to a judge's
jurisdiction by consent of the parties, but also a legislature's decision that it will adjourn (or prorogue) its session
until a later date. Common to both types of prorogation is the notion of extension. By contract the parties extend
the judge's jurisdiction, and by adjournment the parliament extends its debates until a later time. The terminology
comes to us from Scottish law, and derives from the French proroger, which means to prolong or to protract.
5. As a private adjudicatory process marked by both its consensual origin and its bindingness, arbitration
differs from many of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms now in vogue such as conciliation or
statutorily mandated "court-annexed arbitration."
6. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce or the London Court of International Arbitration.
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1. Getting into the Right Court
The story concerns a multinational enterprise headquartered in Boston that wished to
purchase two ships being built in Ruritania, a developing country with good harbors and
cheap labor. A tripartite contract among the shipyard, the multinational, and the
multinational's Liberian subsidiary (established to purchase and to operate the vessels in a
tax-efficient fashion) provided for interim payments to be made as the vessels were built,
with the final installment of the purchase price due at completion of both vessels. The
American parent guaranteed the purchase obligations of its foreign subsidiary.
When the shipyard sent notice that the vessels were completed, a dispute arose over
the vessels' engine rooms and communication systems. The multinational maintained that
the ships were not in fact finished according to contract specifications. Rejecting these
claims, the shipyard filed suit for the final payment in a local commercial court.
Back in Boston, the lawyer who had advised the multinational congratulated herself
on the foresight displayed in negotiations with the shipyard. She had heard that courts in
the shipyard's country lacked a tradition of judicial independence. Less courteous tongues
had even characterized court proceedings there as auctions going to the highest bidder.
Contemplating this unpleasant prospect, counsel had insisted that the contract designate
courts in Boston as exclusively competent to settle any dispute.
The shipyard, of course, had protested that fairness required a more neutral solution.
Its attorneys suggested settlement of any dispute through arbitration in Paris under the
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. The Boston lawyer, however, stood her
ground. Arbitration, she said, injected too much uncertainty into the dispute resolution
process. She had once been involved in a case where the arbitrator split the difference
between the parties even though her client's case was clearly a winner. She noted that
judges in Boston are trained to respect precedent, and their decisions are subject to full
appellate review if something goes wrong. 7 Hungry for business, the shipyard ceded to the
Americans' superior bargaining power and accepted a forum selection clause providing that
"all disputes arising out of this agreement will be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
courts located within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."
When the dispute over the contract specifications crystallized, things did not go
according to plan. An action for damages filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The foreign
subsidiary's presence as an indispensable party to the dispute defeated the jurisdictional
requirement of complete diversity of citizenship. Competence could not be thrust upon
the court. A subsequent action brought in Massachusetts state court was also dismissed on
the basis of a 1916 case holding forum selection clauses presumptively invalid.8
In the next act of this troubling tale, the scene shifted to a local court in the sleepy
port town where the ships were being built. The chief judge owned a paint company whose
principal customer was the shipyard. Since the United States was a party to no judicial

7. For a not dissimilar comparison ofjudges and arbitrators,see Justice Stevens's dissent in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985). In a case involving the arbitrability of antitrust
issues, Stevens lamented that the enforcement of arbitration clauses in international business would "dispatch an
American citizen to a foreign land in search of an uncertain remedy." Id. at 666. He continued, "Consideration
of a fully developed record by a jury, instructed in the law by a federal judge, and subject to appellate review, is
a surer guide to the competitive character of a commercial practice than the practically unreviewable judgment of
a private arbitrator." Id.
8. See discussion of Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 111 N.E. 678 (Mass. 1916), infra text
accompanying note 85.
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jurisdiction treaty, the local court felt free to evaluate the shipyard's commitment to litigate
in American courts in light of its convenience in the circumstances. The Massachusetts case
law assisted the argument that the prorogation clause was invalid. Since the prorogation
clause might not be enforceable, fairness required that the court give the parties some
realistic hope of a remedy. After hearing both sides, the judge approved the shipyard's sale
of the vessels at a bargain price to a local buyer, who incidentally had been a substantial
contributor to the election campaign of the current prime minister.
Back in Boston, the state court decision was appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, which overruled the earlier precedent that had held court selection clauses
presumptively invalid.9 When the multinational finally obtained a favorable Massachusetts
judgment, it moved to attach the shipyard's bank accounts. The Bostonians were surprised
to learn that the country in which the accounts were located recognized foreign judgments
only on the basis of a treaty obligation. The United States, of course, had never concluded
a single enforcement-of-judgments treaty.
Several members of the legal profession were secretly delighted with the opportunities
presented by this transborder drama. Three tenure-hungry professors began writing
critiques of the Massachusetts judgment. One had a law and economics slant, applying the
Coase theorem to the efficient enforcement of international commercial agreements.
Another approached the problem from a law and literature perspective, comparing the
uncertainties of forum selection with the chaotic forces facing Captain Ahab in Melville's
Moby Dick A third attacked contract enforcement as a factor contributing to the
oppression of disempowered workers at the Ruritanian shipyard.
The multinational's chief executive, however, was more than disappointed. Efforts to
secure a favorable forum had misfired. Outside counsel was dismissed, and a rival law firm
began negotiating the multinational's next overseas contract.
2. Staying Out of the Wrong Court
Imagine, if you will, a rewrite of our Ruritanian narrative, in which the American
multinational focuses less on getting into the "right" court (in Boston) and more on
avoiding the "wrong" court (in Ruritania). The new script has the multinational accepting
the shipyard's suggestion that any future controversy be settled by arbitration in Paris under
the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. 0 An arbitral tribunal (composed
of a Belgian engineer, a Swiss professor, and a French lawyer) had no problem accepting
jurisdiction. The fact that ICC arbitrators' fees are based on a healthy percentage of the
amount in dispute made their task easier to contemplate." The arbitrators found that the
ships had not been completed according to specifications. The shipyard was held liable to
the Americans for damages incurred by the wrongful sale of the vessels. As required under

9. On remand the shipyard argued (unsuccessfully) that the action be dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds, since the vessels, most of the witnesses, and two out of three parties were located abroad.
10. Compare the real arbitration in Case 723 (Setenave v. Settebello), Netherlands Arbitration Institute
(Brunner, McCrindle, &Vischer, Arbs.), discussed inA.H. Herman, Rebufffor a PortugueseState Trader,FIN. TimEs
(London), Feb. 27, 1986, at 43. The arbitral tribunal refused to recognize a Portuguese government decree designed
to procure contract benefits to a state-owned shipyard in detriment of the rights of foreign purchasers of
supertankers.
11. See W. LAURENJCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBITRATION app. 1-17, tbL 9A (2d ed. 1990).
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the 1958 New York Convention, the resulting award's res judicata effect was recognized in
the country where bank account attachment was sought and obtained.
As most scholars know, of course, telling stories is problematic, because competing
narratives evoke radically different sympathies. Some business managers tell tales of
excessive judicial review of arbitral awards at the place of proceedings, or of frustrating
limits to discovery in arbitration. An anecdote occasionally suifaces about a truly idiosyn12
cratic award or unprincipled compromise rendered by a "wild card" arbitrator.
C.

JurisdictionalTaxonomy' 3

The absence of any neutral adjudicator with nonconsensual jurisdiction marks most
international commercial dispute resolution. 14 Judges sharing one party's nationality will
usually appear biased to the other side. And the jurisdiction of an arbitrator or a
preselected third-country court exists only as an artifact of the disputing parties'
agreement.' 5
These problematic aspects of international jurisdiction have led business managers and
their lawyers to seek adjudicatory certainty and fairness from the perspective of jurisdiction
through contract. In its widest sense, forum selection clauses include all consensual
submissions to a national judicial system ("jurisdiction clauses") or private adjudication
("arbitration").
Radically divergent goals impel parties to allocate judicial competence by inserting a
binding forum selection agreement 16 into a commercial contract at the time of signing the
basic business arrangement. 7 At the outset, two varieties of forum selection need to be
distinguished: (i) boilerplate clauses contained in standard form agreements such as

12. See 1 Kings 3:24-25.
13. For a European perspective on the variety of forum selection clauses in international business transactions,
see generally GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, LA CLAUSE D'fLECTION DE FOR DANS LES CONTRATS INTaRNATIONAUX

(1980).
14. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg might be considered an exception to the extent that
human rights questions intersect commercial arrangements. Recourse to the International Court of Justice rests
on consensual foundations, usually bilateral investment conventions, often termed Treaties ofFriendship,Commerce,
and Navigation (FCNs). See, eg., Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20) reprinted
in 28 1.L.M. 1109. See paragraph 48 of the LC.J. opinion, which recites the terms of Article 26 of the 1948 FCN
Treaty between Italy and the United States. Id. 1989 LC.J. at 41-42, 28 I.L.M. at 1124-25. On the ELSI case, see
generally PA. Mann, ForeignInvestment in the InternationalCourtof Justice; 86 AM. J. I'L L. 92 (1992).
15. As a practical matter, consent to arbitration or court selection in an international transaction must usually
be obtained at the outset of the contractual arrangement. After the dispute has arisen, one side will often begin
an action in a court perceived as most favorable to its arguments. This development substantially reduces the other
side's leverage in extracting an agreement for a neutral forum. Once the Ruritanian distributor has begun suit
before a Ruritanian judge, arbitration will seem less attractive than it might have several years earlier at the signing
of the agreement with the American manufacturer.
16. Nonbinding, informal dispute resolution may be effective in a closely knit, ethnically homogeneous
community with repeat dealings among community members. However, it is questionable whether such a
"reputation-based" adjudication can be transplanted to disputes among culturally diverse and mutually suspicious
or hostile commercial actors. Lower East Side immigrants are likely to resolve controversies among themselves
differently than, for example, Algerians dealing with Americans, or Chinese contracting with British. Cf. JBROLD
S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW (1983). See generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
ExtralegalContractualRelations in the Diamond Industry,21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
17. Some clauses confer on a particular court personal jurisdiction over one or more of the parties, without
limiting the jurisdiction of other tribunals. In contrast, other clauses attempt to grant exclusive jurisdiction to
courts in one place, to eliminate dispute resolution in competing arenas.
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installment sales, loans, and leases; and (ii) negotiated agreements in more complex
contracts tailored to a single commercial transaction.
Contracts involving international commerce include forum selection agreements
principally in order to protect the parties from being hauled into potentially biased courts
of the other side's home forum. The parties will therefore often consent to the jurisdiction
of a neutral third-country court or arbitral tribunal, and at the same time waive their rights
to bring an action in otherwise competent tribunals. In the sui generis international
commercial relationship, sophisticated business managers with access to competent counsel
can draft a tailor-made contract to remedy the gaps and overlaps of national jurisdiction.
In contrast, the choice-of-forum clause in the standard form contract is designed to make
life simpler for the party with the dominant bargaining power by centralizing customer
litigation in one judicial system. In the United States, such agreements may be linked to
a cognovit clause,18 by which a debtor authorizes an attorney appointed by the creditor to
confess judgment on nonpayment under a loan or lease.19 For consumers faced with such
standard form contracts, it may be argued that forum selection clauses usually raise more
problems than they solve. As will be discussed below, the goal of fairness that commends
forum selection clauses to international business managers presents the reverse image of the
concerns that loom large from the consumer's viewpoint.

II.

COURT SELECTION CLAUSES

"An abstract term," De Tocqueville observed, "is like a box with a false bottom: you
may put in it what ideas you please, and take them out again without being observed." 20
When applied to court-selection agreements, shorthand abstractions such as "valid,"
"enforceable," and "recognized" tend to obscure understanding of the practical reliability
of such clauses. Despite the trend in American judicial decisions toward a presumption
that jurisdiction clauses should be given effect,21 even the best of clauses may not meet
the contracting parties' expectations. Effective court selection can be defeated by the chosen
court's refusal to hear the case, the absence of any treaty network to enforce a judgment
abroad, and confiscatory foreign governmental decrees.
In only one American jurisdiction will court selection clauses be dispositive on the
question of which court will hear the dispute. 22 Whereas arbitration agreements are
enforceable under federal statute23 and international treaty, 24 court-designating jurisdiction clauses generally will be considered as only one of several factors relevant to a judge's

18. From the Latin cognovit actione; meaning "he has confessed the action."
19. See generally,H. Ward Classen et al., Survey of the Legality of Confessed Judgment Clauses in Commercial
Transactions, 47 Bus. LAw. 729 (1992). In the United States, state statutes and case law generally circumscribe
qognovit clauses; in consumer transactions, confession of judgment usually will not be valid, See id. at 731 n.6,
758-72. In commercial transactions, clauses freelybargained for have been upheld on waivers of due process rights
when a contracting party has designated an out-of-state agent to accept service of process. See D.H. Overmeyer
Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
20. 2 ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 70 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1945)
(1840). Compare Sylvia Plath's observation that "[t]he abstract kills, the concrete saves .... " THE JOURNALS OF
SYLVIA PL&TH 287 (Ted Hughes & Frances McCullough eds., 1982).
21. See discussion infta part H.A.
22. New York alone requires its judges to honor the parties' jurisdictional bargain. See N.Y. Gmi. OELIG. LAw
S 5-1401 (McKinney 1989), discussed infra at note 155. No analogous federal rule exists.
23. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. s 1 (1988).
24. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter New York Convention].
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decision to hear a case or to send it elsewhere. 25 When courts enforce jurisdiction clauses,
they do so often in order to clear their dockets by sending the dispute somewhere else.
Federal courts sometimes lack subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding a court selection
clause, or may be required to apply the law of a state that looks unfavorably on ouster of
its jurisdiction. The most well-crafted jurisdiction clause therefore may be unable to deliver
the party-selected court.
Equally as important, the international currency of U.S. judgments cannot be taken
for granted. An American judge may have no power to order attachment of a foreign
defendant's property, because the United States is not party to a single enforcement of
commercial judgments treaty.2' When claims must be satisfied by looking to assets
abroad, creditors frequently learn too late that their security interest and their forum are
27
ill-matched.
Finally, the Act of State doctrine sometimes requires U.S. courts to defer to foreign
governments' decrees purporting to block contract recovery. Courts in the United States
have sometimes declined to call into question foreign governmental acts such as exchange
controls that block the vindication of commercial rights.
At present there exists no multilateral treaty, comparable in scope to the New York
Convention, providing for recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial jurisdiction
clauses and/or judgments. In June 1994, however, a Special Commission of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law met to consider an international convention
regulating jurisdictional matters and the recognition of foreign judgments. 28 Ultimately
this convention may provide rules for jurisdiction and judgments that would uphold the
parties' choice of forum. Until this project bears fruit, however, jurisdiction clauses and
court judgments will often lack the treaty enforcement mechanisms available to arbitration
agreements and awards.

25.
26.
1501, is
27.

See discussion infra part II.A.4 & 5.
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 LL.M.
the only treaty ratified by the United States that requires deference to foreign judgments.
When courts and assets are more compatibly married, risks can be considerably reduced. For example,

a prudent banker would normally take the precaution of securing loans to foreign borrowers with a pledge of assets
in the bank's own jurisdiction, thus minimizing situations in which a local judgment would be ineffective for want
of security. The loan documentation might provide for disputes arising out of the credit arrangement to be settled
by courts of New York, while simultaneously the borrower collateralizes the loan with deposits or securities left with
the same New York bank. Even complete collateralization does not always provide security, however. For example,
a foreign bankruptcy court might be of the view that one creditor's security interest constituted a fraud on other
creditors. The extraterritorial effect of such a foreign bankruptcy finding would depend on the facts of the case.
28. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments: A New Approach for the
Hague Conference?,57 LAw &CoNTEMP. PROEs. 271 (1994); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ThoughtsAbout a Multinational
Judgments Conventiom A Reaction to the von Mehren Report id. at 289; Catherine Kessedjian, Towards a Worldwide
Convention on Jurisdictionand Enforcement INT'L LIrIG. NEws (LB.A.), August 1994, at 8. For an earlier, now
defunct attempt by the Hague Conference at a jurisdiction treaty, see Convention of 25 November 1965 on Choice
of Court [hereinafter Hague Convention], reprinted in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
RECUBIL DES CONVENTIONS DE LA HAYE 96 (1970).
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Presumptively Valid JurisdictionAgreements29

Modem courts have abandoned much of the prior century's hostility to contractual
provisions that oust one state's judicial jurisdiction in favor of a rival forum.30 The
Supreme Court in particular has disapproved of the "parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts."31
Rhetoric favorable to jurisdiction clauses, however, does not mean that such clauses
will be dispositive of the question of which court will hear the case. One overworked
American judge may enforce a court selection clause to clear a crowded docket, while the
equally overworked judge in the chosen court may refuse to accept the task of deciding the
dispute, perhaps citing elements that argue for a more convenient forum elsewhere.
Outside the contexts of admiralty and federal venue transfer, courts have taken divergent
approaches to enforcement of jurisdiction clauses. Some federal courts sitting in diversity
cases have felt compelled to look to state law, while others have looked to the flexible
federal standards that sometimes invite litigation over the very issue of judicial competence
32
that the parties had expected to settle in advance.
1. The Admiralty Cases
The landmark Supreme Court decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.33 dealt
with an agreement between an American and a German company to tow a drilling rig from
Louisiana to Italy. The contract at issue contained a classic prorogation agreement: "Any
34
dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice."'
When a storm damaged the rig, however, the American company brought suit in
Florida,35 where the district court obliged by refusing to respect the forum selection
clause. The United States Supreme Court, however, found that the district court
erroneously placed the burden of proof on the German defendants to show that the

29. See generallyAnne E Covey &Michael S. Morris, The EnforceabilityofAgreements ProvidingforForum and
Choice ofLaw Selection, 61 DENV. L.. 837, 838-39 (1988); Julia L.Erickson, Forum Selection Clausesin Light of the
Erie Doctrine and Federal Common Law:. Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp., 72 MwN. L REv. 1090 (1988);
Michael Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in Internationaland Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REv. 134 (1982); Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of Forum Selection Clauses 19 WAYNE L. REv.
49 (1972); Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selaction Clause Enforcement in
Diversity Cases,66 N.Y.U. L.REv. 422 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice ofLaw:
ConsensualAdjudicatoryProcedurein FederalCourt,57 FORDHAM L. REv. 291 (1988) [hereinafter Mullenix, Another
Choice]; Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, More Bad Law:. Carnival Cruise Lines and ContractualPersonal
Jurisdictiorn 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 323 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, Another Easy Case]; Phoebe Kornfeld, Note, The
Enforceability of Forum-Selaction ClausesAfter Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 6 ALAsrc L.REv.
175 (1989).

30. See, eg, Gruson, supranote 29, at 134, 153-57; Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of Contractual
Provision Limiting Placeor Court in Which Action May Be Brought 31 A.L.R.4th 404 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
31. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,9 (1972). The Court went on to affirm that Americans
"cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our own terms,
governed by our laws and resolved by our courts." Id.
32. The divergence among federal and state law may even require litigants to forum shop in order to obtain
an enforceable forum-selection clause.
33. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
34. Id. at 2.

35. Id. at 3-4. The rig had been towed to Florida.
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"balance of convenience" was in favor of the London court.M Focusing on the needs of
international commerce, the Court noted the parties' mutual need for a neutral dispute
resolution forum:
Manifestly much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties
could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident
might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place where [the vessel or its
owner] might happen to be found. The elimination of all such uncertainties by
agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable
element in international trade, commerce and contracting.3 7
The Court of course overstates the case. It is hardly imaginable, as we shall see, that a
forum selection clause could eliminate "all uncertainties" about the place of future
litigation, nor be characterized as "an indispensable element in international trade."38
However, it is beyond cavil that international trade is not likely to be promoted when
business managers can escape their commitments to litigate in a neutral forum. 39
Unreliable forum selection mechanisms will mean fewer cross-border ventures due to the
greater legal risks and a temptation to sloppy contract performance for want of realistic
enforcement sanctions.
Although Zapataboosted the use of forum selection clauses in international contracts,
the Court made suitable reservations about clauses that were "unreasonable." 40 More
importantly, the Supreme Court found only that in entertaining a forum non conveniens
motion to decline jurisdiction, the lower court had abused its discretion by giving too little
weight to the forum selection clause at issue. Even under Zapata, factors related to
convenience and fairness might still tip the scales against enforcement of the prorogation
agreement.
Almost twenty years after Zapata, another case within federal admiralty jurisdiction
led the Supreme Court to push the frontiers of forum selection further.41 While Zapata
involved a tailor-made commercial agreement between sophisticated business managers

36. Id.at 15. The judgment of the court of appeals was vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with

the Supreme Court opinion.
37. Id. at 13-14.
38. A healthy volume of cross-border commerce existed before the Supreme Court strengthened party
autonomy by its decision in Zapata. Compare the more temperate reasoning in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974), in which Justice Stewart wrote that "the dicey atmosphere of... a legal no-man's-land would
surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of
businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements." Id. at 517.
39. No econometric model or fancy terminology is required for the common sense proposition that merchants
and investors will be less likely to enter into a transaction abroad if disputes arising out of the business relationship
will be settled by biased judges of the other side's home courts. Some business deals may present potential profits
great enough to lure entrepreneurs to take the wildest of risks, or lead negotiators to increase prices to include an
"adjudicatory risk premium." Other deals, however, may not carry an advantage great enough to justify the risk
of being hauled before corrupt or xenophobic judges.
40. The Court noted in Zapatathat the choice of forum was made "in arms-length negotiation by experienced
and sophisticated businessmen." Zapata, 407 U.S. at 16-17. The Court assumed that the selection of a London
court was "a reasonable effort to bring vital certainty to this international transaction and to provide a neutral
forum experienced and capable in the resolution of admiralty litigation." Id.
The English Court in the companion case accepted jurisdiction despite the absence of any connection
between the transaction and the parties. See Unterweser Reederei G.m.b.H. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., [1968] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 158, 163 (C.A.), stating that judicial discretion "will be exercised in favor of holding parties to their
bargain."
41. See Mullenix, Another Easy Case, supra note 29.
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from different continents, Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute42 involved a standard form
consumer contract incorporating two dozen paragraphs of fine print attached to the back
of a passenger ticket. Through their local travel agent, a state of Washington couple purchased a one-week vacation cruise between Los Angeles and Mexico. 43 After the unfortunate wife slipped during a guided tour of the ship's galley, the couple filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington: she for injuries, and he for loss of
consortium.'
A sentence in one of the boilerplate clauses on the ticket provided that "all disputes
shall be litigated... before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the
exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country."4s After a half dozen trips through
the federal and state court systems, 46 the Supreme Court finally decided that it was error
for the court of appeals to refuse enforcement of a non-negotiated court-selection clause
in a standard form ticket solely on the grounds that the clause was not the subject of
bargaining.47 The opinion by Justice Blackmun stated that forum selection clauses had
"the salutary effect of dispelling any confusion" about where suits must be brought, but
made suitable reservations that a court-selection clause was "subject to judicial scrutiny for
fundamental fairness." 48 Blackmun's opinion presumed that the Shutes had received
notice of the forum clause, thus leaving open the possibility for courts to find similar
clauses unenforceable as to plaintiffs who had received insufficient notice.
...

Carnival Cruisehas been thoroughly criticized. Commentators have suggested that the
Supreme Court validated a forum selection clause in the very situation which should have
made it unenforceable as an unconscionable clause contained in an adhesive consumer contract. 49 Carnival Cruise may not have given sufficient weight to those normal contract
doctrines that permit courts to disregard unconscionable or unaccepted terms.5o

42. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Compare the case of Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) which arose out
of the hijacking of the Achille Lauroby Arab terrorists in 1985. Suit in the Southern District of New York for the
wrongful death of passenger Leon Klinghoffer was resisted by Lauro Lines on the basis of a forum-selection clause
printed on the passenger ticket requiring that suit be brought in Italy. The Supreme Court held only that a motion
to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause was not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 because the
order could effectively be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment. Id. at 496-97. See discussion in Lee R.
Hardee, Comment, Enforcing Forum Selection Clauses, 1990 J. Disp. REsoL 401, 408-09.
43. Carnival Cruise Lines had its principal place of business in Miami, although it claimed to be incorporated
in Panama. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1988).
44. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 1988 A.M.C. 591 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
45. CarnivalCruise, 499 U.S. at 587-88.
46. For example, the court of appeals at one point certified to the Washington Supreme Court the question
ofwhether its long-arm statute reached Carnival Cruises activities in the state. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 783
P.2d 78, 79 (Wash. 1989).
47. CarnivalCruise,499 U.S. at 595-96. The district court had granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of sufficient contacts with Washington, and therefore did not address the forum-selection issue. Id. at 588.
48. Id. at 593-94. In a line that must have delighted the more frugal vacationers, Blackmun also asserted that
the clause conferred a benefit on the injured passenger because "passengers who purchase tickets containing a
forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise
line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued." Id. at 594.
49. See Mullenix, Another Easy Case, supranote 29, at 359. CompareNorthwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan,
916 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) ("Ifthere ever was a case for stretching the concept of fraud in the
name of unconscionability it was [Carnival Cruise]; and perhaps no stretch was necessary."). See Jeffrey A.
Liesemer, Note, Carnival's Got the Fun... and the Forum: A New Look at Choice-of-Forum Clauses and the
UnconscionabilityDoctrineAfter Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 53 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1025 (1992).
50. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. 584 at 595. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 208 (1986); U.C.C. S
2-302 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 211(3) (1986) (dealing with terms contained in
standardized written agreements to which one party has reason to believe that the other party would not have
assented had it been aware of the term's existence).
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One need not disapprove of forum selection clauses in order to question the result
in Carnival Cruise.51 The true justification for prorogation agreements lies not so much
in a theoretical assumption about the economic efficiencies resulting from freedom of
contract, but in the practical enhancement of adjudicatory neutrality among parties from
different countries. The Court in Zapata confronted a conflict between legal systems
markedly different in matters of language and procedures: Americans did not want to
litigate in Germany, and Germans wanted to avoid courts in the United States. In Carnival
Cruis however, the dispute was between parties with substantial connections to the same
country.5 2 In such circumstances, pre-dispute waiver of normal rules of judicial
jurisdiction arguably should be limited to transactions between commercially sophisticated
players.53
Some legislators were skeptical enough of Carnival Cruise to take action to overturn
its result. The 1936 Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act made it unlawful for
shipowners to "lessen, weaken or avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court of
competent jurisdiction" with respect to liability for loss or injury.54 In Carnival Cruise
the Court reasoned that since litigation could go forward in Florida, the forum selection
clause in question did not lessen a right to "trial by [a] court of competent jurisdiction,"' 5
reading the indefinite article "a" into the statute.
In late 1992, an amendment to the Marine Mammal Health and Stranding Response
Act inserted the adjective "any" before the word "court"'' in the Shipowner's Liability
Act. According to the legislative history, this amendment was intended to "overturn the
7
result in Carnival Cruise [in order to] further the plaintiff's due process rights."5
Although it affects only maritime contracts, the change is significant in relationship to the
question of when arbitration clauses will be more reliable than court-designating forum
selection clauses. It is unlikely that such a technical clarification would similarly reduce the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, given seventy years of experience with the Federal
Arbitration Act and twenty-three years of application of the New York Convention.
2. The Regretted Choice: An Overview
Courts and commentators describing the modem trend in forum selection characterize
choice-of-court clauses as "presumptively valid,"58 to be "given effect,"5 9 "enforceable

51. See Mullenix, Another Easy Case, supra note 29, at 359, calling forum-selection clauses "a bad idea."
52. The Shute household and the cruise line headquarters were both within the United States.
53. As discussed infiain the text accompanying notes 334-337, one might also justify prorogation agreements
in noncommercial (consumer) relationships if the consumer is given a right to pursue claims in a reasonably
accessible forum such as the court system of the consumer's domicile.
54. 46 U.S.C. S 183(c) (1988).
55. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 592 (1991). See also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Ct App. 1991), involving more than two hundred cruise passengers who sought
damages for injuries during a storm.
56. Ocean Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-587, S 3006, 106 Stat. 5068 (1992).
57. 138 CONG. REc. H11785 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. Studds).
58. See Bonnyv. Society of Lloyd's, 784 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Karlberg European Transpa, Inc.
v. JK-Josef Kratz Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, 618 F. Supp. 344, 347 (N.D. 111.1985); Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian
Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d 285, 287 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989).
59. The Second Restatement on Conflicts summarizes the law as follows: "[Plarties' agreement as to the place
of the action.., will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP CONFLICT

oF LAws S 80 (1988). Compare the formulation of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 5
421(2)(g) (1987) that a state's exercise of jurisdiction is "reasonable if... the person ... has consented to the
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unless unfair or unreasonable," 60 and "recognized if freely negotiated." 61 Cases have
noted, however, that enforcement of jurisdiction clauses can be conditioned on a finding

that the clause was not obtained by fraud or unconscionable means, 62 and that the chosen
forum itself will not be substantially inconvenient, unjust, or unfair.63
When one side to a transaction regrets its jurisdictional commitment, its lawyers are
likely to find more than one avenue to sabotage chances of an action being heard by the
chosen court. Many commercial controversies come into federal courts on the basis of
diversity of citizenship,64 where Erie principles may require application of the law of a
state that does not honor court selection clauses. 65 When federal law applies, no single
motion exists to enforce a court selection clause, whether by staying inconsistent litigation
or compelling the chosen court to hear the case. Enforcement of a court selection clause
in federal court usually will mean a delicate balancing of malleable factors such as
convenience to witnesses and fairness to the parties; 66 the forum selection clause is just

exercise ofjurisdiction." See also id.
S 421 cmt. h (a forum-selection clause "generally confers on the chosen forum
jurisdiction") and id Reporters' Note 6 ("[Clourts in recent years have rarely taken jurisdiction over cases in which
a different forum was chosen by the parties."); RESTATamENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw S 482(2)(f)

Reporters' Note 5 (1987) (Courts need not recognize judgments if "the proceeding ... was contrary to an
agreement between the parties .... The modem trend is to give effect to forum selection clauses.").
. 60. See Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (1st Cir. 1974);
Cuevas v. Reading & Bates Corp., 577 F. Supp. 462, 476 (S.D. Tex. 1983), affil, 770 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1985);
Hoes of Am. Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. i205, 1208 (1979); Continental Grain Export Corp. v. Ministry of War-Etka
Co., 603 F. Supp. 724, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Prudential Resources Corp. v. Plunkett 583 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979); Air Economy Corp. v. Aero-Flow Dynamics, Inc., 300 A.2d 856, 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973);
Reeves v. Chem. Indus. Co., 495 P.2d 729, 731 (Or. 1972); High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d
493, 495 (Mo. 1992); see also Richard A. Gantner, Note, Absent Bad Faith, Fraud,or Overreaching,A Reasonable
Forum Selection Clause in a Commercial Cruise Form ContractIs Enforceable, 22 SaToN HALL L.REV.505, 506
(1992); Ramon F. Reyes, Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp: UncertaintyRequires qn In-Depth Inquiry into Forum-Selection
Clause Enforceability Issues 17 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 687, 697-98 (1991).
61. Hamakua Sugar Co. v. Fiji Sugar Corp., 778 F. Supp. 503, 504 (D. Haw. 1991); Phoenix Can. Oil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del. 1983); Exum v. Vantage Press, Inc., 563 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1977); Smith, Valentino &Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 551 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Cal. 1976);
Komfeld, supra note 29, at 180-81, 185. Cf.Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (Michigan
franchisee forced to defend a rent action in Florida where Florida choice-of-law clause that ensured Florida district
court's personal jurisdiction pursuant to the state's long-arm statute did not offend due process). The Court in
Burger King noted that "minimum requirements inherent in the concept of 'fair play and substantial justice'...
defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities."
Id.at 477-78 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). For just such a
case, see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
62. Interamerican Trade Corp. v. Companhia Fabricadora de Pecas, 973 F.2d 1987 (6th Cir. 1992); Royal Bed
& Spring Co. v. Famossol Industria, 906 F.2d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 1990); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla.
1986); Hauenstein & Bermeister Inc. v. Met-Fab Industries, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1982); Soci0t6 Jean
Nicholas et Fils v. Mousseaux, 597 P.2d 541, 542 (Ariz.1979); see also John M. Kirby, Consumer's Right to Sue at
Home Jeopardized Through Forum Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 70 N.C. L.REv.888, 902-05
(1992); Lederman, supra note 29.
63. See generallycases cited in VED NANDA & DAVID PANsus, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN
U.S. CoURTS S 7.02(1)(e) (rev. 1993); GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES CoURTS 247-50 (2d ed. 1992).
64. Some cases may also raise a federal question. See, eg., Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing the action in favor of the selected forum in Switzerland in a dispute arising out of a
bank account agreement raising questions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. SS 78a-78o) and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. SS 1961-1968)); See also Taag Linhas Aereas
de Angola v. Transamerica, 915 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing a Swiss forum in a controversy over air
transport commissions). In such cases, there would be no reason for the court not to engage in federal common
law making, following Zapata. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972).
65. See discussion infra part IL.A.3.
66. See discussion infra part IL.A.5.c.
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one element to consider along with others in determining jurisdiction. 67 In some cases,
the absence of subject matter jurisdiction will make it impossible for a court to hear the
case.
3. Applicable Law
When federal jurisdiction in a cross-border commercial controversy rests on diversity
of citizenship,68 it remains far from obvious whether federal or state principles will govern
the parties' jurisdiction agreement. Although federal law will govern a motion to transfer
venue from one federal court to another,69 many international cases implicating court
selection clauses will involve no federal transferee court. The forum selection clause itself
designates a foreign court, or a foreign court may be appropriate either because of the
configuration of the case (witnesses, applicable law, and related actions). Nothing in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a "Carnival Cruise motion" expressly
requiring a court to honor the parties' agreement. 70 Moreover, state law will often control
amenability to suit in federal court. 71 When a transborder deal fails, the complexity of
federal/state conflicts will serve only to delight the party resisting the prorogation
agreement. 72

67. See Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am. Inc., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982); Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v.
American Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200 (W.D. Va. 1982); Hoes of Am., Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205 (1979);
Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Pa. 1973). Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311
(1964) (holding valid an agreement to designate an agent to receive service of process under FED. R. Civ. P.
4(d)(1)).
68. For example, a French company agrees to distribute computer equipment made by a Massachusetts
manufacturer's European subsidiary, a New York bank through its Luxembourg holding company buys a Swiss
subsidiary, or auto manufacturers from Japan and Detroit enter into a joint venture to distribute vehicles in Latin
America through a commonly owned Swiss sales entity.
69. 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) (1989). See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), discussed in detail
infta part IL.A.4. The teaching of Zapata and CarnivalCruise can be expected to have an influence on the court's
balancing of factors relevant to the motion to transfer. The transferee forum might still be bound to apply the law
that would have been applied by the transferor forum, which in some cases might view the prorogation agreement
as presumptively invalid. See Ferens v. John Deere, 494 U.S. 516 (1990) in which a Pennsylvania residents hand
was injured in a harvester, suit was brought initially in Mississippi where defendant did business, Suit was
transferred to Pennsylvania; transferee forum was to apply longer statute of limitations of transferor forum
(Mississippi) under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (in diversity cases federal court
applies choice-of-law rules of state in which it is sitting regardless of whether transfer initiated by plaintiff or
defendant).
70. The court could choose to disregard the court-selection clause on grounds of forum non conveniens,
discussed infta at notes 121-143.
71. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co, Ltd., 484 U.S. 97 (1987) (case arising under a statute
that does not provide for service of process); see also United Rope Distrib., Inc. v. Kimberly Line, 770 F. Supp. 128
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd on reh'g, 785 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In response to Omni and other cases where a
federal district court was found to lack personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the United States because the
forum states' long-arm statute did not reach the defendant, Congress amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4
in 1993 to include the authorization of service of summons upon a nonresident in federal question cases so long
as such service comports with due process under the Fifth Amendment See LH. Carbide Corp. v. Piece Maker
Co., 852 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
72. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 76-88.
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Absent preemption by Congress, 73 federal courts sitting in diversity cases generally
will follow the conflict of laws rules of the state in which the district court is sitting.74
A jurisdiction agreement, of course, is a contract, albeit a very special type of contract
whose interpretation could be characterized either as substantive (creating rights and
obligations among private parties) or as procedural (determining where an action will be
heard).
When the validity of a forum selection agreement is characterized as a matter of
substantive contract law, its enforcement would normally be determined by the state law
governing the basic commercial document encapsulating the forum. selection clause."
This approach of looking to state law has led the Third,76 Fourth,77 Eighth,7T and Eleventh 79 Circuits to apply state law to court selection.8 0 Jurisdiction agreements therefore
may turn out to be no more reliable than the state contract principles governing their
enforcement. While many states have held court selection clauses valid,$' others have
82

not.

In some cases, the contract's choice-of-law clause may subject the agreement to a legal
system other than that of the forum. For example, parties to maritime transactions
commonly provide that the law of England will govern their relationship. ,When a U.S.
court is called to enforce the jurisdiction clause in such a contract, it is not at all certain
whether it should apply its own jurisdictional standards or those of the party-chosen
law.8 3
Some courts suffer from a jurisdictional identity crisis about court-selection,
theoretically approving jurisdiction agreements in decisions that in fact question the validity

73. No federal choice-of-forum statute or treaty, analogous to the Federal Arbitration Act or New York
Arbitration Convention (discussed infira text accompanying notes 206-12) preempts state law for court selection
clauses.
74. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See Erie KR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). The Supreme Court stated, "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state." Id. at 78. For a recent rethinking of the Erie doctrine,
see John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 Am. U. L Rav. 1087 (1992).
75. See generaly Erickson, supranote 29; Lederman, supranote 29; Mullenix, Another Choice, supranote 29.
See also Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses Substantive or Proceduralfor Erie Purposes 89 CoLUM. L
Rav. 1068 (1989) (arguing that Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. itself was wrongly decided).
76. Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting, Inc., 817 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1987); General Eng'g Corp. v.
Martin Marrietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986) (state law governs unless significant federal interest
implicated). See also Crescent Intl Inc. v. Avatar Communities, Inc., 857 P.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1988).
77. Bryant Elec. Co., Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985).
78. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986).
79. Alexander Proudfoot Co. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1989).
80. In other circuits, courts have assumed that federal law applies, often with little discussion, and sometimes
on the assumption that federal and state law were similar. In the First Circuit see TUC Elecs., Inc. v. Eagle
Telephonics, Inc., 698 P. Supp. 35 (D. Conn. 1988); C. Pappas Co., Inc. v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 565 F. Supp. 1015
(D. Mass. 1983); in the Second Circuit, see Ritchie v. Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); in the
Seventh Circuit, see Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990); in the Ninth
Circuit; see Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1988).
81. See discussion infra part ILA.5.a.
82. At least nine jurisdictions have restricted forum-selection enforceability. Alabama, Redwing Caniero v.
Foste, 382 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 1980); Georgia, Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, 209 S.E.2d 132 (Ga.
1974); Idaho, McCertyv. Herrick, 451 Idaho 529 (1925); Iowa, Davenport Mach. &Foundryv. Adolph Coors Co.,
314 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1982); Massachusetts, Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 111 N.E. 678
(Mass. 1916), discussed infra text accompanying note 85; Maine, Bartlett v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 46 Me. 500
(1859); Montana, State = reL Polaris v. District Court, 695 P.2d 471 (Mont 1985); North Carolina, Gaither v.
Charlotte Motor Car Co., 109 S.E. 362 (N.C. 1921); and Texas, Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 468 S.W.2d
869 (Ter- Civ. App. 1971), affd, 477 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1972).
83. See Leasewell Ltd. v. lake Shelton Ford, 423 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
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of the clause at issue. Despite dicta commending forum selection clauses,84 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has never overruled its early decisions holding jurisdiction
clauses invalid.8 5 Even if a litigant ultimately could convince the Supreme Judicial Court
to overrule prior law, the time and complexity of the process would defeat one object of
the forum selection exercise: a measure of certainty that the chosen adjudicator will decide
the case relatively rapidly.
At the breakdown of a commercial relationship, the litigation strategy of the foreign
party seeking to avoid crossing the ocean would normally exploit the uncertainties of U.S.
forum selection principles. The existence of cases denying the validity of prorogation
agreements, no matter how old, could lead a foreign court to take jurisdiction. A French
company in a dispute with a Massachusetts corporation might argue, on the basis of longstanding precedents like Nashua River Paper,86 that a prorogation agreement designating
Massachusetts courts was void under the law applicable to the agreement and therefore
ineffective to waive French jurisdiction based on plaintiff's citizenship.8 7
In some states, limits on personal as well as subject matter jurisdiction will impair the
reliability of court selection. A Florida court, for example, held that a prorogation clause
was insufficient to create Florida jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant because
Florida's long-arm statute (like those of most states) does not provide for creation of
jurisdiction by contractual submissionss
4. Venue Transfer
When federal law governs forum selection in a non-admiralty case, the standard for
recognizing the parties' choice of court involves balancing several malleable criteria that
include location of witnesses, fairness to the parties, and the burden on public resources.

84. See Ernest & Norman Hart Bros. v. Town Contracors Inc., 463 N.E.2d 355 (Mass. 1984). An electrical
contractor brought suit in Massachusetts in disregard of a forum-selection clause calling for disputes arising out
of a works contract to be adjudicated in Connecticut. The Massachusetts court approved "the general attitude of
courts toward contractual forum selection provisions [that] has changed in the direction of recognizing them."
Id. at 358-59. Nevertheless, the court ignored the contract clause, citing "equitable considerations," which were
nothing other than the fact that the lower court had already heard the case in disregard of the choice-of-forum
clause. Id. at 360. The lip service accorded the modem trend led at least one commentator to conclude that
Massachusetts enforces prorogation agreements, although the case's language is ill married to its holding. This case
is cited for the proposition that forum-selection clauses will be given effect in Kornfeld, supranote 29, at 185 n.64.
In W.R. Grace v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 555 N.E.2d 214, 219 n.13 (Mass. 1990), the Supreme Judicial
Court stated that it saw "nothing inherently inappropriate in a forum selection clause." In W.R. Grace, however,
the court faced only a service-of-suit clause. Compare the approach in Graphics Leasing Corp. v. Y Weekly, 1991
Mass. App. Div. 110; Cadillac Auto. Co. of Boston v. Engeian, 157 N.E.2d 657 (1959).
85. Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins., 72 Mass. 174 (1856); Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 111
N.E. 678 (Mass. 1916). Recent cases affirming the rule in Nute v. Hamiltoninclude New Eng. Technical Sales Corp.
v. SEEQ Technology, Inc., 1992 Mass. App. Div. 248, and J.S.B. Indus., Inc. v. Bakery Mach. Distribs., Inc., 1991
Mass. App. Div. 1.
86. Id.
87. See CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] arts. 14-15 (Fr.) (attributing jurisdiction to French courts on the basis of
citizenship of either party). If the French court subsequently took jurisdiction, it may be irrelevant whether the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ultimately overruled old decisions.
88. See McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987) (involving a Mississippi lawyer who contracted
for the services of a Delaware corporation whose business was providing expert witnesses in malpractice actions).
Other states, however, have taken a different view. Cf.Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d 949 (Kan. 1992) (holding that
by incorporating a forum-selection clause into their contract, parties waive any challenge to personal jurisdiction
in the chosen forum).

ILLUSION AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION

In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,89 the Supreme Court decided that federal
rather than state law would govern court selection clauses when federal courts were asked
to transfer venue to another federal court.90 In Stewart, an Alabama corporation entered
into an agreement to market copier products for a manufacturer with its principal place of
business in New Jersey. Although controversies arising in connection with the dealership
were to be adjudicated in Manhattan, the dealer disregarded the court selection clause and
filed its action for breach of the agreement in Alabama. The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama refused to transfer the case to New York, reasoning that the
question was controlled by Alabama law, which looked unfavorably on jurisdiction clauses.
The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit both held that transfer of venue from
one federal court to another 9l should be characterized as procedural rather than
substantive for Erie purposes,92 and therefore federal rather than state law controlled. The
Supreme Court also stated that a court selection clause was only one factor to be
considered when courts entertain a motion to transfer venue. Stewart set up a balancing
test, similar in methodology to forum non conveniens analysis, in which the parties'
preference must be weighed in a case-by-case consideration of the convenience and fairness
of a venue transfer.93 The prorogation agreement might be outweighed by other elements
such as the location of witnesses and a "public interest factor of systemic integrity and
9
fairness." 4
On remand in Stewart the district court in Alabama did exactly what it had done
before: refused to transfer the case to New York. Applying the Supreme Court's balancing
test, the district court found Alabama "an entirely appropriate forum"' for the action. 95
With due consideration to the availability of witness and documents, the court in Alabama
concluded that "both private and public interests militate against a transfer to Manhat96
tan."
This later lower court decision in Stewartunderscores the insecurity of court selection
clauses under federal standards. Some federal courts have elaborated their own transferrelated factors, including not only convenience to witnesses and parties, but also relative
bargaining power, governing law, place of occurrence of relevant activities, and congestion
97
in transferee and transferor courts.
Under Stewarm prorogation agreements may turn out to be merely an invitation to
adjudicatory foreplay, rather than binding dispute resolution. The multiplicity of the
factors weighed in deciding whether or not to transfer venue will rarely permit firm

89. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
90. "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought" 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) (1994).
In cases other than venue transfer, however, the Supreme Court's decision did little to resolve the basic ambiguity
about whether enforcement of forum-selection clauses should be governed by state or by federal law. While some
federal courts take Stewartto stand for the proposition that federal law generally governs forum selection in federal
courts (see, eg., Northwestern Natel Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990); Venners v. Kimball Int'l,
749 F. Supp. 714, 715 (ED. Va. 1990); see also Seward v. Devine, 888 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1989)), others are less
certain that federal law should apply in diversity cases outside a motion to transfer an action from one federal court
to another. See discussion supra part ll.A.3.
91. 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) (1994).
92. See discussion of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), supra note 74.
93. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1961)).
94. Id. at 30.

95. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 696 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
96. Id. at 591. The court of appeals, however, balanced the relevant factors differently, and reversed the
district court for abusing its discretion. See In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1989).
97. See Advent Elec. v. Samsung Semiconductor, 709 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
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predictions about forum.9 8 Moreover, the transferee court might even be required to
apply the choice-of-law rules of the transferor court, thus sometimes vitiating the object of
the exercise.99
5. When the Chosen Judge Defaults

(a) Refusing to Hear the Case
Until well into the last century, English judges were compensated according to the
number of cases decided, in the form of fees paid by the parties. 100 This practice led to
a lively struggle for business among the various courts. 10 1 If such case-based compensation had continued, judges might be less inclined than they are to find reasons to refuse
to hear cases notwithstanding a jurisdiction agreement. As it is, however, courts designated
by jurisdiction agreements often vitiate the parties' forum choice by refusing to close the
loop and decide the case. The Supreme Court has never said that a court selection clause
will confer jurisdiction. Some courts might not even be constitutionally permitted to hear
a case pursuant to a jurisdiction clause.102
Two reasons justify judicial refusal to allow the parties to thrust jurisdiction upon the
court. First, a federal court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction cannot hear a case even
if it wants to do so. Second, invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens may
result in a discretionary refusal to hear a case. The Uniform Model Choice of Forum
Act' 0 3 provides that a court will entertain an action only if the state is a "reasonably

98. See Red Bull Assoc. v. Best W. Int'l Inc., 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusal to honor forum-selection
clause that would have transferred case to Arizona, on assumption that "outside the admiralty realm, S 1404(a)
transfer motions are not governed by the standards articulated in Bremer?);Page Constr. Co. v. Perini Constr., 712
F. Supp. 9 (D.R.I. 1989) (enforcing a forum-selection clause by transferring a case from Rhode Island to
Massachusetts); Advent Elec. v. Samsung Semiconductors, 709 F. Supp. 843, 845 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (transferring case
from Illinois to California under forum-selection clause that "weighed heavily" in favor of venue transfer); Van's
Supply & Equip. v. Echo Inc., 711 F. Supp. 497 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (refusal to enforce a forum-selection clause that
would have transferred case from Wisconsin to Illinois; suit involved construction of Wisconsin Fair Dealership
Act); First Interstate Leasing Serv. v. Sagge, 697 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (vending machine lessor resists
transfer from New York to California residence of lessee; choice-of-forum clause enforced); cf Lexington Inv. Co.
v. Southwest Stainless Inc., 697 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dismissing a complaint based on forum-selection
clause designating Fort Bend County, Texas for improper venue under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)).
99. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). See also Ferens v. John Deere, 494 U.S. 516 (1990),
discussed supra note 69. Cf 28 U.S.C.A. 5 1631 (1994).
100. On a per case basis judges sealed judicial writs. See generally MARJORIE BLATCHER, THIS COURT OF
KING'S BENCH: 1450-1550, at 39 (1978); DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH INENGLAND 1727-1875, at 111-26
(1982). Fees were eliminated by parliamentary acts in 1825 (for the common law courts) and 1832 (for the Court
of Chancery). DUMAN, supra, at 123-24. (Thanks to John Spencer and David Seipp for this information.) See
also MARGARET HASTINGS, THE CoURT OF CoMMON PLEAS IN FIFTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 83 (1971); 1
WILLIAM S. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 252-64 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1969).
101. See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 48 (1990).

102. See discussion infra part l.A.5.b.
103. The 1966 draft act was approved in 1968 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. The Act was adopted in two states-New Hampshire (N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. S 508-A (1983)) and Nebraska
(NEB. REv.STAT. S 25-413 (1989))-before being withdrawn by the Conference in 1975. See generally NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM CHOICE
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE,

Aug. 5, 1966; 77 HANDBOOK OF

ON UNIFORM

219 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 HANDBOOK]; 84

STATE LAWS

OF

FORUM ACT, PROCEEDINGS IN

THE NATIONAL CONPERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
HANDBOOK

OF THE NATIONAL
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convenient" place for the trial, 1°4 and requires dismissal of a case in favor of another
forum only if the other state is not a "substantially less convenient" place for the trial.10
A business manager's crystal ball will not always permit prediction of the contours of
convenience in a controversy yet to be born.

When one looks at what American courts are really doing by enforcing jurisdiction
clauses, it becomes apparent that such enforcement will most often serve as a vehicle to

clear dockets by sending cases elsewhere. State court cases that commend enforcement of
jurisdiction clauses usually do so either in dicta only, 0 6 or when dispatching the parties
to another forum,107 rather than in order to hear the dispute108 Similar patterns

CONPERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 142 (1975). The Conference explained the withdrawal
by citing the Act's limited adoption as well as a constitutional question under D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co.,
405 U.S. 174 (1971).
104. UNIF. MODEL CHOICE OF FORuM ACT S 2(a)(2) (1968) (withdrawn 1975) reprinted in 1968 HANDBOOx,
supra note 103, at 219-22.

105. Id. S 4(3).
106. Ernest &Norman Hart Bros. Inc. v. Town Contractors Inc., 463 N.E.2d 355 (Mass. 1984) (considerations
of fairness and convenience favor disregard of forum-selection clause; Massachusetts court hears the case); High
Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1992) (dicta suggesting that court was adopting new,
modem rule; on facts of case, court refuses to uphold forum-selection clause on public policy grounds); Tandy
Computer Leasing v. Terina's Pizza, Inc., 784 P.2d 7 (Nev. 1989) (plaintiffgains judgment bydefault in Texas court
which asserts personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to forum-selection clause; plaintiff tries to gain
enforcement of judgment in Nevada, but Nevada will not recognize Texas judgment holding that assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Texas court violated defendant's 14th amendment rights and notions
of due process); Dancart Corp. v. St Albans Rubber Co., 474 A.2d 1020 (N.H. 1984) (ruling that forum-selection
clause did not state that the alternative forum (England) held exclusive jurisdiction over defendant; New Hampshire
is a suitable forum); United Standard Management Corp. v. Mahoning Valley Solar Resources, Inc., 476 N.E.2d
724 (Ohio 1984) (remanded to trial court to determine if upholding forum-selection clause was reasonable); Eads
v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 785 P.2d 328 (Olda. Ct. App. 1989) (holding it unfair and unreasonable
to dismiss case where contract not freely negotiated and bargained for;, in dicta suggesting that forum-selection
clauses are not "per se invalid"); Dyersburg Mach. Works, Inc. v. Rentenbach Eng'g Co., 650 S.W.2d 378 (Tenn.
1983) (refusal to enforce forum-selection clause designating Kentucky as the forum; trial in Kentucky will be very
inconvenient and against public policy since plaintiff may not be able to obtain a complete remedy); Exum v.
Vantage Press, Inc., 563 P.2d 1314 (Wash. App. 1977) (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying validity of
forum-selection clause choosing New York as the forum where all witnesses, transactions, and other evidence are
connected to Washington); Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jack Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (West
Virginia law controls; West Virginia court refuses to give effect to forum-selection clause that allowed a New York
court to assert in personam jurisdiction over the defendant in a default judgment against the defendant; West
Virginia, holding the forum-selection clause as unfair and unreasonable, refuses to enforce New York judgment
where jurisdiction rested solely on forum-selection clause).
107. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GMBH, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 974 (1980);
SociWt Jean Nicholas et Fils v. Mousseux, 597 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1979); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 551 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1976); ABC Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Harvey, 701 P.2d 137 (Colo.
CL App. 1985); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. Diaz, 378 A.2d 108 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Elia Corp. v. Paul N.
Howard Co., 391 A.2d 214 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1986); Calanca v. D
& S Mfg. Co., 510 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. App. 1987); Prudential Resources Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. CL App.
1979); James v. Midland County Agric. & Horticultural Soc'y, 308 N.W.2d 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Hauenstein
& Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 344 N.W.2d 454 (Neb. 1984); Air Economy Corp. v. Aero-Flow
Dynamics, Inc., 300 A.2d 856 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Reeves v. Chem. Indus. Co., 495 P.2d 729 (Or.
1972); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1965); St. John's Episcopal Ctr. v.
South Carolina Dep't of Social Serv., 280 S.E.2d 207 (S.C. 1981); Green v. Clinic Master, Inc., 272 N.W.2d 813
(S.D. 1978).
108. See SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 640 S.W.2d 451 (Ark. 1982) (forum-selection clause upheld
as an example of one contact that may be sufficient to satisfy 14th Amendment requirements of minimum
contacts); Kimco Leasing, Inc. v. Ransom Junior High Sch., 556 N.E.2d 1371 (Ind. App. 1990) (holding forumselection clause sufficient to give court personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d 949
(Kan. 1992); Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Bodell, 316 P.2d 788 (Mont. 1957); Credit Francais Int'l S.A. v. Sociedad
Financiera de Comercio, C.A., 490 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1985) (on other grounds, court rules that plaintiff has no standing
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appear in a random survey of federal cases, where decisions that commend enforcement of
prorogation agreements most often do so in order to send litigation to another court 09
rather than in order to decide the dispute." 0 Cases with dicta favorable to prorogation
agreements sometimes refuse enforcement due to the chosen forum's inconvenience or
unreasonableness."' In some cases, courts avoid enforcing prorogation agreements by
construing them to be permissive rather than mandatory,12 designating only one place
3
among many where litigation might be conducted."

to sue individually since plaintiffis really part of consortium of banks); International Collection Serv., Inc. v. Gibbs,
510 A.2d 1325 (Vt. 1986); State ex ret Kuhn v. Luchsinger, 286 N.W. 72 (Wis. 1939).
109. See Riley v.,Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
658 (1992) (forum-selection clauses prima fade valid and enforceable); Trinidad Foundry & Fabricating, Ltd. v.
MIV K.A.S. Camilla, 966 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1992Y (forum-selection clauses valid); Milanovich v. Costa Crociere,
S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (contractual choice-of-law clause on back of ticket stub reasonable and
enforceable); Taag Linhas Aeras de Angola v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1990) (forumselection clauses prima facie valid); Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Commercio de Moveis Ltda.,
906 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1990) (forum-selection clause constitutes a major factor in a forum non conveniens analysis
and enforcement of clause is reasonable); Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1989)
(in forum non conveniens analysis, forum-selection clause provides strong presumption of enforceability); Bonny
v. Society of Lloyd's, 784 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (forum-selection clauses presumptively valid); Best Buy
Co. v. Onkyo U.S.A., No. CIV.A.4-90-677, 1991 WL 156571 (D. Minn., Aug. 1, 1991) (forum-selection clause valid
and binding); Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Ritchie v. Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp.
700 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (upholding transfer from Arizona to New York); Page Constr. Co. v. Perini Constr., 712 F.
Supp. 9 (D.R.I. 1989) (transfer from Rhode Island to Massachusetts); Advent Elec. v. Samsung Semiconductors,
709 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. III. 1989); Hughes Drilling Fluides v. MV Luo Fu Shan, No. 1988 A.M.C. 82 (forumselection clause enforceable in bill of lading); Falcoal, Inc. v. Turkiye Komur Isletmeleri Kurumu, 660 F. Supp. 1536
(S.D. Tex. 1987); Tisdale v. Shell Oil Co., 723 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (forum-selection clause a major factor
in a forum non conveniens analysis); Karlberg European Transpa, Inc. v. Jk-JosefKratz Vertriegbsgesellschaft mbH,
618 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (forum-selection clause in distributorship agreement valid and enforceable);
Cuevas v. Reading & Bates Corp., 577 F. Supp. 462 (S.D. Tex. 1983), affd, 770 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1985); Hoes
of Am., Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205 (D.C. Ill. 1979) (enforcement of forum-selection clause reasonable); TUC
Elec., Inc. v. Eagle Telephonks Inc., 698 F. Supp. 35 (D. Conn. 1988).
110. See First Interstate Leasing Ser. v. Sagge, 697 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (vending machine lessor in
New York successfully resists transfer to California domicile of lessee; New York forum-selection clause enforced);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Travellers Indem. Co., 401 F. Supp. 927 (D. Mass. 1975). However, in St. Paul
Fire the court already had jurisdiction and had to decide only whether to give effect to the venue provisions of a
construction payment bond or the venue provisions of a subcontract.
111. See Red Bull Assoc. v. Best W. Int'l Inc., 862 P.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988) (allegation of discrimination); Union
Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981) (despite forum-selection clause in bill of
lading that required litigation in Germany, Carriage of Goods Act applied where terms of forum-selection clause
represented an adhesion contract); Van's Supply & Equip. v. Echo Inc., 711 P. Supp. 497 (W.D. Wis. 1989)
(interpretation of Wisconsin Fair Dealership Act); Continental Grain Export Corp. v. Ministry of War-ETKA Co.,
Ltd., 603 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (forum-selection clause not enforced where unreasonable and unjust to do
so).

112. Courts have discerned ambiguity by playing with the absence of mandatory terms such as "shall" or
"exclusive" in the forum-selection clause. See, eg., Citro Fla., Inc. v. Citrovale, S.A., 706 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1985)
(refusal to enforce a clause stating "place of jurisdiction is San Paulo, Brazil"); Keaty v. Freeport Indon. Inc., 503
F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1974) ("the parties submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of New York" held ambiguous as
to exclusivity).
113. See generally Gary D. Sesser, Choice of Law, Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses in International
Contracts: The Promise and the Reality, A U.S. View, 1992 IIA Bus. LAw. 397 (noting that such decisions
sometimes run counter to common sense, particularly when English might not have been the mother tongue of the
clauses drafters).
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(b) Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As most first-year American law students are taught, federal courts1 4 are tribunals
of limited jurisdiction whose power generally is limited to cases "arising under... the Laws
of the United States" (federal question jurisdiction) and cases between citizens of different
states or between a citizen of a state and an alien (diversity jurisdiction).15 In many
cases, neither basis for jurisdiction will exist, and federal courts may be unable to hear the
case regardless of how eager the litigants are to create judicial power. At the signing of a
commercial contract, therefore, it maybe impossible for the parties' counsel to confirm that
a federal court can hear a dispute.
Federal court power does not extend to suits between aliens, and complete diversity
of citizenship has been required in international as well as domestic cases. 116 Therefore
one foreigner might not be able to sue another in federal court even if an American has
been joined to the litigation. 117 When a foreign company is an indispensable party on
the wrong side of the litigation, federal courts may be compelled to dismiss even suits
implicating American parties." 8 Thus complete diversity, as a predicate for federal court
jurisdiction can cause unpleasant surprises for American multinationals that have insisted
on their home courts. 19

114. Some state courts, of course, are also of limited jurisdiction. Although the power to hear disputes is
usually presumed in state courts of general jurisdiction, these also are subject to jurisdictional limits.
115. See U.S. CONsT. art II, S 2.
116. 28 U.S.C. S 1332 (1988). See generally CH RLEs A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS S 24 (5th
ed. 1994). The statutory requirement of complete diversity cannot be defeated by parties' collusive efforts to confer
jurisdiction on courts "by assignment or otherwise." 28 U.S.C. S 1359 (1988).
117. See, e-g., Montalet v. Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46 (1807); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806). Complete diversity does not rise to the level of a constitutional requirement. See cases cited in BonN &
WESTIN, supra note 63, at 550. See also discussion infra part V.A.
118. See, eg., Faysound Ltd. v. United Coconut Chems., Inc., 878 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1989); De Wit v. KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines, N.V., 570 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Field y. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293 (3d Cir.
1980); Ed & Fred Inc. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 506 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1975). On indispensable
parties, see FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). Compare Allendale Mut Ins. v. Ball Data Sys., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993),
where Judge Posner distinguished suits between foreigners from suits between U.S. citizens in which foreigners were
also incidentally on both sides of the litigation.
119. The tripartite joint venture prevalent in international economic cooperation provides a common context
for trouble. If an American and a foreign manufacturer agree to market a product through their subsidiaries in
different parts of the globe, a dispute between the parties might lack complete diversity by virtue of a foreign
subsidiary of the American parent.
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(c) Convenience and Fairness"20
Courts may refuse to enforce a forum selection clause either because the clause itself
is not valid (due to fraud or absence of any real bargaining)121 or because the designated
forum would be unfair, or inconvenient, or violative of national public policy. 22 The
latter set of impediments relate to the forum itself rather than the clause. They are likely
to be more disruptive to transactional certainty in part because at the time of contract
formation, the parties will not be able to predict what elements in the future dispute
configuration will cause a particular forum to seem unfair. The constellation of factors that
inhere in notions related to a forum's fairness and convenience include unpredictable
elements such as the future location of witnesses and potentially relevant documents, or
translation difficulties. 123
Considerations of fairness and convenience generally can trump even an otherwise
valid choice-of-court clause. In neither federal nor state courts 124 must consent-based
jurisdiction be exercised if it would result in injustice or substantial inconvenience.125
Perhaps the most elaborate enumeration of such malleable forum-related criteria is found
in the Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act.' 26 Proposed in 1989 by a subcommittee of the
American Bar Association Section on International Law and Practice, the Model Act calls
for designation of an "adjudicating forum." 127 The fourteen factors to be considered in
determining that forum include "interests of justice," "public policies of the countries

120. See generally BORN & WESTIN, supra note 63, at 208-21; ANDREAS F. LOWENPELD, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 263-80 (1993); Mark D. Greenberg, The Appropriate Source of Lawfor Forum Non
Conveniens Decisions in InternationalCases:.A Proposalfor the Development of Federal Common Law, 4 INT'L TAX
& Bus. LAw. 155 (1986); Hilny Ismail, Forum Non Conveniens, United States Multinational Corporations,and
PersonalInjuries in the Third World: Your Place or Mine 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.. 249 (1991); Harry Litman,
Considerationsof Choice of Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 74 CAL. L REV. 565 (1986); Margaret
G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1259 (1986).
121. See Colonial Leasing of New Eng. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1984) (Oregon forum
disregarded due to no bargaining on the clause in question).
122. For a choice of forum that was held to violate American public policy, see Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton,
Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981) (actions to be brought in Bremen, Germany under contract for
shipment of air conditioners from Kentucky to Kuwait; forum selection held contrary to Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. S 1303(8)(1988) which prohibits contract terms that result in a "lessening of liability").
See discussion suprapart II.A.5.b.
123. See, eg., factors listed in Copperweld Steel v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 578 F.2d 953, 954 (3d Cir.
1978) (refusal to enforce a clause designating German courts in sale of a casting machine).
124. New York is the only state in which forum-selection clauses are dispositive. See discussion infrapart Il.B.
125. See 1968 HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 219: "A court, however, should not exercise jurisdiction which
is based on consent, if to do so would result in injustice or in substantial inconvenience to the parties." The Model
Choice of Forum Act included the concept of "reasonable convenience" as a necessary precondition for a court
to entertain an action based upon a forum-selection clause, and qualified the duty to stay actions inconsistent with
a forum-selection clause on a finding that the chosen court not be "a substantially less convenient place for trial"
than the alternative forum. MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT SS 2(a)(2), 3(3) (1968) (withdrawn 1975).
126. CONFLICT OF JURISDICTIONS MODEL LAW S 10 (ABA Section on Int'l Law & Practice 1989). See generally
Louise E. Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites at the Apple: A Proposal To Resolve Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Multiple
Proceedings 26 INT'L LAw. 21 (1992) (stating that this Act leaves a court free to determine whether to dismiss or
to stay the action).
127. Teitz, supra note 126, at 21. See generally CoNFLICT OF JURISDICTIONS MODEL LAW, supra note 126, S
10. Judgments arising out of the same transaction are enforced as if a timely designation of an adjudicating forum
had been made. Connecticut became the first state to adopt the Act in 1991. CONN. GEN. STAT. SS 50a-200 to
50a-203 (1992).
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having jurisdiction," location of witnesses and documents, and the "impact of litigation on

the judicial systems involved." While admirable as a jurisprudential exercise, the
contemplated balancing of these factors is not likely to inspire party confidence in the
security of their court selection agreement.12s

The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits courts to dismiss a case notwithstanding a basis for jurisdiction, on the ground that the case may be tried more conveniently
in an available alternate forum indicated by the ends of jusiice.129 Via this discretionary
escape hatch from the obligation to hear a case, a judge can give any of several elements
decisive weight in declining to exercise jurisdiction.5 0
Whereas the parties' agreement to a particular forum may overcome some of the
chosen forum's inconvenience,131 challenge to courts designated by jurisdiction
agreements will likely be clothed in the garb of "public interests." The strain on the court's
own administrative system enters into consideration in determining whether a controversy
may be better tried elsewhere.132 The location and/or language of witnesses and
evidence" 33 may make litigation less expensive in what the court sees as a more ap-

propriate place.' 3' Public interests can derive from congested dockets, 3 5. the burden
of jury duty, 136 the complexity of the conflict-of-laws issues,137 and the substantive
law applied in the competing jurisdiction.138

128. The only model act that does make forum-selection clauses dispositive is the now-defunct Hague
Conference Convention on the Choice of Court, discussed infra part IV.A. Hague Convention, supra note 28.
129. On the development of forum non conveniens by American courts, see generally Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Foreigners' attraction to American
courts due to pro-plaintiff tort laws and contingency fees created much of the backdrop for understanding
American judicial attitudes toward "convenience" in forum selection.
130. See PiperAircraft Co., 454 U.S. 235, and Gulf Oi4 330 U.S. 501. A federal court's dismissal for forum
non conveniens relies on concepts derived from these decisions. See, eg., Howe v. Goldcorp Invs. Co., 946 E.2d
944 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 1172 (1992) (forum non conveniens doctrine allowed to be invoked in
favor of a Canadian corporation in a private action in which their significant contacts were found to be limited).
131. Arthur Young & Co. v. Leong, 383 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1976).
132. See Koster v. American Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (jurisdiction could
be deprived if the forum is inappropriate due to considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal
problems).
133. In at least one case a forum-selection clause was refused enforcement because of translation difficulties
for witnesses. See Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 578 F.2d 953, 965 (3d Cir. 1978). In
a dispute about the performance of a casting plant built bya Pennsylvania company, the clause designating German
courts was characterized as unreasonable because witnesses spoke English, and the litigation in Germany would
require translation and its "inherent inaccuracy." Id.
134. See eg., New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Burnett Estes, 228 N.E.2d 440, 443 (1967) (suitwas moved to
venue where the defendant was domiciled and service could be had, and to make the adjudication less expensive).
135. See Gilbert v. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (administrative difficulties follow for courts when
litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at their origins).
136. See id.
at 508-09 (jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community
which has no relation to the litigation).
137. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). An aircraft crash in Scotland resulted in a wrongful
death action against the manufacturer of the airplane and the manufacturer of the propeller. The district court
found that Pennsylvania law would apply to the suit against the manufacturer of the airplane, and Scottish law to
the manufacturer of the propeller.
138. See id.
at 254 (if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory
that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight). Se, &g., Stangvik v.
Shiley, 819 P.2d 14 (1991) (stayed California products liability litigation with respect to products designed and
manufactured in California, in order to allow the suits to be tried in the plaintiffs' home countries of Sweden and
Norway). Cf Holmes v. Syntex Labs., 156 Cal. App. 3d 372 (1984) (suitability of the alternative forum,
encompassing such factors as differing conflicts-of-law rules and substantial disadvantage of litigation in the
alternative forum must be considered).
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Much will depend on the procedural configuration of the particular case. The
Supreme Court has indicated that a domestic plaintiff's choice of forum will be entitled to
more deference than the choice of a foreign plaintiff.13 9 While this approach may make
sense in dealing with matters of private convenience, the distinction would be less relevant
to a forum challenge based on the public interest in the efficient administration of

justice.

140

The Supreme Court has avoided deciding whether state or federal law applies to forum
non conveniens motions in a diversity action.141 Choice-of-law ambiguity therefore
further frustrates the search for assurance that a party-selected neutral court will hear their
dispute.
Decision-making based on open-ended and ill-determined factors such as convenience
and justice may possibly be appropriate for disputes turning on community values.
Adjudicators considering hate crimes or claims to free exercise of religion should probably
be as concerned about the right result in the case as about consistency. In the global
commercial community, however, the malleability of convenience and fairness notions
defeats the certainty sought by global business managers. When merchants designate a
neutral national court to hear any future dispute arising out of their relationship, it will be
difficult for them to foresee the outcome of applying the factors that go into making a
forum appropriate or convenient, including location of witnesses, applicable legal norms,
complexity of the conflict-of-laws question, and the court's own administrative burden." 2
4
(d) Sovereign Immunity' '

Immunity from adjudicatory jurisdiction often imposes additional limitations on the
ability of an American court to vindicate contract rights in international transactions. One
sovereign generally may not haul into its courts a foreign government or governmental
agency. 44 Most major legal systems follow a "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity,
which attempts to distinguish between commercial and public activities, 145 with immunity

attaching only to the latter.146 Because the characterization of "commercial" activity, of

139. "When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient." Piper
Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255-56.
140. For example, if foreign realty is at issue, the rivalforum might have an interest in having its community
values bear on what it views as a predominantly local dispute.
141. See PiperAircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 248 n.13. The court assumed that state law and federal law on forum
non conveniens were essentially identical. See generally Greenberg, supranote 120.
142. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241.
143. See generallyGruson, supra note 29; Mary K. Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A ProceduralCompass 34
STAN. L REv. 385 (1982). For a recent case on the commercial certainty exception to immunity, see Republic of
Arg. v. Weltover Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2160 (1992) (foreign state not immune from suit in U.S. courts for default on
bonds). For an illustration of the practical difficulties created by sovereign immunity, see Michael S. Sher, Can
Lawyers Save the Rainforest. Enforcing the Second Generation of Debt for Nature Swap4 17 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv.
1 (1993).
144. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as a grant of subject matter
jurisdiction to federal courts; the enforcement action will constitute a federal question "arising under" the laws of
the United States. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
145. See generally authorities cited in William W. Park; LegalPolicy Conflictsin InternationalBanking, 50 OHio
ST. L.J. 1067, 1079-81 (1989).
146. See 28 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(2). Compare other formulations of the doctrine. For Britain, see CHARLES J.
L wis, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (3d ed. 1990); for France, see BERNARD AUDIT, DRoiT INTERNATIONAL
PasvA SS 402-06 (1991). See generallyGAMAL M. BAD, STATE IMMUNITY (1984); George R. Delaume, Sovereign
Immunity and Public Debt 23 INT'L LAW. 811 (1989); Claude Reymond, Souverainet6 de l'lltatet Participationa
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course, to a large extent will be culturally determined, some commentators have
recommended replacement of the public/commercial distinction with a "functional
l 7
approach" that relies on a more explicit enumeration of immunity exceptions. 4

Sovereign immunity from jurisdiction is distinct from the immunity of government
property from execution or attachment. 148 Therefore, effective vindication of contract
rights against foreign sovereigns will often remain problematic even after a judgment on the
merits. Without attachment of assets, a judgment may be no more than a piece of paper.
American courts generally permit execution against foreign government property4 9 only
if there is a link between the property and the commercial activity on which the basic claim
is based.150 This nexus requirement may prove problematic when default by a foreign
government makes attachable assets scarce in the enforcement forum.'x5
B.

New York's Choice of Court Statute

When a state circumscribes the subject matter jurisdiction of its courts, the local bar
will have a harder time selling opinions about the enforceability of forum selection clauses.
Such was the case in New York, where both the Business Corporation Law' 52 and the
Banking Law' 5 3 restrict state court subject matter jurisdiction in international actions.154

'Arbitrage,1985 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE [REv. ARB.] 517 (1985).
147. See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking 'Sovereign' Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. A Functional
Approach to the CommercialActivity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489 (1992).
148. Some countries also impose a general link between the forum and the subject matter or parties of the
dispute. Switzerland, for example, requires an internal connection (Binnenbeziehung) to justify attachment of a
foreign government's assets. See P. Nicholas Kourides, Swiss Case Note, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 153 (1981) (Geneva
arbitral situs deemed insufficient connection).
149. With respect to property of autonomous state entities, agencies, and instrumentalities, however, all
property within the United States is subject to execution if the agency or entity is engaged in commercial activity
in the United States. 28 U.S.C. S 1610(b) (1994). American courts will recognize waivers of immunity, either
through an explicit forum-selection clause including consent to the jurisdiction of a particular court, or implicitly
by an arbitration clause. 28 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(1) (1994). However, a waiver of immunity from attachment or from
execution must be separate from the waiver of immunity from suit. See 28 U.S.C. S 1610 (1994). On the matter
of piercing the corporate veil of a state-owned trading agency, see Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig.,
879 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1989).
150. 28 U.S.C. S 1610(a)(2) provides that the property will not be immune if "the property is or was used for
the commercial activity on which the claim is based." A similar nexus requirement is followed by other major
jurisdictions. See generally GEoRGES R. DELAumE, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRAcTs: APPLICABLE LAW AND
SETTLEMENT op DISPUTES SS 8.09-.12 (1990).
In the United States, the provisions of the Hickeniooper
Amendment remove immunity from attachment when what is at issue are rights in property which have been taken
in violation of international law. 28 U.S.C. S 1610(a)(3) (1994).
151. The requirement of a functional nexus between the property to be attached and the commercial activity
of the underlying action often will frustrate vindication of a creditor's right, notwithstanding the validity of the
basic forum-selection clause designating courts. See generally William W. Park, L'arbitrageet Ie recouvrement des
pr~ts consentis a des ddbiteurs itranger4 37 McGILL LJ. 375, 398-99 (1992) [hereinafter Park, L'arbitrage et le
recouvrement].
152. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw S 1314(b)(1)-(5) (McKinney 1994).
153. N.Y. BANKING LAw S 200-b (McKinney 1994).
154. Grounds for subject matter jurisdiction in actions involving foreign corporations include causes of action
within the state, contracts made or to be performed within the state, action involving property within the state,
and doing business within the state or subject to state court jurisdiction.
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In response to the bar's concern over these jurisdictional limits,155 as well as its
anxiety over uncertainties in predicting applicable law,' 56 the New York legislature in
1984 moved to preserve New Yorks status as a center for international commerce and
finance through its adoption of a choice-of-court statute. 57 State courts are now
required to respect choice of New York law58 and to honor a forum selection clause in
a transaction involving not less than one million dollars and subject to New York law.15 9

Dismissal of such actions on forum non conveniens grounds was prohibited.160
C.

Enforcing the Judgment
1. U.S. Judgments Abroad

Any thoughtful international business manager contracting with a foreign party will
(or should) be haunted by the specter of a judgment that must be satisfied from property
outside the jurisdiction of the competent judge. The United States is not party to a single

155. Act of July 19, 1984, ch. 421, 1984 N.Y. Laws 1406 (codified as amended at N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw SS
5-1401 to -1402 (McKinney 1989)). To my knowledge, California is the only state which has had a similar statute.
See CAL. Cirv. PRoc. CODE, S 410.40, repealed by its own terms effective Jan. 1, 1992; CAL. STATs. 1986, ch. 968,
S 5. For the legislative history of N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw SS 5-1401 to -1402, see generally NEw YORK STATE
LEGISLATiVE ANNUAL 156 (1984) (memorandum of Assemblyman Mark A. Siegel).

156. Choice-of-law principles gave little weight to the parties' intent in determining the law applicable to
agreements with multijurisdictional elements. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954). Rather, choice-oflaw clauses were honored if the chosen law bore a "reasonable relationship" to the contract, similar to the approach
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws SS187-188 (1988). The possibility that a choice of law
clause would be ignored raised concern that parties to international contracts would be deterred from choosing
the law of New York to govern their relationships, to the detriment of the standing of New York as a major
commercial and financial center.
157. One can assume that the standing of New York included fees paid to local lawyers who might be asked
to opine on the validity of the contracts in question.
158. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw S 5-1401 (McKinney 1989). The transaction must involve at least $250,000. See
generallyEdith Friedler, PartyAutonomy Revisited:A Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-LawProblem; 37 KAN. L. REv.
471 (1989); Barry W. Rashkover, Title 14, New York Choke of Law Rule for ContractualDisputes: Avoiding the
UnreasonableResults 71 CORNELL L. Rav. 227 (1985). For two cases arising under the new statute, see Credit
Franjais Int'l v. Sociedad Financiera COmercio, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1985) (payments due defendant held by New
York subsidiary of Marine Midland); Peter Lisec Glastechnische GmbH v. Lenhardt Maschinenbau GmbH, 577
N.Y.S.2d 803 (1991) (German and Austrian companies sue over breach of settlement agreement).
159. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw S 5-1402(1) (McKinney 1989) provides:
[Amny person may maintain an action or proceeding against a foreign corporation, non-resident, or foreign
state where the action or proceeding arises out of or relates to any contract, agreement or undertaking for
which a choice of New York law has been made in whole or in part pursuant to section 5-1401 and which
(a) is a contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or otherwise, in consideration of, or relating to any
obligation arising out of a transaction covering in the aggregate, not less than one million dollars, and (b)
which contains a provision or provisions whereby such foreign corporation or non-resident agrees to submit
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
160. See N.Y. Civ. Psuac. L & R. S 327(b) (McKinney 1991). It provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of this rule [providing for stay or dismissal of an
action when required by "substantial justice"], the court shall not stay or dismiss any action on the
ground of inconvenient forum, where the action arises out of or relates to a contract, agreement or
undertaking to which Section 5-1402 of the general obligations law applies, and the parties to the
contract have agreed that the law of this state shall govern their rights or duties in whole or in part.
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enforcement of judgments treaty.' 61 Therefore the practical effectiveness of a forum
selection clause designating a U.S. court might depend entirely on the domestic law of the
foreign country where the debtor has property. 62 Some countries recognize foreign
judgments on the basis of comity,163 a judicially created golden rule by which one
country's courts respect acts of another country's tribunals even though under no legal
obligation to do so.164 Not all nations, however, are equally generous.165
Stubborn resistance to a comprehensive judgments treaty even by close allies and
trading partners of the United States is based on concern over extraterritorial application
of U.S. economic regulation, civil jury verdicts, multiple damage awards, and strict product
liability law.1'" A judgment treaty with the United States raises for many foreigners fears
about American respect for basic procedural fairness.167 A treaty with Great Britain
proved impossible, due largely to fears of multiple damages on the part of British
manufacturers, notwithstanding Anglo-American cultural, linguistic, and juridical
affinities.168

161. The Hague Conference on Private International Law currently is working on a draft treaty that may, or
may not, bear fruit in several years. See Michael Cohen, Hague Conference To DraftConvention on Enforcing Foreign
Judgment A.B.A. NEWSLETTER FOP SEC. ON INT'L Bus. L. 4 (Winter 92193).
162. A judgment creditor might not care about the other country's attitudes if the other party is
unquestionably subject to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court, and had substantial attachable assets within the United
States. Thus, banks traditionally favor clauses that designate local courts when the borrower pledges funds on
deposit with the bank, which obviate the need to worry too much about recognition of a judgment abroad.
163. On comity, see generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991); Vince
Carson, Recent Development, Foreign Judgment 20 TEx. INT'L L.. 217, 219-22 (1985).
164. Foreign judgments will be recognized without any requirement of reciprocity in England (See JOHN H.C.
Momus, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 416-28 (1971), discussing the Foreign Judgments Act of 1933, and ia. at 518-20,
discussing "comity"); in Switzerland (Loi Fdrale de Droit International Privd [Federal Law on Private
International Law] arts. 25-32, SR 291.435.1 (1987) [hereinafter Swiss LDIP], translated in PiPRnE A. KARRER &
KARL W. ARNOLD, SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL STATUTE OF 1987, at 50-56 (1989), and in 27 I.L.M.
37 (1988), and discussed infra part EI.C.2.c); and in France (see AUDIT, supranote 146, S 440-485). See also cases
cited in REsTATEMENT (TniiD) OF FOREIGN REt.ATIONs LAw S 481, Reporters' Note 6 (1987). In Germany, on
the other hand, foreign judgments will be recognized only on the basis of reciprocity. ZIVILPROZE6ORDNUNG
[ZPO] S 328(5) (Ger.).
165. See discussion infra part m.C.2.
166. See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.) and parliamentary debate particularly critical
of multiple damages in antitrust judgments. U.S. damage awards maybe considered excessive or unjust In most
countries, civil juries are unknown, and thus verdicts tend to be much lower than in the United States. Even in
England the civil jury exists only for cases such as defamation, which were once common law crimes.
167. Compare a recent decision refusing enforcement to an English libel judgment that provides a reverse twist
on foreign concerns about U.S. judicial decisions. A New York state court refused to enforce the judgment on
public policy grounds, because English libel law did not provide the media with the same level of First Amendment
protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution. The offending article said that Swiss authorities had blocked
plaintiffs' bank accounts into which a Swedish arms manufacturer (Bofors) had deposited kickbacks. The NewYork
court noted that British libel law places the burden on the defendant to prove the truth of the published statement,
whereas in New York the plaintiff bears the burden of showing falsity and fault. See Bachchan v. India Abroad
Publications Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992). See also Ellen J. Pollock & George Anders, Libel Judgment
From BritainIs Rejected WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1992, at B1l.
168. In 1976 the United States and the United Kingdom initialed the Draft Convention for the Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, reprintedin 16 IL.M. 71 (1977) (initialed at London,
Oct. 26, 1975). See generally,Peter Hay & Robert J. Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention
Between the UnitedStates and the United Kingdon; 11 Tax. INT'L L.U.421 (1976); P.M. North, The Draft U.K./U.S.
Judgments Conventiorn A British Vwpoint 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219 (1979); Comment, The Effect of the
ProposedU.S.-U.K. ReciprocalRecognition and Enforcementof Civil Judgments Treaty on CurrentRecognition Practice
in the United States, 18 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119 (1979).
After publication of the draft, changes were made in order to render the text more acceptable to British
interests. The revised text is published in the appendix to David L. Woodward, Reciprocal Recognition and
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Lack of a judgment treaty network means that American business managers
considering jurisdiction clauses designating American courts must consult foreign counsel
about enforcement of judgment rules for each counterparty's country. This expensive
venture will reveal that some countries enforce foreign judgments on a discretionary basis,
while others do not. Recognition on the basis of comity has been the rule in France, 169
England, 170 Germany, 7' and Switzerland.172 Countries that may not always be so
generous 173 include the Netherlands, 74 Denmark, and Sweden. 75 In some countries, an "entrustment procedure" requires the enforcement forum to be officially entrusted
with a judgment by the foreign court that renders it.176

If an American company's counterparty is resident of a country following English legal
tradition, guidance about recognition of judgment principles can be found in the latest
edition of Dicey & Morris, 77 available in most university libraries. However, few countries present similar ease in learning about foreign attitudes toward recognition of foreign
judgments. American multinationals doing business in Greece, Venezuela, Zaire, or China
will face a daunting task in coming to grips with the relevant enforcement of judgment
principles.

Enforcement of Civil Judgments in the United States, the UnitedKingdom and the European Economic Community,
8 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 298, 322 app. (1983).

169. Judgment of Jan. 7, 1964 (Munzer v. Munzer-Jacoby), Cass. civ. Ire, 1964 La Semaine Juridique II, at
13590. See generally AUDIT, supra note 146, SS 440-485; YVON LoussouARN & PIERRE BOUREL, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVf, SS 491-509 (1978).
170. ALBERT V. DICEY & JOHN H.C. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS Rules 35-53 (Lawrence Collins ed., 11 th

ed. 1987).
171. ZPO S 328(5) (Germ.). See Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement ofAmerican Money Judgments
in Germany, 40 Am.J.CoMP. L. 729 (1992).
172. Swiss LDIP arts. 25-32. See generally KARRER & ARNOLD, supra note 164, at 50-56; Olivier Wehrli,
Recognition in Switzerland of ForeignBankruptcy Judgments 2/3 EUROPEAN REPORT 5 (1992).
173. On non-U.S. recognition procedures, see generally EUGENE F. SCOLES &PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS
967-71 (1984); ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE (Charles Platto ed., 1989) (hereinafter
ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE]; Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition ofMoney Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters; 36 Am.J. COMP. L. 1 (1988). On procedures available in Central America, see generally ROBERT C.
CASAD, CIVIL JUDGMENT RECOGNITION (1981).

174. See WETBOEK v w BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [CODE CIV. PROC.] art 431(1) (Neth.) ("Except for
provisions of Articles 985-94 [concerning treaties] decisions rendered by foreign judges or public deeds executed
outside the Netherlands cannot be enforced in the Netherlands.") (Albert J. van den Berg trans.). In practice,
foreign judgments may be given persuasive evidence as to the merits of a case in the Netherlands, particularly if
based on a forum-selection agreement. See authorities cited in RENE VAN' Rooij & MAuRIcE V. Po.AK, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 58-75 (1987); JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION
AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATON 496 n.28 (1992); Juenger, supranote 173, at 27.
175. See, eg., Danish Code of Civil Procedure S 223-a, and materials cited in LOOKOPSKy, supra note 174, at
495-96. Sweden also apparently will review foreign judgments, but will give them weight as persuasive evidence
in the case if predicated on a valid and exclusive forum-selection clause. See Michael Bogdan, The Recognition in
Sweden of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matter4 54 NoRDISK TIDSSKIanr FOR INT'L RET 85 (1985).
See generallyENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD

(Ronald A. Brand ed., 1992) [hereinafter ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS].
176. Chinese procedure makes enforcement of a foreign judgment difficult by requiring an explicit "judicial
entrustrnent" of the judgment by a foreign court to a People's Republic of China tribunal. See Zhonghua Rennin
Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao [Foreign Economic Contract Law] art 204, published in 6 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF STATE COUNCIL GAzETTE 207 (1982) (discussed in Andrew COy-Nung Cheung, Enforcement of ForeignArbitral
Awards in the People's Republic of China, 34 Am.J. COMp. L. 295, 317 (1986)). Cf.W.D.W. Dennis, China, in
ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE, supra note 173, at 36-38 (discussing Chinese "entrustment" requirements).
177. DicEY & MoRIus, supranote 170. See also Mous, supranote 164, at 419, discussing Foreign Judgment
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, also discussed in DicEY & Moius, supra,Rule 48.
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2. Judicial Hijacking
When commercial controversies heat up, one common element of a litigation strategy
is to disregard the contractual court selection clause in an attempt to hijack the dispute to
a rival forum. When foreign judgments are recognized by American courts, a competing
judicial proceeding may put assets at risk at home as well as abroad. 178
Foreign judgments will generally be recognized in American courts as a matter of
comity.179 The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts provides that "[a] valid judgment
rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized
in the United States so far as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are
concerned."' 80 Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides that
"[a] final judgment of a court of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of
money... is conclusive between the parties and is entitled to recognition in courts in the
United States."181 In the twenty-two states 82 that have adopted the Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJRA),183 foreign money judgments must be
84
Judgments
recognized if "final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered."'
85
generally may not be called into question for error of fact or law, although nonrecognition is mandated for lack of due process, personal jurisdiction, and subject matter
jurisdiction.186

178. On recognition of foreign judgments, see generally, ENFORCING FomIGN JUDGEMENTS, supra note 175;
R. Doak Bishop & Susan Burnette, United States Practice Concerningthe Recognition of ForeignJudgments; 16 INT'L
LAw. 425 (1982); Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States In Search of
Uniformity and InternationalAcuptance, 67 NOTRE DXME L. Rav. 253 (1991). For a European perspective, see
generally CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, LA RECONNAISSANCE T LEXtCUTION DES JUGEMENTS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PRIVt AUX PTATS-UNIS (1987).
179. See generally ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AAERICAN CONFLICTS LAw S 74 (3d ed. 1977). See also PAUL, supra
note 163. State rather than federal law generally governs recognition of foreign judgments. See Svenska
Handelsbanken v. Carlsson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS S 98 (1988).
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw S 481 (1987).
182. Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia,
Washington.
183. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962). Twenty-two states have
adopted the UFMJRA. However, five of these states (Idaho, Georgia, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas) have
included lack of reciprocity as a ground for nonrecognition of foreign judgments, making enforcement of U.S.
judgments rendered in those jurisdictions problematic or impossible in foreign countries that require proof of
reciprocity for enforcement. For a recent case implementing the Act as adopted in Massachusetts (MAss. GEN. L.
ch. 235, S 23A (1990)), see Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewel, 585 N.E.2d 321 (Mass. 1992) (Quebec judgment
awarding court costs to a Canadian law firm). See generally Alan J. Sorkowitz, Enforcing Judgments Under the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Ac; 37 PRAC. LAw., July 1991, at 57; Brand, supra note 178, at
286-88. Cf. UNiF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1964), which applies to judgments
of American courts entitled to full faith and credit
184. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT S 4.
185. Massachusetts and Texas, however, have reserved the right to apply the Act on the basis of reciprocity,
thus in some cases opening the way to merits review of a foreign judgment
186. Discretionary grounds include insufficient notice, fraud, violation of public policy, conflict with another
final judgment, inconvenient forum, and conflict with an agreement of the parties. Grounds for refusal of
recognition listed by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law are generally the same. The Restatement
treats lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a discretionary rather than mandatory ground for refusal, and does not
include forum non conveniens.
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Although courts generally need not recognize a foreign judgment rendered in
disregard of an agreement between the parties,187 it is uncertain when and whether a
court selection clause will prove ineffective because of the designated court's refusal to hear
the case. For example, a French judgment in disregard of a jurisdiction clause designating
Alabama courts might well be enforceable if the jurisdiction clause was inoperative under
Alabama law or ineffective on forum non conveniens grounds.188
D.

Foreign Decrees

To avoid meeting obligations in hard currencies, foreign debtors will occasionally
invoke exchange controls or payments moratoria imposed by their home countries. Under
the Act of State doctrine, judges have sometimes felt prohibited from calling into question
such foreign governmental acts even if the acts are contrary to American public policy.189
Exchange controls have on occasion barred American courts from ordering payment of a
debt contracted abroad. 190
The underpinnings of the Act of State doctrine derive from a choice-of-law theory
which holds that the law of the country where an act is performed determines its legitimacy.
In the United States, a more modern justification for the doctrine has been articulated in
terms of the Constitutional separation of powers; courts should not risk hindering the State
Department's conduct of foreign affairs by passing judgment on foreign governmental acts
affecting property within the foreign country's own territory.191
Courts sometimes avoid applying the Act of State doctrine by manipulating the situs
of the property allegedly subject to the foreign government's power. For example, a debt

187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw S 482(2)(f) (1987); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEYS 4.

JUDGEMENTS RECOGNITION ACT

188. The absence of any federal judgments statute analogous to the Federal Arbitration Act also means that
federal-state controversies will continue to plague the enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States. Since
1938, federal courts whose jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship must apply the foreign judgment
recognition rules of the state in which they sit, absent federal preemption by either treaty or legislation. See Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also discussion in Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448,
450-57 (D. Mass. 1966) (decided before Massachusetts adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements
Recognition Act; Massachusetts rather than federal law applied in a diversity action between Swedish bank and
Massachusetts residents). It is an open question, however, what rules a federal court should apply if asked to
recognize a foreign judgment when jurisdiction is based on a federal question rather than on diversity of
citizenship. For example, if a federal court were to take jurisdiction over an action against a foreign government
invoking a defense of sovereign immunity, its jurisdiction would be based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, not diversity of citizenship. Presumably federal rather than state law would apply to recognition of the foreign
judgment Similar conflict between state and federal rules might arise if federal law required recognition of a
foreign judgment under the Act of State doctrine when state law, for whatever reason, called for the opposite result.
For example, a French court pronouncement on a securities law issue raised in a dispute about a sale of American
securities between two Frenchmen might be refused enforcement when that judgment offends federal American
public policy. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1983).
189. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw S 443 (1987), which provides:
In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, courts in
the United States will generally refrain from examining the validity of a taking by a foreign state of property
within its own territory, or from sitting in judgment on other acts of a governmental character done by a
foreign state within its own territory and applicable there.
190. See Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
191. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See alsoForeign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C.
S 2370(e)(2) (1994).
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may be deemed to be outside the country of debtor's residence192 by a judicial finding
that the debt was not governed by the law of the expropriating country.193 However,
9
such situs manipulation may come after several years of appellate litigation. 4
III. PRIVATIZED DISPUTE RISOLUTION
A

The InternationalCurrency of Arbitral Awards

Rejecting the jurisdiction of all courts in favor of binding privatized dispute resolution
can enhance confidence that a dispute will be decided by a forum that will respect
contracting parties' shared commercial expectations. 195 It is not so much that parties
choose arbitration, but that arbitration imposes itself faute de mieux when there are no
neutral national courts of compulsory jurisdiction.
Arbitration will suffer from few of the infirmities that plague court-designating forum
selection clauses, outlined in the previous section. First, arbitrators will have little reason
to refuse to hear a case as long as the claimant can provide an adequate deposit to cover
costs. Second, multilateral treaties bind the United States and almost one hundred other
countries to stay litigation inconsistent with an arbitration agreement and to enforce both
the arbitration clause and the resulting award. Finally, arbitrators generally need not show
deference to foreign governmental decrees such as exchange controls and expropriation
96
orders.
Not all cases will be best served by arbitration, however. Simple disputes may be dealt
with adequately even in a court at the foreign defendant's residence, assuming the judge
is honest and the court has jurisdiction over the defendant's assets. A U.S. bank, for
example, would prefer to bring an action against a defaulting English borrower in the High
Court of London, rather than arbitrate the loan default in Geneva or Paris. Not all
international cases fit such clear-cut scenarios, however. Frequently one party or the other

will have doubts about the integrity of the foreign judiciary or the attachability of the other
side's assets.

192. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed;
473 U.S. 934 (1985). Cf Perez, 463 N.E2d at 5; Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir.

1984).
193. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 695 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y 1988), affd, 852 F.2d 657 (2d
Cir. 1988), vacatedand remanded, 495 U.S. 660 (1990), reconsidered,936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 2990 (1992). The result in the Wells Fargocase would be different today in light of the recently added S 25(c)

of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. S 633 (1994)), which provides that, absent a written agreement to the
contrary, no Federal Reserve member bank may be required to repay a deposit made at a foreign branch if
repayment was prevented by the act of a foreign government in the country where the branch is located.
194. In the Wells Fargosaga there were no less than five different decisions spanning four years.
195. One is reminded of Lord Harris of High Cross's observations that "[i]t has taken long decades of
empirical experience to discover that Government failure is often so much worse than so called market failures."
416 PARm.
DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1222 (1981).

196. Compare J.MARTiN HuNTR ET AL, THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AND ADR 1-2 (1993),
which also suggests that national courts are less desirable than arbitrators because: (1) national judges may be
untrained to deal with the foreign law governing the contract; (2) language and translation pose difficulties to
courts; and (3) judicial proceedings are subject to public scrutiny.
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1. Treaties

In signing an arbitration agreement, business managers implicitly waive the right to
invoke the jurisdiction and procedural safeguards of their home country courts. Nations
therefore have concluded arbitration treaties to secure enforcement of bargains contracted
97
by their commercial elites.1
Multilateral treaty networks enforce arbitration agreements and awards even in
countries that have resisted analogous conventions covering court judgments. Arbitration
conventions to which the United States is a party commit almost one hundred countries
to recognize and to enforce arbitration agreements and awards.198 Nothing would have
stopped these same countries from entering into similar treaties with the United States to
cover court judgments. So far, however, this has not been done, partly due to concerns
discussed earlier in this Article about the expansive nature of U.S. damage awards. 199
For seventy years, the commercial community has used treaty mechanisms to make
arbitration awards readily "transportable" from the country where rendered to the country
where the loser has assets. The inadequacies of the Geneva Conventions of 1923 and
1927200 led the International Chamber of Commerce to draft a new convention that
would liberate international arbitration from many of the constraints of burdensome
procedures 201 and national law.202 A United Nations sponsored version of the International Chamber of Commerce initiative was adopted in 1958 at a conference in New
204
York 20 3 to provide a more streamlined way to enforce awards and agreements.

197. While it would be possible to tailor a narrow judgments treatment that would apply only to judgments
pursuant to forum selection clauses, attempts at judgments treaties have been more ambitious and consequently
less successful. For trading partners of the United States who have been unsettled by reports of American treble
damage awards, it is also important that arbitrators presumably will be under less pressure than American judges
and juries to award punitive damages.
198. In addition to the New York Convention, the United States is party to the 1975 Panama Arbitration
Convention, which binds eleven Latin American and Caribbean countries: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, andVenezuela. Inter-American Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, Pan-Am. T.S. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama
Convention].
199. See discussion infra note 24 and accompanying text. Part V of this article suggests a more limited, and
therefore more acceptable, form of judgments treaty.
200. The New York Convention replaces the 1927 Geneva Convention as to the states that are parties to both
Conventions. The 1923 Convention provided only for stay of court proceedings in the state where made, operating
like a uniform law. See generally D. ALAN REDFERN & J. MARTIN HUNTER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 343-46 (2d ed. 1992).
201. In particular, the requirement of double-exequatur(leave for enforcement in the award's country of origin)
was read into the Geneva Convention of 1927. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 200, at 456-57.
202. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS,
REPORT AND PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION, ICC BROCHURE No. 174 (1953), reproduced in U.N. Doc.
E/C.2/373 (1953).
203. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, DRAFT CONVENTION, U.N. Doe. E/2704 (1955).
204. See U.N. Doc E/Conf. 26/SR. 1-25, reproduced in GIORGIO GAyA, NEW YORK CONVENTION, part III
(1987-88). See generay ALBERT J.VAN DEN; BERG, THE NEw YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 (1981);
New York Convention, supra note 24.
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The New York Convention requires courts of contracting states to "refer the parties
to arbitration' when a dispute is subject to a written arbitration agreement.205 This
means that business managers generally will be held to their bargains notwithstanding later
20 6
regrets about having abandoned recourse to judicial proceedings.
After an award has been rendered, the Convention requires that it be recognized as
binding and enforced as would be a domestic award. 20 7 The Convention covers awards
rendered outside the enforcing forum.208 A court of a Convention state may refuse
recognition and enforcement of an award only on the basis of the limited defenses
enumerated in a litany that includes procedural defects such as lack of a valid arbitration
agreement, denial of an opportunity to be heard, an excess of jurisdiction, a procedure
contrary to the parties' agreement, and annulment of the award in the country where it was
rendered. 20 9 To promote the international currency of arbitration awards, the United
States and many other treaty parties have traditionally given the Convention defenses a
narrow scope. In particular, the Convention's public policy defense has been interpreted
restrictively 21° on the assumption that a broad interpretation would defeat the Conven-

205. Article II(1) of the New York Convention, supra note 24, limits recognition to agreements concerning "a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration." Article 1(3) limits enforcement to agreements not "null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." Id. The Panama Convention states only that an agreement
to arbitrate is "valid," and is silent on court orders to compel arbitration. Panama Convention, supra note 198,
art. 1. It is uncertain, however, whether the Panama Convention would compel a recalcitrant party to arbitrate.
206. An arbitration clause will not necessarily terminate an administrative proceeding. See, e.g., Farrel Corp.
v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 949 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 1947 (1992) (holding
that an I.T.C. investigation of trade secret misappropriation, in a complaint filed by an American machinery
manufacturer against an Italian licensee, was not terminated by virtue of an ICC arbitration clause in the contract
between the two parties).
207. New York Convention, supra note 24, art. I. The Panama Convention is more ambiguous. Article 4
provides that an arbitral award shall have the force of a final judgment; but goes on to say only that the award
"may" be enforced. Panama Convention, supranote 198, art. 4. The Panama Convention requires that the award
be "not appealable," a concept of uncertain meaning in arbitration. Id. The New York Convention, supra note
24, art. V(1)(e) permits (but does not mandate) refusal of recognition of an award that is "not binding... or has
been set aside," which is much narrower than "not appealable." In some countries there is New York Convention
case law saying that an award may be binding even though subject to appeal. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 204, at
48.
208. New York Convention, supranote 24, art 1. The United States and many other countries have reserved
application of the treaty on the basis of reciprocity to awards rendered in the territory of another Convention party.
See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 204, app. B at 426. The Convention may also apply to "non-domestic" awards,
an obscure term that has only been interpreted once to my knowledge. Bergesen v. Muller, 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.
1983). In that case, a U.S. court characterized an award rendered in New York as "non-domestic." The dispute
involved a ship charter between Nonegian and Swiss parties for transport of chemicals between Europe, the
Caribbean, and North America.
209. New York Convention, supra note 24, art V. These procedural defects, which must be asserted and
proven by the resisting party, permit the court to avoid lending its power to support a fraudulent or unfair
arbitration, but are not intended to permit judicial review of the merits of the dispute. Two additional defenses
against recognition of an arbitral award are open to a court on its own motion, without any proof by the party
resisting the award: that the subject matter is not arbitrable, and that enforcement would violate the forum's
"public policy." Id. While the first five Convention defenses relate generally to public policy in the sense that they
are safeguards against injustice, the final defense serves as an explicit catch-all for the forum's particular substantive
public policy.
210. VAN DEN BERG, supranote 204, at 271. In contemplating alternatives, one must remember that rules for
recognizing foreign judgments also include a public policy escape hatch, but one construed more broadly than in
the treaty context
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tion's purpose of permitting parties to international transactions to assure themselves of
211
some measure of neutral dispute resolution.
The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitrationl 21 complements
the New York Convention among citizens of its European contracting states. Its scope is
narrower than that of the New York Convention, in that it applies only to relationships
between parties from contracting states, rather than to foreign awards generally.213 The
European Convention's more rigorous enforcement scheme permits a country to refuse an
award set aside where rendered only when the annulment was for a Conventionenumerated reason, such as lack of proper notice to a party or arbitral excess of authori2 14

ty.

In the United States, the New York Convention generally preempts inconsistent state
law,215 giving arbitration agreements dispositive effect.216 Convention-implementing
legislation sweeps away much of the jurisdictional uncertainty that might otherwise plague
aliens attempting to vindicate arbitral rights in the United States. Federal district courts

211. See Parsons &Whittemore v. Socidt6 Gnk4rale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d
Cir. 1974), in which public policy was defined in the context of the New York Convention to include only "our
most basic notions of morality and justice." U.S. and European law give public policy a narrower scope in relation
to transactions of an international character. The reasoning behind this is that there is more justification for a
refusal to recognize foreign laws and courts when they affect controverted events that occur principally within our
own borders. Cases have construed the public policy defense narrowly in order to avoid disrupting the
international dispute resolution process. An arbitrator's lack of independence from one of the parties has been held
not to constitute a violation of public policy. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 542
(S.D. Ohio 1982). Participation in the Arab boycott of Israel has been held not to give rise to a public policy
defense. Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar, 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Misleading the arbitral tribunal has
been found not to justify the public policy defense, although dicta in the same case states that active fraud, such
as perjury, might cause enforcement of the award to violate public policy. Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraere
GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.J. 1976). Rarely has an award been
refused recognition under the Convention's catch-all public policy defense. But see Laminoirs-Trefileries.Cableries
de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980). This case, which involved what the court
deemed a penal provision of French law calling for penalties for late payment for goods, must be viewed as an
aberration. See generallyRobert Coulson, So Far,So Good: Enforcement of Foreign CommercialArbitrationAwards
in United States Court.s in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 353 (Julian D.M. Lew ed.,

1986). For a contrasting view about the wisdom of a narrow public policy exception, see discussion in Andrew
Armfelt, Avoiding the Arbitration Trap, Fix. TIMES (London), Oct. 27, 1992, at 20.
212. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961, Feb. 9, 1968, 484 U.N.T.S. 349
[hereinafter European Convention]. vAN DEN BERG, supra note 203, at 94.
213. Thus, the European Convention would cover disputes involving European subsidiaries of an American
multinational.
214. For example, an award rendered in Paris in an arbitration between a French and an Italian company
might be set aside by a French court for violation of French public policy (ordrepublic). Since violation of public
policy is not listed in the recognized grounds for annulment in the European Convention, the award would still
be enforceable in Italy. On the other hand, enforcement would not be assured to a similar award against the Italian
company's American parent, since the United States is not a party to the European Convention, and the New York
Convention permits blanket refusal of recognition to awards set aside where rendered.
215. Uncertainties do exist at the margins. Generally, state arbitration law can be applied to international
arbitration only to an extent not more restrictive than federal law. What is or is not more restrictive, however, is
less than self-evident. For example, provisional measures such as pre-award attachment interject national court
proceedings that parties intended to avoid while increasing the winner's chances of enforcing the award. See
William W. Park National Legal Systems and PrivateDispute Resolution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 616, 617-18 n.5 (1988)
(book review). See also Volt v. Stanford, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), where the parties provided that a construction
contract would be governed by the law of California. State law provisions staying arbitration pending resolution
of related litigation were held not to be preempted by federal law.
216. Some scholars have suggested, however, that state law be given a greater role in international arbitration.
See Lue R. MAcNEL, Am EpicAN ARBITRATION LAW 179 (1992), proposing what he terms the "heretical" view that
"modern state arbitration laws would govern in both state and federal courts."
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have original jurisdiction over any action falling under the Convention, 217 regardless of
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. 218 Convention-related actions
may be removed from state to federal court.219
2. Money
When the parties can pay the arbitrator's fee, there is relatively little risk that a chosen
adjudicator will refuse to hear the case.220 Some arbitral institutions fix the arbitrators'
compensation by reference to the amount in controvers. For example, under the rules of
the International Chamber of Commerce,2 21 an arbitrator hearing a one million dollar
&
Many
controversy (modest in international transactions) could receive $30,000 in fees.
law professors welcome arbitrators' fees to supplement their meager academic stipends.
Substantial financial disincentives therefore argue against arbitrators refusing to hear a case
for reasons analogous to forum non conveniens.
3. Foreign Decrees
Arbitrators generally are not prohibited from calling into question foreign governmental decrees, such as expropriation orders or exchange controls. Judicial deference under the
Act of State doctrine toward foreign governmental decrees derives from a Constitutional

concern that courts not interfere with the executive branch of governments conduct of
foreign affairs. 223 In few situations will such concerns inhibit private adjudicators.
American courts, moreover, may not invoke the Act of State doctrine to refuse to
enforce arbitral awards. After a judicial decision denying enforcement to a multi-million
dollar arbitration award that arose out of nationalization of American-owned oil
concessions,2 4 the Federal Arbitration Act was amended to provide with elegant
simplicity that "enforcement of arbitral... awards and execution upon judgments based

217. 9 U.S.C. S 203 (1988) provides that Convention actions "shall be deemed to arise under the laws and
treaties of the United States."
218. Federal courts may confirm Convention awards even between aliens. See Bergesen v. Muller, 710 F.2d
928 (2d Cir. 1983) (charter party between Norwegian shipowner and Swiss company; confirmation of "nondomestic" award rendered in New York under 9 U.S.C. S 207 (1988), providing for three-year period for
confirmation rather than one-year limit for domestic awards).
219. 9 U.S.C. S 205 (1988).
220. There are, however, some limits. For example, the ICC Rules restrict their scope to disputes that are
commercial in nature. INTERUNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC RuLEs oF ARBITRATION art. 1, ICC Pub.
No. 291 (1988) [hereinafter ICC RuLEs]. In addition, courts have in the past held certain subject matters to be
"non-arbitrable." However, recent cases have chipped away at arbitrability restrictions, and even securities disputes
and antitrust matters (in an international context at least) are now arbitrable. See infra part IV.B.1.
221. The ICC was recently described as "the most renowned among international arbitral institutions."
Christopher P. Hall & Scott J. Newton, InternationalArbitrationBodies A Survey, N.Y. L., June 16, 1992, at 1,
6.
222. See CRAIG, PARK & PAULSSON, supra note 11, app. 1, tbls. 9A & 9B.
223. Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 39, 423-28 (1964). See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, Rethinking
the Act of State Doctrine, 62 WASH. L. REv. 397, 444 (1987).
224. Libyan Am. Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C.
1980), vacatedwithout opinion, 684 F.2d 1032 (1981). The expropriation was considered an act of state that would
have been indirectly called into question by enforcement of the award.
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on orders confirming such awards shall not be refused on the basis of the act of state
doctrine."225
4. Sovereign Defendants
Execution of judgments against property of foreign states generally requires a nexus
between the property and the particular commercial activity that gave rise to the underlying
claim. 226 Following a case involving a Libyan expropriation, 227 however, the requirement of a link between assets and activity was eliminated in the enforcement of
arbitral awards, as long as the property serves in a commercial activity in the United States.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act now provides that: "property in the United States
of a foreign state . . . used for commercial activity in the United States, shall not be
immune from attachment in aid of execution... if [a United States] judgment is based on
an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against the foreign state." 22
Outside the United States, arbitration clauses will also serve to limit a sovereign's right
to claim the basic immunity from suit, even if the contract contains no explicit waiver of
immunity. In March of 1990, a £182 million settlement between the International Tin
Council and its creditors ended a dispute over the suspension of buffer stock
operations. 229 Six months earlier, the English House of Lords had interpreted the
Council's Headquarters Agreement with the United Kingdom as granting immunity from
suits arising out of the Council's creditors' claims.2s ° The same Headquarters Agreement,
however, had provided that the Council would not benefit from immunity in the
enforcement of arbitration awards. Only a few creditors had the foresight to incorporate
arbitration clauses in their agreements." 1 These arbitration clauses gave creditors the
benefit of waived immunity under both the Headquarters Agreement and the British State
2 33
Immunity Act.P 2 A similar result would obtain in the United States.
Arbitration also takes some of the sting out of the special hostility to foreign
judgments often manifested by developing country courts. The Charter of Economic Rights

225. 9 U.S.C. S 15 (1988). Even without such a statute, arguments can be made that the LIAMCO case was
wrongly decided. In enforcing foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention, a court does not run afoul
of the Act of State doctrine for the simple reason that it does not call into question foreign governmental acts; the
court merely enforces an award.
226. See 28 U.S.C. S 1610(a)(2) discussed supranote 150.
227. See discussion of the LAMCO case, supra text accompanying note 224.
228. 28 U.S.C. S 1610(a)(6) (1994).
229. International Tin Council Press Release, March 30, 1990.
230. Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Department of Trade & Indus., [1990] 2 App. Cas. 418 (1989) (appeal taken
from Eng.).
231. Id. For example, the London and Malayan Metal Exchanges had inserted arbitration clauses in their
standard form metal trading contracts, as had one bank, according to the House of Lords. Id.
232. State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, S 9 (Eng.), which provides for implicit waiver of immunity by states
or state agencies that have entered into a written arbitration agreement.
In an American compensation case, a New York state court enforced an agreement providing that
controversies with the ITC "shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New York." See International Tin Council
v. Amalgamate Inc., 524 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1988). See also A.H. Hermann, US Court Rejects ITC's Claim to
Sovereign Immunity, Fin. TimS, Feb. 11, 1988, at 9.
233. See 28 U.S.C. S 1605(a) (1989). An arbitration agreement will be enforceable notwithstanding a claim
of sovereign immunity if- (i) the arbitration takes place in the United States, and (ii) the agreement or award is
or may be governed by a treaty calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards, such as the New
York or Panama Arbitration Conventions. For enforcement of awards, see discussion of 28 U.S.C. 1610, supra
note 150. See International Tin Counci, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 971. See also Hermann, supra note 232, at 9.

1995]

ILLUSION AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL FoRUM SELECTION

and Duties of States requires questions of compensation for expropriated property to be
decided solely by host state tribunals.2- The result in some countries would empower
an adjudicator seeming to lack neutrality and independence. One party to the dispute
would in essence judge its own case, thereby reducing the stability of private international
investment and its attendant transfer of development technology. Arbitrators who have
considered the Charter, however, have rejected its effect with respect to arbitration
agreements.235 More significantly, ratification of the New York and Panama Conventions
by many developing countries 36 constitutes an explicit treaty obligation that on its face
will trump the Charter.
5. Credit Arrangements
The epidemic of lender liability litigation gives financial institutions an additional
reason to look to arbitration clauses to maximize certainty.23 7 An expression of
catchword quality, the term "lender liability" describes a set of situations in which banks
have been subject to implicit understandings in their dealings with borrowers. In lender
liability claims, borrowers invoke banker-client understandings to obtain damages for refusal
to advance funds, even if within the bank's discretion under the terms of a credit line. This
populist concept in essence makes the financier partially liable for the borrower's business
failure.233
To discourage what lenders consider to be excessive and unpredictable damage awards
by juries in lender liability litigation, several American financial institutions now provide
for arbitration in credit agreements. From a lender's perspective, arbitration commends
itself because an arbitral panel presumably will be a more sophisticated trier of fact and less

234. Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties states: "In any case where the question of
compensation [for expropriated property] gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of
the nationalizing state and by its tribunals ....
" G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See William W. Park, Legal Issues in the Third World's Economic Development, 61 B.U.
L. R v. 1321 (1981). See also ROBERT F. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER

(1979).
235. See Award of Jan. 19, 1977 (Texaco Overseas Petroleum/Cal. Asiatic Oil v. Libyan Arab Republic)
(Dupuy, Arb.), reprintedin 17 IL.M.1 (1978). See generally discussion in CRAIG, PARK & PAULssoN, supra note
11, at 643-57.
236. The New York Convention has been ratified by almost a hundred countries, of which approximately half
could be characterized as developing. For a list of parties to the New York Convention, see 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 4-6;
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 200, app. 23.
237. See generally Park, L'arbitrageet le recouvrement supra note 151.
238. See, eg., Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987). The jury awarded $100,000 in compensatory
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages (the punitive damages were struck down as impermissible under Maine
law in contract actions) for the bank's breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing by
terminating a line of credit to owners of a paint business, despite the right to do so under the loan agreement.
See also KMC v. Irving Trust, 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); GERALD L. BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY: LAW,
PRACTICE AND PREVENTION S 2.12 (1994); A. BARRY CAPPELLO & FRANCES E. KoMoRosKE, LENDER LIABILITY 44
(1991); Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of LenderLiability,99 YALE L.J. 131 (1989); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial
Relationshipsand the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 565-74 (1990); Kenneth
L. Goldberg, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. REv. 653 (1988); Janine S. Hiller, Good Faith Lending,26
Am.Bus. L.J. 783 (1988); David L Johnson & Terrence J. Gaffiey, Lender Liability:. Perspectives on Risk and
Prevention, 105 BAN IcG L. 325 (1988); Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability and Discretionary
Acceleration:Of Liewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L.REv. 169 (1989); Todd C.
Pearson, Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward Written Credit Agreement Statutes, 76 MINN. L REv.295
(1991) (noting that a majority of states have now added credit agreements to their statutes of frauds in order to
preclude lender liability claims based on oral contract claims).
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swayed by solicitude for the borrower than a civil jury whose own credit problems may
make them empathize with the unfortunate debtor.
The validity of arbitration clauses in consumer banking transactions has been subject
to vigorous challenge. While some state court decisions have refused to enforce arbitration
clauses invoked against borrowers under consumer loan contracts, other decisions have
upheld consumer finance arbitration 3 9 Borrowers who resisted the arbitration
agreement have often argued that the arbitration agreements inserted into account
statements were not genuinely consensual.
6. Interim Awards
Arbitrators in international cases often sit in tribunals of three with power to render
interim awards slicing the dispute into pieces to be decided one at a time. Depending on

the particular arbitration rules applied, each interim award can become res judicata before
the arbitration proceeds to its next stage.24 0 Such issue-by-issue adjudication arguably
enhances the business manager's ability to rely on the application of principled norms that
promote commercial predictability.
In contrast, appellate court judges deciding a case implicating more than one issue
usually tally votes on the overall outcome of the case, regardless of decisions on particular
issues.241 For example, a court might deny recovery in a contract action even though a
majority of judges (albeit different ones) agreed that the contract had been breached and
that the plaintiff suffered loss. 242 In case-by-case decision-making, judges decide only

239. See Geneva Bell v. Congress Mortgage, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Ct. App. 1994) (review denied and order
that opinion not be officially published, Cal. Sup. Ct. July 28, 1994). The court in Geneva Bell refused to compel
arbitration absent a "clear and informed" waiver of the right to a jury trial (homeowner claims against mortgage
lenders for fraudulent business practices). See also Patterson v. Tr Consumer Financial Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d
563 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1217 (1994); California Court of Appeal held that the arbitration
clause, used in documentation for relativelysmall loans, was an unconscionable limit on the borrower's opportunity
to be heard. CompareBadie v. Bank of Am., No. 944916, 1994 WI. 660730 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 1994); bench
opinion discussed in Bank of America's MandatoryArbitrationPolicy is Upheld by San FranciscoJudge, 63 BNA's
BANKING REp. 293 (1994), and in Consumer Arbitration-Part , 5 World Arb. & Mediation Rep. (BNA) 231
(1994); court upheld arbitration clause inserted into account statement where account agreement allowed bank to
change terms of agreement at any time. See generally, Consumer Arbitration, 4 World Arb. & Mediation Rep.
(BNA) 192 (1993), quoting Patricia Sturdevant, chief attorney for the plaintiffs: "I like to say that ADR is like sex:
it's great if both parties consent but can't be allowed if one party is forced into taking part." Id. at 193. See also
ConsumerArbitration, 5 World Arb. & Mediation Rep. (BNA) 231, 231-33 (1994).
240. On interim awards, see CR.AiG, PARx& PAuLssoN, supra note 11, S 19.03. For a recent example of an
arbitration involving an interim award, see Prudential Bache v. Kyocera, Aug. 25, 1994, reportedin INT'L ARD. Rap.,
Oct. 1994, at 3. Normally, an interim award would become enforceable under article III of the New York Convention. Interim awards should be distinguished from procedural orders that serve as efficiency devices to order
debate in such a way that the arbitrators do not spend time on unnecessary questions not pertinent to the
controversy's outcome.
241. See generallyLewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial
Courts, 81 CAL L. REv.1 (1993). With respect to U.S. Supreme Court practice, the authors note that "[w]ith few
exceptions, each Justice on the Supreme Court has taken herself to be individually sovereign not only over the
choice among rationales, but also over the choice among outcomes ....[Alt the end of the day each Justice aligns
herself with the outcome she would have chosen were she deciding the case alone." Id. at 13.
242. Consider the following voting configuration in a contract action to recover insurance on a building
destroyed by fire:
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whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover, not whether there has been a contract and a loss.
When interim awards are issued, arbitrators vote bindingly on each issue. If a threearbitrator panel looks at breach of contract in the first part of the arbitration and the extent
of loss in the second part of the proceedings, the interim award on the first issue binds the
arbitrators in the latter stage. This form of decision-making might result in an award to
a plaintiff even though a majority of the arbitrators would have come out differently on the
bottom line of recovery. For example, an arbitrator who did not believe an insurance
contract was ever signed (therefore casting a negative vote on whether a contract was
breached) might nevertheless find that the defendant's house did in fact bum down, and
thus that the defendant suffered loss.
Either an issue-by-issue or a case-by-case voting protocol may occasionally produce
paradoxical results when compared with the other. However, the issue-by-issue
adjudication to which international arbitration lends itself generally will do a better job in
elaborating norms to guide future conduct. By exercising their discretion to provide for
interim awards, arbitrators can help commercial actors predict the outcomes of complicated
business ventures.
B.

Wild Cards

Private adjudication falls prey to its own forms of uncertainty. An agreement to
settle disputes through arbitration rather than in the courts may resolve some problems at
the expense of creating others.
The catalogue of arbitration disadvantages might better be described as characteristics
of arbitration which can work against particular litigants in particular contexts. In addition
to the perception that arbitrators tend to compromise on the merits of a dispute,
problematic aspects of arbitration frequently cited by litigators include the undeniable facts
that arbitrators are not bound by formal rules of evidence, that their awards are subject to
only limited judicial review, and that there may be little pre-trial discovery. In the growing
volume of arbitration literature, 243 considerable ink has been spilled on at least five
critical sources of uncertainty: (i) limits on the subject matters that can be submitted to
arbitration; (ii) joinder of parties; (iii) interim relief; (iv) judicial control mechanisms
exercised at the arbitral situs; and (v) rules applied by arbitral tribunals. As discussed

Judge

Was There a
Contract?

Was There
Loss?

1

yes

no

2

no

yes

3

yes

yes

Onlyjudge #3 would grant recovery under a case-by-case voting protocol. However, under an issue-by-issue
protocol (similar to an interim award scenario in arbitration) the question of whether a contract had been signed
would become res judicata before the arbitrators dealt with the question of loss, thus permitting recovery on a
majority vote by judges #2 and #3.
243. No fewer than seven journals now deal in whole or in partwith international arbitration. In addition
to the Journal of InternationalArbitration and the Revue de l'Arbitrag4 journals are published by the American
Arbitration Association, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the London Court of International Arbitration, and
the Swiss Arbitration Association, and there is a Revista de la Corte Espanola de Arbitraj.
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below, in each of these areas judges, arbitrators and legislators are now inventing the civil
procedure of international arbitration.
1. Arbitrability
At one time or another, U.S. courts have questioned the right of private litigants to
oust judges of jurisdiction to hear disputes that raise sensitive public policy concerns.
Antitrust, securities legislation, patents, ERISA claims, bankruptcy matters, civil rights and
state franchise statutes in the past have been declared nonarbitrable, in the sense that courts
would not enforce an agreement to arbitrate such claims, limiting the scope of the
arbitration clause to basic contract matters. 2 " Subject matter arbitrability also limits the
multilateral treaty framework for enforcing the arbitral process, since courts enforce
arbitration agreements and awards only if questions are "capable of settlement by arbitration."245

While most laws affect societal interests in some way, some statutes implicate public
rights in a more vital way than others. For example, legislation that promotes a fair stock
market or free competition creates direct benefits not only for the contracting parties, but
also for the community at large.246
Suspicion of arbitrators has formed the central theme of nonarbitrability cases.
Arbitrators sometimes appear like foxes guarding the chicken coop, with a pro-business bias
that will lead to under-enforcement of laws designed to protect the public. Lack of appeal
247
on the merits of an award, and the absence of Constitutional rights in arbitration,
make arbitration seem to some like a black hole to which claims for vindication of
fundamental rights are sent, never to be heard from again.

244. See, eg., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (discussing the 1933 Securities Act); Marchese v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 P.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing the Commodities Exchange Act); Zimmerman v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984) (discussing bankruptcy
matters for which there is an automatic stay of all actions). See generallyWilliam W. Park, PrivateAdjudicators
and the PublicInterest:The ExpandingScope ofInternationalArbitration,12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 629 (1986); Richard
E. Speidel, ArbitrationofStatutory Rights Under the FederalArbitrationAct:. The Case for Reform, 4 OHio ST. J. oN
Disp. REooL 157 (1989).
245. New York Convention, supranote 24, art. 11(1). The Panama Convention contains no similar language
with respect to its declaration that arbitration agreements are valid. It may be that Latin American courts will
imply such a limit, perhaps by reading the provision on validity of arbitration agreements together with the
provisions on the enforcement of awards, which do contain in article V(2)(1) a subject matter limitation. VAN naw
BEiG, supra note 203, at 369.
246. Reference to statutory claims often serves as a functional equivalent to public law claims. Not all statutes,
however, incorporate nonwaivable rights of fundamental importance. In civil law systems, for example, basic
contract law is statutory in much the same way the UCC has codified the law of commercial transactions. Thus,
my preference for the term "public law right."
247. See Edward Brunet, Arbitrationand ConstitutionalRight 71 N.C. L. REV. 81 (1992).
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Judicial resistance to arbitration of public law claims has eroded,248 however,
particularly with respect to contracts containing an international element.249 Although
questionable in domestic transactions, where arbitration may lend itself to abuse in
consumer contracts, this trend toward greater subject matter arbitrability is harder to debate
when the divergence of the parties' nationalities creates a fear of biased courts in the wake
of a failed arbitration clause.250 Therefore, many legal systems have a double standard
for arbitrability, and deem subjects arbitrable in an international context even if not so in
a purely domestic transaction. 251
2. Multiple Parties
When more than one commercial agreement touches related parties or transactions,
inconsistent results may arise as to common issues. In his legendary story of the Macao
Sardine Case, Michael Kerr reminds us that judicial power to join claims presents a
considerable advantage over arbitration when multiple transactions all raise the same issue,
such as force majeure arising from a single event.252 In Sir Michael's tale, a quarter
million tins of sardines secretly filled with mud by a Macao canning company had been
sold and resold many times over throughout Asia. Most of the claims gave rise to
consistent judgments for damages against the sellers, rendered in one consolidated action
before the Hong Kong Commercial Court. However, the original buyer's action against the
Macao canning company that had packed sardines ran into trouble. The underlying
contract for this initial sale was subject to an arbitration clause that precluded jurisdiction

248. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The Court overruled
precedent, and held enforceable a predispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933. The
Securities Act no longer requires resolution of claims exclusively in a judicial forum. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), concerning claims arising under the Age Discrimination
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. S 621 (1990); Jenifer A. Magyar, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration,72 B.U.
L. REv. 641 (1992); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). Suit alleged violations of both the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and state law securities act. The Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Arbitration
Act mandated arbitration of all issues covered by an arbitration agreement, leaving no room for discretion on the
part of the district court because of "intertwining" of arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims. Id. at 216-17. See
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (action in California to compel arbitration of claims arising under
the California Franchise Investment Law; the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state
law and applied to state as well as federal claims, concluding that claims arising under the California franchise law
were arbitrable).
249. The line of Supreme Court cases in which arbitration clauses have been upheld in international contexts
goes back almost twenty years to Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), in which the Supreme Court
explicitly extended its recognition to arbitration agreements that implicated securities regulation, even if the dispute
could not have been arbitrated in a purely domestic transaction. Id. at 519-20. In 1985, the Supreme Court in
the landmark case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), announced
that arbitration agreements will be enforced in international contracts even if the claims relate to the fundamental,
or "core," public policy issues raised by antitrust laws that are not arbitrable in a domestic context. Id. at 634-35.
See also Socidt6 Nationale Algdrienne (SONATRACH) v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)
(contract for supply of liquified natural gas; arbitration ordered in Geneva between Algerian state agency and
American company in Chapter 11 reorganization).
250. Even in Mitsubish the Supreme Court made clear that one must look to "congressional intention
expressed in [statutes other than the Federal Arbitration Act] ... to identify any category of claims as to which
agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable." Mitsubish 473 U.S. at 627.
251. Id. On French case law, see JEAN ROBERT & THoMAs E. CARBONNEAU, THE FRENCH LAW OF
ARBITRATION SS 1.03, 2.03-.04, 9.03-.08 (1983), discussing the difference between domestic and international
public policy constraints in French arbitration, at part I, S 1.03, and part II, SS 2.03-.04, 9.03-.08.
252. The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Kerr, Arbitration v. Litigation/TheMacao Sardine Case, 3 ARE. INT'L 79, 86
(1987).
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by the Hong Kong court. The arbitrator in the proceeding against the Macao company
applied lex mercatoria to exonerate the Macao supplier, leaving the merchant with
substantial damages to pay, and no hope of recovery against the real culprit.
Although the rules of some arbitral institutions provide for joinder of parties even if
resisted by one of the existing parties to the arbitration,25 3 this does not eliminate the
need to obtain the consent of the party to be joined. While some jurisdictions meet this
problem by providing for statutory consolidation of related arbitrations, 254 others do
not.25 5 Federal case law has held that consolidation of arbitrations pursuant to a state
statute is not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.2-6
When arbitration does not take place in a jurisdiction with a consolidation statute,
careful drafting can promote effective joinder of related arbitrations.2 57 The objection
to consolidation is that arbitrators who consolidate actions will thereby exceed their
authority. However, if all relevant parties authorize the arbitral tribunal to join two or
more proceedings, it is difficult to see why a party consenting to joinder should later be
allowed to change its mind when the arbitral process runs counter to post-dispute preoccupations. 25 8 When two parties are named as defendants, of course, they may face a
dilemma in nominating their party-appointed arbitrator. If the arbitration agreement
provides for a three-member tribunal, the parties' options include compromise on a
candidate or default in the nomination. 5 9
3. Pre-Award Attachment
No consensus exists yet on the permissibility of interim relief such as pre-award
attachment in international arbitration. 260 Some jurisdictions see interim relief as
inconsistent with the goals of the New York Convention. The argument runs that by
bargaining for arbitration, parties to the contract have agreed to exclude intervention by
national courts until such time as there is an award ready for enforcement. Other courts

253. See RULES O THE LONDON COURT OF INT'LARBITRATION art. 13.1(c) (1985) [hereinafter LCIA RULES].
254. See, ,g., MAss. GN. L. ANN. ch. 251, S 2A (West 1988). In the Netherlands and Hong Kong, courts
have power to order consolidation of related arbitrations unless the parties stipulate otherwise.
255. See Government of U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a federal district court
in New York lacked power to order consolidation of arbitral proceedings arising from separate arbitration
agreements absent the parties' consent).
256. New Eng. Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077
(1989).
257. All relevant arbitration clauses should provide for arbitration in the same country, according to the same
substantive and procedural law, under the same institutional rules, and before a tribunal constituted of the same
arbitrators.
258. Even in England, which has long been unfavorable to consolidation, there is a recognition of the validity
of a contractual solution. See Sir Michael J. Mustill, MultipartiteArbitrations:An Agenda for Law-Maker 7 ARE.
INT'L 393 (1991).
259. See Judgment of Jan. 7, 1992, Cass. civ. Ire, 1992 Bull. Civ. I, Nos. 89-18.708 & 89-18.726 (Fr.).
260. In the United States, pre-award attachment is permitted in maritime matters. However, with respect to
nonmaritime arbitration, the circuits are divided. Compare McCreary Tire and Rubber Co. v. CEAT, S.p.A., 501
F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974) (denied attachment) with Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp 1044
(N.D.Cal 1977) (court determined that nothing in the New York Convention precludes pre-award attachment).
At least one First Circuit case, Teradyne v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986), is favorable to pre-award
injunctions to preserve assets, although it did not deal with a New York Convention context. See also Andros
Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andr6 & Cie., S.A., 430 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See generally, Joseph D. Becker,
Attachment in Aid of Arbitration:The American Position; 1 ARE. INT'L 40 (1985).
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accept pre-award attachment as a way to maximize enforceability of the arbitral process,
entirely consistent with the objectives of the multilateral treaty network.
State legislation has promoted the trend toward allowing interim measures of preaward attachment.2 6' However, state statutes may be of limited value when subject to
challenge on grounds of federal preemption in cases falling under the New York
Convention. 262 To deal with this division of authorities, contracting parties should
provide by contract for pre-award attachment, thereby rebutting any presumption that such
interim measures are inconsistent with the arbitration agreement.
4. Rules, Reasons, and Applicable Law
The quality of an arbitration depends on the arbitrators' skill at finding the facts of
the case and weighing arguments of law. The selection of skilled arbitrators in turn will
depend largely on the applicable arbitration rules, which will provide the mechanism for
constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
Institutional arbitration generally does a better job of maximizing certainty than ad
hoc proceedings not supervised by an arbitral institution. Frequently used arbitral
institutions include the American Arbitration Association, 263 the London Court of
International Arbitration 2 " and the International Chamber of Commerce,265 all of
which generally provide procedures and safeguards for the selection of competent
arbitrators. The last two institutions also provide for reasoned awards,26 6 thus adding to
the rigor of the arbitral process.
Ad hoc arbitration on the other hand is problematic, whether under guidelines drafted
by the parties themselves or under standardized rules. 267 Arbitrations on an ad hoc basis

lack administrative supervision other than by the parties themselves or the arbitrators. 268

261. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. S 7502(c) (McKinney 1994).
262. See, eg., Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobdane, S.A., 57 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1982) (vacatur of attachment in
support of ICC arbitration in Zurich, on grounds that attachment incompatible with New York Convention
obligation of courts to refer the parties to arbitration). See also Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 531
N.Y.S.2d 547 (1988).
263. The American Arbitration Association (AAA), despite its enormous prestige within the United States, is
sometimes perceived as non-neutral by non-American parties.
264. See LCIA RULES, supra note 253.
265. See CRAIG, PARK & PAULSSON, supra note 11. There are at least three distinctive features of ICC
arbitration. First, there is a court to scrutinize awards. Second, the arbitrators are required to draft terms of
reference to focus and define the issue. ICC RuLEs, supranote 220, art. 13. Finally, ICC arbitration has a seventyyear history and has been the object of an entire treatise to provide guidance on its interpretation.
266. See LCIA RuLEs, supra note 253, art. 16.1, providing that the award must state "reasons upon which the
award is based unless all parties agree otherwise" and ICC RuLEs, supra note 220, art. 20(1), requiring the award
to "deal with the merits of the case." French procedural law also requires that arbitration awards contain reasons.
CODE DE PROC9DURE CrWLE [C. PR. cr.] art. 1471 (Fr.). In an international arbitration, however, the parties may
dispense with this requirement, which is not a matter of mandatory public policy (ordre public international). See
cases discussed in ROBERT & CAREONNEAU, supra note 251, SS 6.06, 6.10-.13 (1983).
267. Standard ad hoc rules include the U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES,
arts. 6(2)-(4), 7(2)(b), U.N. Doc. AJ31/17, U.N. Sales No. E.77.V.6 (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL RULES].
UNCITRAL Rules are not to be confused with the model arbitration law drafted by the same body. See generally
Coulson, supra note 211.
268. Under the UNCITRAL Rules, the parties name an "appointing authority" to select the sole arbitrator or
presiding arbitrator, as the case maybe. In default of a selection of an appointing authority, the Secretary General
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague selects the appointing authority. UNCITRAL RULES, supra
note 267, art. 6.
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This supervisory vacuum can only serve to delight defendants wishing to drag their feet.
Moreover, after an ad hoc arbitration, courts asked to enforce awards obtained by default
may be more concerned that the defaulting party did in fact obtain proper notice of the
proceedings than when the arbitration bears the imprimatur of a recognized international
institution such as the International Chamber of Commerce or the London Court of
International Arbitration.
Even with an unequivocal agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration according
to institutional rules, parties wishing to maximize certainty will want to include a choice-oflaw provision in their arbitration clause.269 In some international proceedings, the parties
give the arbitrator the right to decide in amiable composition, which is to say, without any
reference to a recognized legal system. 270 The goal of certainty would generally counsel
against a grant of such powers to arbitrators. In a cross-border business transaction, fidelity
to shared expectations is usually best secured by rights and duties delineated under a legal
system.
C.

The Arbitral Situs

The location of private dispute resolution will influence the availability of procedural
safeguards more than any other element within the parties' control at the time they draft
the arbitration clause.271 The place of arbitration will affect three variables: the integrity
of local judges, the availability of treaty enforcement mechanisms, and statutory provisions
for challenge to arbitral awards.
The concern about judicial integrity is almost self-evident. If the dissatisfied loser of
an arbitration succeeds in having the award annulled by a corrupt judge at the arbitral situs,
then in practice the award will be virtually unenforceable. The New York and the Panama
Conventions both provide for refusal to recognize an award that has been "set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which . . . that award was
made."272 In theory, a court at another situs where the loser has assets could enforce an
annulled award on a discretionary basis. 273 As a practical matter, however, an enforcement forum (other than in France) rarely will second guess courts at the place of arbitration
by recognizing awards set aside where rendered. 274
Therefore, maximizing certainty

269. Other indispensable elements include place of arbitration and language of the proceedings. Desirable and
useful elements include the number of arbitrators, procedures for nominating a presiding arbitrator, option for a
single arbitrator if the amount in controversy is small, qualifications for the presiding arbitrator, and provisions
for interim attachment
270. See William W. Park, Control Mechanisms in the Development of a Moder Lex Mercatoria, in Lax
MERCATOR.A AND ARBTATixroN 109 (Thomas F. Carbonneau ed., 1990).
271. The selection of arbitrators, of course, is the single most important choice the parties may make during
an arbitration. However, the composition of the arbitral tribunal almost always takes place after the dispute arises,
rather than when the arbitration clause is drafted.
272. New York Convention, supra note 24, art V(1)(e); Panama Convention, supra note 198, art. 5(e).
273. The English version of the New York Convention uses the permissive may rather than the mandatory shall
in articulating the court's power to refuse recognition. The French text of the Convention is less clear, and more
forceful: "La reconnaissance et l'ar.cution de la sentence ne seront refuse... que si ... ." [Recognition and
enforcement of the award will not be refused unless .... ] New York Convention, supra note 24, art. V(1).
274. To the best of my knowledge, only once has a court outside France enforced an award annulled where
rendered. In Sonatrach v. Ford, Bacon 6- Davis; a Brussels court ordered execution of an ICC award that had been
set aside after a merits review by an Algerian court at the seat of arbitration in Algiers. The Algerian defendant
was the national gas agency, among the most powerful of state agencies in Algeria. The Belgian court likely
suspected political interference at the arbitral situs. Judgment of Dec. 6, 1988, Trib. pr. inst. de Bruxelles, affd,
Judgment of Jan. 9, 1990, Cour d'appel de Bruxelles (Se chambre) (Belg.).
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involves choosing an arbitral situs where courts are relatively honest, so that annulment of
awards is not likely to be facilitated by a bribe to a local judge.
The second concern-treaty enforcement mechanisms-implicates the scope of the New
York Convention enforcement provisions, which generally apply to awards that are
"foreign" from the perspective of the enforcement forum. Therefore arbitration in one
party's home country usually eliminates the treaty's enforcement obligation at the arbitral
seat. Moreover, many countries will apply the Convention only on a reciprocity basis,
looking to whether the. country in which the award was rendered is also a party to the
Convention. 27" Whether nontreaty enforcement mechanisms are available under national
276
law will depend on the idiosyncracies of local statute.
The final matter-challenge to awards at the arbitral situs-merits special treatment.
In this connection the following sections will examine the interplay of judicial review and
award finality.
1. Judicial Review of Awards
From a legal perspective, the best place for arbitration will be a country whose
judiciary promotes an arbitration's basic procedural integrity, but does not intervene to
correct an arbitrator's honest mistake of law or fact. Finality in arbitration requires that the
parties assume some risk that the arbitrators will render a bad award. Excessive review and
annulment at the arbitral seat will leave counsel with opportunities to disturb the award's
res judicata effect.
Finality of award should not mean, however, that the losing party must accept an
arbitrator's refusal to respect the terms of the arbitral mission, or that courts at the arbitral
situs should ignore a fundamental disaccord between how the arbitrators were authorized
to decide and how they in fact did decide. In addition to making sure that the arbitral
tribunal was properly constituted pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement, courts at the
arbitral situs should hear challenges to awards for: (i) excess of authority by the arbitral
tribunal; (ii) corruption or a lack of independence on the part of any member of the
arbitral tribunal; or (iii) denial of one side's right to present its case.

In France, however, courts have been willing to enforce even awards annulled where rendered. See Pabalk
v. Norsolor, where a French court recognized an Austrian award of an arbitral tribunal that had applied the law
merchant (lex mercatoria),rather than any national legal system. Judgment of Oct. 9, 1984, Cass. civ. Ire, 1984
Bull. Civ. I, No. 83-11.355 (Fr.). See also Judgment of Mar. 23, 1994 (Hilmarton v. Omnium de Traitement et
Valorisation (OTV)), Cass. civ. Ire, reprinted in 1994 RPv. ARa. 327 (note Jarrosson) and in 9 INT'LARB. REp. 483
(1994).
275. See, eg., United States reservations to application of the New York Convention, vAN DEN BERG, supra
note 204, app. B at 416. In some countries, it may matter very little whether the New York Convention applies.
For example, chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act can be used to have the award confirmed and enforced. 9
U.S.C. SS 1-14 (1988). The only significant differences in the United States between enforcing a New York
Convention award and a domestic award are: (i) a three year period (rather than one year period) for
confirmation of the award, and (ii) additional grounds for refusal of confirmation drawn from article V of the N.Y.
Convention. The Convention's article V defenses are available in connection with a motion to confirm, but not for
vacatur. 9 U.S.C. S 207 (1988). In practice courts often confuse the two. See, eg., Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l
Mktg. S.A., 811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987).
276. While it might be theoretically possible for an award to come within the Convention's scope if
characterized as nondomestic, reliance on this little used and unfocused concept would create risks. See Bergesen
v. Muller, 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983), discussed supra part III.A.1.
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2. Models of National Arbitration Law
Judicial review of an award at the place where rendered will be governed not by the
New York Convention, but by the local arbitration law of the arbitral seat. Three statutory
models have emerged for review of arbitral awards by courts at the seat of arbitration: (i)
appeal on the merits, (ii) review to ensure procedural integrity of the arbitration, and (iii)
no right of review at all.277 From the perspectives of justice and efficiency, the second
alternative would seem best. An arbitration statute should permit challenge to an award
for violations of fundamental procedural fairness (such as arbitrator corruption or bias,
arbitrator excess of authorit, and denial of one side's right to present its case), but should
not interfere with the merits of the dispute. Without a right to have the award annulled
at the arbitral situs for procedural irregularity, a losing defendant might be forced to resist
a defective award everywhere in the world that it had assets; a losing claimant in a defective
arbitration would have no remedy at all, other than a new arbitration or litigation.
Procedural integrity will be furthered by arbitral regimes in force in England, 278
France, 279 Switzerland, 280 and the United States,28 1 as well as countries that have
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law. Given the importance of such judicial review at the

277. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 278-311. For an example of the third model (total nonreview), see Belgium's CODE JUDICIARE art. 1717. Even in a country that allows review only for breaches of
procedural integrity rather than error of law, room will still exist for an overreaching judge to set aside awards.
The line is thin between a simple arbitral error ("a bad award" in the vernacular), and an award that exceeds the
arbitrator's authority. Its thinness often peribits a judge who does not like the result in an arbitration to justify
vacatur of the award without invoking the disputes merits. The arbitrators' "manifest disregard of the law" serves
well as grounds to set an award aside in most jurisdictions. These classic justifications for annulment owe their
durability to dictum in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). See also Inter-City Gas Corp. v.Boise Cascade Corp.,
845 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1988).
278. This assumes that the parties have excluded the normal right of appeal by contract. Section 23 of the
1950 English Arbitration Act provides a nonwaivable right to have an award set aside for arbitrator "misconduct."
Arbitration Act 1950 S 23 (Eng.). The right to opt out of appellate review by what the English call an "exclusion
agreement" would be denied in cases governed by English law and dealing with commodities, insurance, or
admiralty matters. The purpose of this exclusion is to keep English law in these areas fertilized by a stream of real
live
cases.
279. See discussion infra part IlI.C.2.e.
280. This is subject to two caveats: the parties may choose cantonal rather than federal procedure, in which
case article 36(f) of the Intercantonal Concordat effectively gives courts the equivalent of appellate review on the
merits by permitting challenge to awards that are "arbitrary... or constitute a clear violation of law or equity."
Swiss Intercantonal Concordat on Arbitration art. 36 (f), SR 279 (1969) [hereinafter Intercantonal Concordat]
translatedin KARRERt & ARNOLD, supra note 164, at 196-217. Under federal procedure the parties may exclude
all review, thus putting themselves under the same regime of arbitral anarchy operating under the Belgian 1985
statute. Swiss LDIP, art. 192(1).
281. However, care must be taken to avoid arbitration clauses that provide for application of state rather than
federal arbitration law. In Volt v. Stanford, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), restrictive provisions of California law trumped
the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act in a way probably unintended by the parties.
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place of arbitration, both for the practitioner and the policy maker, the operative provisions
of the national arbitration law of major arbitral centers will be sketched below.
(a) England
In England and Wales,23 2 courts are empowered to hear appeals from an arbitrator's
decision on matters of law.283 However, the parties may conclude exclusion agreements
that eliminate most judicial review of arbitration awards rendered in international disputes,
as well as interlocutory appeals on questions of law arising in the course of the arbitration.
Even if the parties to an international arbitration conducted in England have agreed
to exclude appeal, an award may still be set aside for arbitrator misconduct.284 English
courts thereby have power to promote the basic integrity of the arbitral process. Court
decisions since the 1979 Arbitration Act have made clear that correcting arbitral misconduct
will not serve as an excuse for backdoor judicial tampering with the legal or factual merits
of an arbitration.238
An exclusion agreement must be in writing. However, reference to appropriate
institutional arbitration rules constitutes the incorporation of a valid exclusion agreement
into the basic contract if such rules stipulate waiver of the right to appeal. 2 6 For
example, arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce 287 and the London
Court of International Arbitration 2ra both will operate as exclusion agreements.
Exclusion agreements will not be valid when English law applies to the substantive
merits of a dispute and the controversy relates to insurance, commodities, or admiralty
matters. Parliament intended that commercial controversies should continue to fertilize the
development of English law in areas in which it has long been preeminent. Exclusion
agreements entered into before the dispute arises will not be valid if all parties are British
residents or nationals. In such cases, domestic interests will be protected through normal
appellate procedures.
A recent House of Lords decision illustrates the contours of English courts' inherent
powers to intervene in an arbitral proceeding. In Channel Tunnel Group v. Balfour Beatty
Construction Ltd.,289 a dispute arose about the cost of alterations in construction of the
Channel Tunnel between England and France. The general contractor threatened to stop
work and the owner/employer brought an action for an injunction restraining suspension
of work. The contractor then moved to stay court proceedings by virtue of a dispute
resolution clause referring the parties to arbitration in Brussels under the rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce. Although the House of Lords stayed the action in
light of the arbitration clause, it also said that English courts had inherent power to grant

282. Scotland has its own arbitration regime, and has recentlyadopted the UNCTRAL Model Arbitration Law,
discussed infra part III.C.2.e.
283. See Arbitration Act 1979, ch. 42, S 1 (Eng.). On English arbitration law, see generally Sm MICHAEL J.
MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARIiTRATION (2d ed. 1989); Adam
Samuel, Developments in English ArbitrationLaw Since the 1984 Antaios Decision, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1988, at 9.

284. Arbitration Act 1950, ch. 27, S 23 (Eng.).
285. See Bank Mellat v. GAA Dev. & Constr. Co., [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 44, 45 (Q.B.) (majority arbitrators
refused to convene further meetings requested by dissenter).
286. Arab African Energy Corp. v. Olieprodukten Nederland B.V., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 419 (Q.B.).
287. ICC RULES, supra note 220, art. 24.
288. LCIA RuLEs, supra note 253, art. 16.8.
289. [1993] App. Cas. 334 (appeal taken from Eng.). See generally,Claude Reymond, The Channel TunnelCase
and the Law ofInternationalArbitration, 109 LAW Q. REv. 337 (1993).
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the injunction, even though in these circumstances it would exercise its discretion not to
do so.290
(b) France

The French arbitration regime applicable to arbitrations that "implicate international
commerce" is designed to promote the procedural integrity of arbitration but not to permit
courts to second-guess arbitrators on matters of law or fact. Article 1502 of the Nouveau
Code de ProcdureCivile permits an international award rendered in France to be annulled
in the following cases:
(1) the arbitrators decided in the absence of an arbitration agreement or
on the basis of a void or expired agreement;
(2) the arbitral tribunal was improperly constituted or the sole arbitrator
irregularly appointed;
(3) the arbitrators exceeded their mission;
(4) the adversary principle [i.e., due process] was not complied with;
(5) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to international public policy [ordrepublic international].
Shortly after its promulgation, the French decree was tested in a case in which a Hong
Kong company had concluded a contract, signed by the Egyptian Minister of Tourism and
the Egyptian General Organization for Tourism and Hotels, for a joint venture to develop
a resort complex near the Pyramids. 29, It was uncertain whether the Minister of Tourism

had bound Egypt as a party to the arbitration dause, or had intervened only in a
supervisory and regulatory capacity. Opting for the first interpretation, the arbitrators
rendered a $12 million award against the Republic of Egypt. The Paris Cour d'appe4
affirmed by France's highest court, the Cour de cassation, disagreed. The Cour d'appel
annulled the award against Egypt on the ground that the arbitrator decided in the absence
of a valid arbitration agreement. There is nothing unusual about such court scrutiny of an
award to determine whether the loser did in fact sign the arbitration agreement. However,
it is less clear whether a judge should limit the judicial role to a minimal check on the
arbitrators' possible distortion of the contract, or should engage in a full examination of
all issues presented by a jurisdictional challenge.

290. Cf Hiscox v. Outhwaite, [1992] 1 App. Cas. 562 (1991) (appeal taken from Eng.). The case is
reproduced in 17 Y.B. CoM. ARE. 599 (1992). Commentaries on the case include Claude Reymond, Where Is an
Arbitral Award Made?, 108 LAw Q. Rav. 1 (1992); John M. Timmons, Where Is an ArbitrationAward Made and
WhatAre the Consequences?, 58 ARBTRATiIo 124 (1992); Fraser P. Davidson, Where Is anArbitralAward Made?Hiscox v. Outhwaite, 41 IT'L & Com P.L.Q. 637 (1992); Michael Schneider, LeLieu otr/a Jurisprudenceest Rendue,
9 BULLETIN DE L'AssocILTIo SUISSE DE L'A.RBTR&GE 279 (1991). The award in Hiscoxwas deemed to have been
rendered in France (and thus normally enforceable under the New York Arbitration Convention), yet held subject
to the "curial" powers of English courts, including the right of appeal.
291. Judgment of July 12, 1984 (Arab Republic of Egypt v. Southern Pac. Properties, Ltd.), Cour d'appel de
Paris, 1987 J.D.I. (Cunet) 129; 1986 RBv. ARw. 75, reprintedin 23 1.L.M. 1048 (Emmanuel Gaillard trans., 1984),
affd Judgment of Jan. 6, 1987, Cass. civ. Ire, 1987 J.D.I. (Clunet) 469, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1004 (Emmanuel
Gaillard trans., 1987). See discussion of Hilmartonand Pabalk supra note 274.
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It may also be worthy of note the French judiciary has evidenced a willingness to
enforce foreign awards even if annulled where rendered. Courts in France have read Article
VII of the New York Convention to permit more generous treatment to foreign awards
than that provided by the Convention. 292
(c) Switzerland

293

The Swiss federal conflict-of-laws code gives parties to international arbitration in
Switzerland a choice between three regimes: (i) broad review for "violation of law or
equity" under cantonal law; (ii) complete autonomy, if the parties have concluded an
explicit agreement to exclude court challenge; 294 or (iii) limited court review for matters
of procedural fairness under the federal conflict-of-laws code. 295
If the parties neither elect cantonal procedure nor explicitly exclude judicial review,
the code provides five grounds for challenge of awards: (i) irregular composition of the
arbitral tribunal; (ii) an erroneous decision by the arbitral tribunal with respect to its own
jurisdiction; (iii) an award beyond the issues submitted to the arbitrators, or the arbitrators'
failure to decide claims within the request for arbitration; (iv) failure to respect the
principle of equal treatment of the parties or the right to adversarial proceedings ("l'dgalitg
des partiesou droitdtre entendu enprocdurecontradictore');and (v) incompatibility of the
award with public policy (ordre public). Challenge to the award must be made before the
Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne unless the parties have expressly agreed to substitute
review by the cantonal court of the arbitral seat.
Review of awards may be excluded under article 192 of the code by an explicit
agreement (dclaration expresse) if no party is a Swiss resident or has a Swiss permanent
establishment. Because waiver of the right to judicial review of the award must be explicit,
reference to institutional arbitration rules containing renunciation of appeal, such as those
of the International Chamber of Commerce or the London Court of International
Arbitration, will not be sufficient to exclude review. If the parties elect to apply cantonal
rather than federal procedure, the Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat permits judicial
review of awards on grounds that include "arbitrariness," defined to encompass "clear
296
violation of law or equity."

292. See discussion of Hilmarton and Pabalk supranote 274.
293. See generally Marc Blessing, The New InternationalArbitration Law in Switzerland: A Significant Step
Toward Liberalism, J.INr' ARE., June 1988, at 9; Charles Poncet & Emmanuel Gaillard, Introduction, Switzerland:
Statute on InternationalArbitration,27 IL.M. 37 (1988).
294. Article 192 of the Swiss LDIP permits exclusion of review only when both parties reside outside
Switzerland. However, a party wrongfully joined to a Swiss arbitration on the basis of an agreement it never signed
presumably would still be able to challenge the award under LDIP article 192. Swiss LDIP art. 192.
295. Id. art. 190(2).
296. Article 36(f) of the Intercantonal Concordat permits an action for annulment of the arbitral award "where
it is alleged... that the award is arbitrary in that it was based on findings which were manifestly contrary to the
facts appearing on the file, or in that it constitutes a clear violation of law or equity." Intercantonal Concordat4
supra note 280, art 36(o. See Philippe Neyroud & William W. Park, Predestinationand Swiss ArbitrationLaw:.
Geneva'sApplication of the IntercantonalConcordat 2 B.U. INT'L LJ. 1, 5 (1983). On the Intercantonal Concordat
see generally PIERRE JOLIDAN, COMMENTAIRE DU CONCORDAT SUISSE SUR L'ARBITRAGE (1984).
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(d) The United States
A federal district court may vacate an award rendered in the United States on grounds
that fall into three general categories: corruption, violation of procedural fairness, and
excess of arbitral authority.297 Contravention of public policy is not an enumerated ground
on which a commercial arbitration award may be vacated under the U.S. Arbitration
Act,298 notwithstanding the broad invocation of public policy in labor arbitration. 299
The statute is drafted broadly enough to encompass arbitrator misconduct of the
proceedings, for example by refusal to postpone hearings or to receive pertinent evidence.
American courts can thereby annul awards when the bargained-for arbitral procedure was
not followed by the arbitrators. The Uniform Arbitration Act generally parallels federal
grounds for vacating an award, permitting vacatur only where an award was procured by
fraud, or where arbitrators exceeded their authority, displayed partiality, or conducted the
hearings so as to prejudice the parties' rightsM0
In the United States as elsewhere, excess of arbitral authority remains difficult to
define. No bright line distinguishes clearly between an arbitrator's reviewable excess of
authority and a simple arbitrator error which neither the parties nor the legislators intended
should lead to relitigation on the merits. A Supreme Court opinion handed down forty
years ago contained dicta interpreting the U.S. Arbitration Act to include the right to
challenge an award for "manifest disregard of the law.s' °1 A concept that is fuzzy at best,
"manifest disregard of the law" dearly presupposes "something beyond and different from
a mere error of the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand and apply
the law."302 It might include an arbitrator's intentional disregard of the correct governing
law, but not an honest mistake in contract interpretation. Some courts have suggested that

297. See 9 U.S.C. S 10 (1988 &Supp. V 1993) (amended 1990, 1992); UNIP. ARBiTRATION ACT 5 12, 7 U.L.A.
1 (1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & P, S 7511 (McKinney 1980).
298. Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act permits vacatur of awards only as follows:

(a)
(b)
(c)

where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators;
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct by refusing to postpone the hearing or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
(d) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

9 U.S.C. S 10 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (amended 1990, 1992).
299. The statutory foundation of labor arbitration lies in section 301(a) of the Taft-HatlhyAct rather than the
Federal Arbitration Act. 29 U.S.C.. S 185(a) (1978). See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987); Michael C. Harper, Limiting Section 301

Preemption: Three Cheersfor the Tri7ot, Only One for Lingle and Lueck, 66 CH.-KENT L.Rav. 685 (1990).
300. See UNIF.

ARBITRATioN

Acr S 12.

301. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
302. Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967) (quoting San Martine Co.
de Navigacion v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961) in which the court refused to apply
the concept of "manifest disregard"). See also Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales
Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960). In one reported case, the court did strike down an award that did not

"draw its essence" from the parties' agreement. Swift Indus. Inc. v. Botany Indus. Inc., 466 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir.
1972). In Sea Dragon v. Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaartkantoor, 574 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court
vacated an award that would have directed violation of a Dutch injunction ordering charterer not to pay the debt
to vessel owner.
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manifest disregard of the law may be found only where the arbitrators "understood and
correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it."303
In an international dispute to be arbitrated in the United States, it is far from clear
what aspects of procedural fairness ought to be considered mandatory. The right to crossexamine witnesses is usually seen by American lawyers and judges as essential to a fair
arbitral hearing notwithstanding divergences between different legal traditions.34 On
other procedural matters, such as discovery, the correct approach is less clear. To the
European business manager, American-style discovery adds unfamiliar complication rather
than comfort. 3° s
(e) The UNCITRAL Model Law
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has drafted
a model law that strikes a balance between arbitral autonomy on the merits of the dispute
and court control of the arbitrations procedural fairness. 3°6 Adopted in 1985 for
consideration by national legislatures, the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration3° 7 gives parties freedom to choose their procedural arbitration rules 3°8
within a framework of judicial review inspired by the New York Convention. 30 9
Article 34 of the Model Law permits annulment of an award for essentially the same
reasons that an award may be refused recognition under the New York Convention. An
award may also be annulled if the arbitration lacked procedural fairness,"*0 or if a court

303.
921 (2d
(Meskill,
304.

Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, 356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y 1973), rev'd on other ground 500 F.2d
Cir. 1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 937 (2d Cir. 1986)
J., concurring) (quoting Seigal v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985)).
Continental legal systems generally provide for proceedings which are more inquisitorial than those with

which Americans are comfortable. On cross-examination in arbitration, see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &R. S 7506(c)
(McKinney 1980); Nestel v. Nestel, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
305. Foreign fears of extensive discovery may account for much reluctance to choose New York as an arbitral
situs, even though courts in New York will ordinarily deny requests for discovery in arbitration. See cases cited
in Steven J.Stein & Daniel R. Wotman, The ArbitrationHearing,in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
n NEw YoRK 86, 87-93 (.Stewart McClendon &Rosabel B.Goodman eds., 1986).
306. See generally HOWARD M.

HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS,

A GuIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL
(1989); Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL Adopts Model Law on
InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 2 ARE. INT'L 2 (1986); IS.AK L DORE, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION
UNDER THE UNCITRAL RuLes: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS (1986).
307. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, U.N. GAOR,
40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 81-93, U.N. Doc. A/40117 (1985) [hereinafter THE MODEL LAW], reprintedin 24 1.L.M.
1302. The Model Law was adopted by G.A. Res. 40/72, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 112th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 53,
at 308, U.N. Doc. A140/53 (1985).
308. THE MODEL LAW, supra note 307, art. 19.
309. Compare THE MODEL LAW, supra note 307, art 34 with New York Convention, supra note 24, art. V.
310. To secure annulment; the party making the application must furnish proof of one of the following defects:
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

(i)
(ii)
(iii)

(iv)

a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity or the agreement
is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it
one party was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of
the arbitral proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case;
the award deals with a dispute not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration;
the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties.

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:135

finds that the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable or that the award conflicts with
the forum's public policy. On the other hand, Article 5 of the Model Law prohibits courts
from exercising any powers not explicitly conferred by the law, such as those exercised by
English courts and discussed above. 311
IV.

EUROPEAN PARADIGMS

Like traveling, a comparative approach to law can enlighten as well as entertain.312
Many European legal traditions do a better job than the United States in balancing
competing objectives in forum selection. Through treaty and statute, most of Western
Europe protects consumers from untoward waiver of jurisdictional rights while at the same
time giving more sophisticated commercial players an assurance that they will get their
bargained-for forum. In Europe, the teachings of a case like Zapata, drawn from a
maritime towing contract between sophisticated German and American companies, 313
would never have been invoked to justify enforcement of a boilerplate prorogation clause
in a standard form cruise ticket like the one at issue in Carnival Cruise.314

A.

The Convention Frameworksls
1. Jurisdiction

The European Union's Treaty on Jurisdiction and Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, known generally as the Brussels Convention, 3 6 enhances litigation certainty
while safeguarding fairness toward consumers 317 through a comprehensive framework for
international allocation of judicial competence. A parallel treaty adopted in Lugano 318

THE MODEL LAw,

supra note 307, art 34.

311. Id. art 5. See suprapart III.C.2.a.

312. On comparative approaches to law, see generally MARY Aln

GLENDON ET AL, COMPAILATIVE LEGAL

TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL (1982); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6Tz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW

(Tony Weir trans., 1987); Gtlnter Frankenberg, CriticalComparisons:Rethinking ComparativeLaw, 26 HIRv. INT'L
L.J. 411 (1985).
313. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, 407 U.S. 1 (1972), discussed supra part II.A.1.
314. See Carnival Cruise v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), discussed supra part II.A.1.
315. To make description easier, the following discussion will cite to the text of the more recent Lugano
Convention, which follows the Brussels text with minor exceptions. For an American perspective on the
Conventions, see von Mehren, supranote 28, at 281-82. Professor von Mehren notes that the United States would
find offensive to standards of fair play the Conventions' provisions for enforcing judgments obtained on the basis
of "exorbitant jurisdiction" against non-domiciliaries of Convention states.
316. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27,
1968, as amended, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. This agreement entered into force on
Feb. 1, 1973 among the six original members of the European Community:. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. By subsequent protocols, the treaty has been extended to newer members of
the Community:. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1978, Greece in 1982, and Portugal and Spain
in 1989. See generallyAUDIT, supra note 146.
317. In domestic cases, employees would generally benefit from the exclusive jurisdiction of labor courts
(Tribunal de prud'hommes). See Case 25179, Sanicentral v. Collin, 2 C.M.L.R. 164 (1979).
318. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcenent of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16,
1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano Convention]. At present, the Convention has been signed by eleven
EC members and four EFTA members: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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extends similar principles 3 19 to nations belonging to the European Free Trade Association.320

These Conventions grant dispositive effect to forum selection clauses. Written
prorogation agreements granting exclusive jurisdiction to courts of a contracting state must
be enforced as long as one party is domiciled in a contracting state. 321 Oral agreements
are permitted if confirmed in writing. Generally, a contractually designated judge may not
refuse to hear a case covered by a valid forum selection clause if one party's domicile is in
a Convention state. 322 Continental law has long been hostile to the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. 323 Although English law is ambiguous in cases where the alternate
forum is outside a Convention state, 324 English courts have no discretion to decline
jurisdiction when the forum selection principles of the Convention apply.325
The Conventions also implicitly endorse the recognition of arbitration clauses and
awards by excluding arbitration from their scope 326 in favor of international treaties that
mandate enforcement of arbitral proceedings.327 Whether this exclusion covers collateral
proceedings related to the validity of the arbitration clause itself has not always been clear.
A broad view of the exclusion would carve out from Convention coverage all disputes
related to an arbitration, including ancillary controversies relating to the validity of the

319. The Brussels and Lugano Conventions build to some extent on the work of the Hague Conferences
Convention on the Choice of Court, concluded in 1965 but never ratified. See Hague Convention, supranote 28.
Similarly, a draft treaty on foreign judgments completed in 1971 has never come into force.
320. EFTA members now include Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
321. Brussels Convention, supra note 316, art 17.
322. By contrast, the Hague Convention seems to impose no limit related to party residence or nationality.
Rather, article 5 by negative implication imposes an obligation on the chosen court to hear the case unless another
court could claim exclusive jurisdiction based on the disputes subject matter. Hague Convention, supranote 28,
art. 5.
323. See generally Georges Droz, Compdtence Judiciaireet Effets des Jugements dans leMarch6 Commun, 1972
RECUEIL DALLoz No. 206. Professor Droz writes: "lifaut tuer dans l'oeufcette source de chicane." [We must kill
this source of squabbling and turkey in its egg.]
324. In a dispute in which a company registered in England was named defendant, the English Court of
Appeal determined that it had discretionary power to refuse to hear the case if it would be more appropriately
heard in Argentina. The court's jurisdiction, however, was based on the English defendant's domicile rather than
a forum-selection clause. The Court of Appeal held that article 2 of the Brussels Convention prevented the
invocation of forum non conveniens only in favor of a contracting state's courts. Therefore an English court could
stay or dismiss proceedings if the alternate forum was outside the European Community. In re Harrods (Buenes
Aires) Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397, reported in Fix. TnmEs, Mar. 26, 1991, at 16. Since 1979, the shares of the great
London department store had been divided between two Swiss entities, with control ultimately residing in
Argentina. See Hlne Gaudemet-Tallon, Le Forum Non Conveniens: Une Menacepour la Convention de Bruxelles?,
80 REvuE CRITIQUE DE DorT INTERNATIONAL Piurv [R.C.D.I.P.] 491 (1991). See also Lawrence Collins, Forum
Non Conveniens and the Brussels Convention, 106 LAw Q. Rv.535 (1990); Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryanston
Ins. Co., [19901 2 All E.R. 335 (Q.B.); S & W Berisford plc v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [1990] 2 All E.R. 321
(Q.B.). In both cases, the more appropriate forum was New York.
325. See S & W Berisford, [1990] 2 All E.R. at 332 ("The [Brussels] convention leaves no room for the
application of any discretionaryjurisdiction by the courts of this country; the availability of such a discretion would
destroy the framework of the convention."). See also DicEY & Moxuus, supra note 170, at 410: 'Where Article
17 of the 1968 Convention applies the chosen court has no discretion to decline jurisdiction."
326. Brussels Convention, supra note 316, art. 1(4) ("The Convention shall not apply to ...arbitration.")
Matters of status, matrimonial relationships, and succession, as well as bankruptcy and social security, are also
excluded from coverage.
327. New York Convention, supra note 24; European Convention, supranote 212. The European Convention,
intended to supplement rather than to compete with the New York Convention, covers arbitrations between
residents of treaty countries. The New York Convention's broader scope looks to the place of arbitration rather
than the residence of the parties, and includes all foreign awards, regardless of party residence; the New York
Convention permits a reservation to limit coverage to awards rendered in other treaty countries. See discussion
of both Conventions supra text accompanying notes 315-44.
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agreement to arbitrate. A narrower view would make the Convention inapplicable only in
litigation connected directly with an existing arbitration, such as judicial recognition of an
328
award.
The broader view prevailed in a recent decision 29 involving a Swiss buyer of oil

transported on a vessel known as The Atlantic Emperor.3" The European Court of Justice
interpreted the Convention's scope solely by reference to the litigations subject matter
(arbitration) rather than the procedural posture of the litigation.3 3' Consequently,
preliminary issues related to whether an arbitration agreement exists at all were excluded
3 32
from the Convention's scope.

What the European court called "the principle of legal certainty" served as the
jurisprudential touchstone and policy underpinning for its decision. The court reasoned

that the reliability of arbitration would be reduced if the Convention's scope could "vary
according to the existence or otherwise of a preliminary issue that could be raised at any

time by the parties." 333 More preliminary issues for lawyers to argue about mean less
certainty that the chosen arbitrators will hear the case.

The Conventions recognize that standard form consumer contracts sometimes impose
prorogation agreements on presumptively naive individuals with inferior bargaining power.
The Conventions deal with this potential for abuse by restricting recognition of prorogation
agreements in contracts concluded for the supply of goods, service, or credit for a purpose
outside the scope of the user's trade or profession. A special jurisdictional regime applies

to: (i) installment sales of goods on credit, (ii) installment loans to finance the sale of
goods, and (iii) contracts for the supply of goods or services resulting from a solicitation
33
or publicity in the consumer's country of domicile. 4

328. For a discussion of the merits of these competing views, see His Hon. Judge M. Zuleeg, MarcRich: Report
for the Hearing,7 ARa. INT'L 187 (1991); Marco Darmon, Marc Rich: Opinion of theAdvocate Genera 7 Awi. INT'L
197 (1991); Peter Schlosser, The 1968 Brussels Convention and Arbitration,7 ARB. INT'L 227 (1991); Paul Jenard,
Opinion, 7 ARB. INT'L 243 (1991).
329. Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. Societa Italiana Impianti P.A., 2 CEC (CCH) 358 (1991),
reprintedin Marc Rich The Judgment of the European Court,7 ARs. INT'L 251 (1991). For an American report of
the case, see Important Ruling for ADR in Europe, ARB. TirEs, Spring 1992, at 8. See generally Bernard Audit,
Arbitrationand the Brussels Convention, 9 ARB. INT'L 1 (1993).
330. The buyer claimed the oil was seriously contaminated and began arbitration against the Italian seller in
London, as provided in the contract. When an English court was asked to assist in the appointment of an
arbitrator, the sellers commenced a rival proceeding in Italy, claiming that under the Brussels Convention only
courts at the Italian defendant's residence were competent to hear the dispute. The real dispute (said the Italian
seller) was not over the nomination of an arbitrator, but over the very validity of the arbitration clause; if this
subsidiary issue were to be decided by Italian courts, English courts might be ousted from their jurisdiction to
appoint an arbitrator. For the English aspect of the case, see Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. Societa Italiana Impianti
P.A. (The "Atlantic Emperor") 1 Lloyd's Rep. 548 (C.A. 1989). The Court of Appeal referred the question to the
European Court of Justice under the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the Common Market.
331. The English Court of Appeal had taken a similar view. Id.
332. The English proceeding for the appointment of arbitrators therefore could go forward, notwithstanding
the Italian litigation. What this does, of course, is open the door to the possibility of inconsistent findings on the
validity of an arbitration agreement For example, an Italian court competent to hear a dispute under normal
convention rules (based on the defendant's domicile) might find an arbitration clause void, while English courts
at the arbitral situs might find the arbitration clause valid, and thereby proceed to assert the arbitral proceedings.
333. Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. Sociea Italiana Impianti P.A., 2 CEO (CCH) 358, 374 (1991),
reprinted in Marc Rich Judgment of the Court; 7 ARB. INT'L 251, 256 (1991).
334. Brussels Convention, supranote 316, art. 13. The application of this regime assumes steps are taken to
conclude the contract in the country of domicile.
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In such consumer cases, the consumer may be sued only in his or her home
courts. 335 Plaintiff consumers, however, have an option to bring actions either at the
place of their own domicile or the domicile of the other party. The Conventions permit
waiver of the consumer's special jurisdictional protection only after the dispute has
37
arisen 33 or when both parties are domiciled in the same state.3
2. Judgments
The best of rules allocating judicial competence are of limited value if national courts
may ignore decisions emanating from competent fora. Therefore, effective forum selection
implicates enforcement of foreign judgments as well as jurisdictional agreements.
The Conventions require each contracting state to recognize and execute the others'
judgments 338 in a manner not unlike that of the United States Constitution's full faith
and credit clause. 339 The Conventions' foreign judgments provisions admit only limited
exceptions to recognition, intended to insure procedural integrity.340 Judgments rendered
in other Convention states must be recognized even without any judicial confirmation.341
Refusal of recognition is justifiable only for: (i) procedural irregularities (including lack of
proper notice to the defendant and the res judicata effect of another judgment),34 2 (ii)
violation of the public policy of the enforcement forum,343 and (iii) disregard of subject
matter limitations as to which exclusive fora have been designated. Exclusive fora exist for
insurance, consumer contracts, in rem proceedings, patents, and corporate dissolution. 3- 4
3. The Interaction of National Law and Treaty
Even absent treaty provisions, European law generally provides less risk of forum non
conveniens problems than the U.S. doctrine. Traditionally, English judges have welcomed
jurisdiction on the basis of a forum selection clause, regardless of whether the parties or the
dispute possessed a link with England.? s Recent acceptance of forum non conveniens
notions has been limited to cases in which the existence of an "appropriate" alternate

335. Id. art 14.
336. Id.art 15(1). Waivers may be predispute if both parties are domiciled or habitually resident in the same
treaty state. Because the Convention excludes arbitration from its scope, it would seem possible to avoid this proconsumer provision by an arbitration clause, even if not by a court-designating prorogation agreement.
.337. Id. art 15(3).
338. Id. art 26.
339. U.S. Coxsr. art IV, S 1.
340. Brussels Convention, supra note 316, arts. 26 (on recognition), 31 (on execution).
341. Id. art 26.
342. See id. arts. 27(2)-(3), (5).
343. See id. art 27(1).
344. Brussels Convention, supra note 316, arts. 27-28 (using the mandatory shall not (be recognized) rather
than the permissive may not). Article 28 provides that "a judgment shall not be recognized if it conflicts with the
provisions of SS 3, 4 or 5 of Title n" of the Convention. Id. These sections deal respectively with insurance,
consumer contracts, and "exclusive jurisdiction" for the special subjects mentioned in the text above. Id.
345. Lord Denning dismissed the policy concern over forum-shopping in a case arising from a collision in
Belgian waters between Dutch and Belgian vessels. "You may call this 'forum shopping' if you please," wrote
Denning, "but if the forum is England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the goods and the
speed of the service." Owners of the Motor Vessel "Atlantic Star" v. Owner of the Motor Vessel "Bona Spes" 1973
Q.B. 364, 382 (Eng. C.A. 1972). However, the English rules on forum non conveniens obtain even in forum clause
cases. See DIcEy & Momus, supra note 170, at 393-95.
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forum argues against litigation in England.3 6 Because England has no system of federal
courts similar to those of the United States, resort to forum non conveniens concepts also
serves a function in connection with venue transfer among geographical districts.4

7

Continental do'ctrine has generally been more categoric about the duty of courts to
hear a case regardless of claims of inconvenient forum. 348 A recent French case decided
by the Paris Cour d'appelhas held that a prorogation agreement granting jurisdiction to the
commercial courts of Paris in a contract between companies organized in Liechtenstein and
Mauritius would be enforced notwithstanding the absence of any link between France and
the parties or their dispute. 49 The court reasoned that the absence of any statutory
prohibition on competence favored honoring the forum selection. Similar results obtain
under German law 3so and Switzerland's conflict-of-laws statute. 51
B.

The Helvetic Model

Switzerland's federal conflicts-of-law code rationalized the patchwork of procedural
rules applicable in twenty-six cantonal jurisdictions.5 2 This remarkable piece of

346. In a case usually referred to as The Spiliada after the name of the implicated ship, the House of Lords
elaborated notions of discretionary refusal to hear a case notwithstanding the presence of a clear statutory basis
for jurisdiction. Spiliada Maritime Co. v. Cansulex, [19871 1 App. Cas. 460 (appeal taken from Eng.). A Liberian
shipowner sought leave to serve process on a Canadian seller, under an English statute allowing extraterritorial
jurisdiction in cases governed by English law. In The Spiliada, the bills of lading were expressly made subject to
English law. English "Rules of the Supreme Court" permit a plaintiff to serve a writ on a defendant outside England
in a breach of contract action governed by English law. See RSC Order 11. The House of Lords affirmed the trial
court's discretion to allow service of the writ, in large measure because the action would have been time-barred
in Canada. However, several Lords noted the possibility of a stay of litigation when there exists another available
forum where the case can be "tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice." See,
e.g., the opinion of Lord Goff of Chieveley, The Spiliada, [1987] 1 App. as. at 466-68.
347. In contrast, specific rules deal with the correct "divisions," such as probate or admiralty. Scottish law
has more precise rules dealing with the proper "sheriffdom" for an action. The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments
Act of 1982 applies the principles of the 1968 Brussels Convention to intra-United Kingdom jurisdictional
allocation between the three legal systems of England/Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland.
348. See Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 324, at 509-10. Normally, French courts would hear a case if there
existed a "chef de compdtence' [ground of competence], which would include the parties' nationality, the place of
contract execution or performance, or the situs of the wrongful act. See generallyAUDIT, supranote 146. Cf Swiss
LDIP art. 5 discussed infra note 373.
349. Judgment of Oct. 10, 1990 (Belle Vue Mauricia Harel Frres v. Canmaga Trade Corp.), Cour d'appel de
Paris (Ire chambre) (Fr.), reprintedin 80 R.C.D.I.P. 605 (1991) (note Gaudemet-Tallon).
350. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 391-93.
351. Swiss judges must hear international cases pursuant to a prorogation agreement as long as one party
resides in Switzerland or Swiss law is applicable to the dispute. See Swiss LDIP art. 5. One commentary has noted
the problematic nature of this mandate: "Les juges composant le tribunal ilu par les parties ne seront pas
n .essairement enchantds de ee surcroltde travail" [The judges constituting the court selected by the parties will
not necessarily be charmed by the surplus of work.] FRANos KNOEPPLER & PHILIPPE SCHWEIZER, PRECIS DR
DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt SUISSE 198 (1990). When both parties are Swiss residents, the LDIP does not apply,
and Swiss courts may apply the notion of forum non conveniens. See discussion infra note 375.
352. Swiss LDIP. One hundred years prior to the LDIP, Switzerland enacted the Loi Fdralesur les Rapports
de DroitCivil des Citoyens A.tablis ou en SUjour (effective June 25, 1891, now abrogated); the law dealt with matters
of family, personal status, and inheritance. See generally discussion by Alfred E. von Overbeck, Introduction to
Suisse, in Las LEGISLATIONS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 107 (Asser Instituted., 1971). See generally,KARRIHR
& ARNOLD, supra note 164; KNOEPFLER & SCHWEIZER, supra note 351, at 192-201; Francois Knoepfler, Le Contrat
dans le Nouveau Droit InternationalPrivd Suisse, in LE NouVEAu DRr INTERNATIONAL PRIVt SUISSE 79-106

(Prancois Dessemontet ed., 1989); Alfred E. von Overbeck, Lese ections de for selon la Loi fdd&ale sur le droit
internationalpriv6 du 18 ddcembre 1987, in FFsTsCHRIUT FOR MAx KELLER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 609, 611-12
(Peter Forstmoser et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter von Overbeck, Les ilections]. In twenty-six cantons, the three sets
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legislation sets forth relatively precise rules relating to jurisdiction, choice of law, judgments,
and international arbitration. 3 "3 Among the codes important features is a provision
under which a Swiss court 5 4 must exercise jurisdiction conferred by a forum selection
agreement. 355 The code also supplies a framework for international arbitration in
Switzerland 3-% (while leaving domestic arbitration to cantonal law357) and affirms the
primacy of the New York Convention as to foreign awards, which will continue to benefit
from a presumptive validity if not set aside where rendered or held to be inconsistent with'
fundamental procedural fairness. 3-s
While still leaving many questions open to debate,35 9 the Swiss statute suggests a
starting point for reducing adjudicatory ambiguities in forum selection.3 6s The private
interest in party autonomy has not obscured the public goal of protecting a community's
weaker members from abusive clauses. Federal standards that preempt unsettling
divergences among cantonal procedures give the Helvetic model a particular merit over the
prorogation disharmony of the U.S. federal system.361
1. Honoring Agreements
The federal statute fixes not only the international allocation of competence between
Switzerland and other countries, but also eliminates many intercantonal jurisdictional
inconsistencies arising out of Switzerland's federal system, previously governed by local civil
procedure codes.362 Swiss courts must recognize contractual jurisdiction clauses if the
dispute involves a question relating to money or other property,36 3 and the prorogation

of "half-cantons" (Appenzell, Basel, and Unterwald) are counted as six jurisdictionally distinct political
subdivisions, notwithstanding their common ancestry.
353. Swiss LDIP art 1 provides that the law applies "en maotilreinternationaleliminternationalenVerhaltnis."
What makes a matter international is not defined. See KNOEPFLas & SCHWEMER, supra note 351, at 88-89.
354. In Switzerland, the federal judicial system is effectively limited to one court of general jurisdiction, the
Tribunalftddra in Lausanne.
355. Swiss LDIP art 5.
356. Id. arts. 176-94. See generally PiERaa LALIVE ET At., La DROIT DE L'ARBITRAGa (1989); Blessing, supra
note 293, at 9; Emmanuel Gaillard, A Foreign View of the New Swiss Law on InternationalArbitration, 4 ARB. INT'L
25 (1988); S euEL, supra note 283.

357. In all cantons except Lucerne this will be the Intercantonal Concordat, supra note 280. See generally
supra note 296.
358. Swiss LDIP art 194. On interpretation of the New York Convention by Swiss courts, see LALivE, supra
note 356, at 456-62.
359. For example, it is uncertain what the attitude of Swiss courts should be toward foreign judgments that
have ignored a prorogation agreement valid under Swiss principles, when the defendant raised and lost the forumselection issue before the foreign court See von Overbeck, Les glections, supra note 352, at 624-26.
360. Id. at 620.
361. Professor von Overbeck has referred to these as "the uncertainties of cantonal folklore" ["les
incertitudes
du folklore cantonal"]. Id. at 620.
362. Before enactment of the LDIP, cantonal law generally covered matters related to jurisdiction and
judgments, and federal law governed matters related to choice of law. Cantonal law could be preempted by federal
judgments treaties and by the 1891 Loi Fddfrale sur les
Rapports de Droit Civil des Citoyens .tablis ou en Sjour
(discussed supranote 352) on family, personal status, and inheritance matters.
363. Swiss LDIP art. 5 speaks of matiarepatrimoniale[financial interest]. Thus, divorce disputes as such are
excluded from the scope of the article. Other portions of the LDIP carve out additional subject areas as to which
the normally competent jurisdictional rules applynotwithstanding a choice of forum. These include determinations
of title to Swiss realty (art 97), actions concerning public securities issues (art 151(3)), and predispute clauses in
consumer transactions (art 114). Swiss LDIP arts. 5, 97, 151(3) & 114.
JOLIDON,
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agreement permits proof of a precise text (including a fax or telegram). 36' The choice
of jurisdiction will be presumed exclusive unless the contract provides otherwise. 365 The
choice of forum must not, however, "abusively" deprive a party of the protection of a
forum provided by Swiss jurisdictional rules. 6
The prohibition of "abusive" court selection clauses was the subject of vigorous debate
within the Swiss parliament. Certain legislators considered the nullity of abusive clauses
objectionable because of its tendency to reduce business certainty: another opportunity to
put forum selection in doubt.36 7 On the other hand, others tried to expand the scope

of the provision to invalidate abusive waivers of foreign court protection as well as Swiss
jurisdiction. 36 8

An additional protection afforded to consumers369 gives consumers an election to
sue either at their domicile or at the supplier's domicile. Consumers may not waive the
right to sue at their residence or domicile except after a dispute has arisen. 370 Choice-oflaw clauses are excluded for consumer contracts. 371
The code circumscribes the contexts in which a Swiss court may refuse the jurisdiction
thrust upon it by the parties. 372 In an international case, a party-chosen judge may not
decline to hear a dispute ifi (i) Swiss law governs the litigation, 373 or (ii) one of the
parties is a resident of Switzerland.374 Thus Swiss legislators have statutorily limited
judicial abstinence under any analogue to forum non conveniens, except in cases where the

364. Id. art. 5(1).
365. Id. art 5. Swiss case law has generally been generous in assuming the exclusivity of forum-selection
clauses. See the cases discussed in DIE INTERNATIONALE SCHIEDSGERICHTSBAREIT INDER SCHWaIZ (G. Waiters
et al. eds., 1991), construing the term "unterwerfe' [to submit] as expressing exclusivity.
366. Swiss LDIP art 5(2) provides: "L'&ction de for est sans effetsi elle conduit aprverd'une manire abusive
une des partiesde la protection que lui assure un for prdvu par le droitsuisse "
367. See von Overbeck, Les glections, supra note 352, at 620-21.
368. The Conseildes Atats (analogous to the U.S. Senate) at first voted to eliminate the limitation, and reversed
itself only after opposition from the more populist lower chamber, the Conseil national See von Overbeck, Les
dlectionS supra note 352, at 620.
369. The concept of a consumer is similar to that under the Lugano and Brussels Conventions: the supply
of goods or services not linked to the user's trade or profession. Swiss LDIP art. 120(1).
370. Id. art 114(2).
371. Id. art. 120(2).
372. Law prior to the entry into force of the federal statute was also welcoming to forum shoppers unless the
forum-selection clause served as a basis for provisional measures that could involve extraterritorial assertion of
jurisdiction. In one case, a Geneva cantonal court accepted to hear a dispute between a Bermuda company and
a Liechtenstein foundation (anstat) concerning a worthless chrome mine in Zimbabwe. Judgment of Sept. 25, 1987
(Chalkwell Inv. Co. v. Bolac Anstalt), Trib. fediral, No. P 373/86 (Sup. Ct. of Switz.). See also Judgment of Feb.
8, 1990 G & M Communications v. Seabay Corp.), Cour de justice civile de Gen ve (Ire sec.), reported in 112
SEMAINE JuoscIAl.E, Apr. 3, 1990, at 196. A British Virgin Islands company had agreed to purchase from a
Cayman Islands company all of the share capital of a Dutch Antilles company. The relevant contract was governed
by Swiss law, and provided for settlement of disputes by Geneva courts. Fearing that its counterparty was
negotiating directly with a competing buyer also outside Switzerland, the purchaser requested the Swiss court to
block any negotiations between the seller and the rival purchaser. Both the lower court and the appellate courts
refused to issue such orders, reasoning that the more appropriate forum for the matter was the court with powers
to enforce its orders directly. SeegenerallyCarlo Lombardini, JurisdictionalClause in Contract FIN. L. REv. 42 (Jan.
1991).
373. Swiss LDIP art 5(3). This requirement can usuallybe arranged through a choice-of-law clause. See Kurt
Siehr, Rules for Decliningto ExerciseJurisdictionin Civil and CommercialMatters, in RAvPoRTs SUIssEs PalSENTks
AU XIVME CoNGRts INTERNATIONAL DE DRoIr COMPARA 163, 170-71 (1994).
374. Id. A foreign entity with a Swiss branch (6tablissement) in the relevant canton would also give rise to
mandatory jurisdiction.
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controversy has no connection with Switzerland. 375 Contractually designated courts must
hear the case when the dispute implicates Swiss law or a Swiss resident, regardless of how
great the burden might be on public resources. 376
2. Foreign Judgments 377
The federal statute provides a uniform scheme for recognition of foreign judgments.
Foreign court decisions not subject to challenge where rendered will benefit from
recognition unless incompatible with Swiss public policy or a valid prior judgment (either
in Switzerland or elsewhere).378 The Swiss court may raise violation of public policy on
its own motion. A court may refuse to recognize a judgment if the foreign proceeding is
tainted with lack of proper notice to the losing party or absence of due process,3 79 which
must be proven by the party resisting recognition. Unlike some prior cantonal
provisions,3 80 the federal statute does not require reciprocal treatment of Swiss judgments
in the foreign country whose courts rendered the decision'. When judgments or arbitral
awards are directed against foreign states, Swiss law will require a "sufficient connection"
with Switzerland (Binnenbeziehung) for the judgment or award to be enforceable. 38'
A Special Statusfor Merchants

C.

Like Switzerland's conflict-of-laws code, the German 38 2 and French 38 3 legal
systems commend themselves for an equilibrium and precision in forum selection far
superior to the United States approach. Both countries enforce jurisdiction agreements
against presumptively sophisticated business professionals, but not against consumers.
France and Germany provide separate procedures to regulate transactions between
merchants, a term of art that includes both individuals and companies contracting in their

375. A different standard would apply in a domestic (internal) case not covered by the LDIP. See, eg.,
Judgment of Sept. 9, 1992, Handelsgericht des Kantons Zilrich, HG92127B/HG92, in which the Zurich commercial
court heard a dispute between two Swiss entities (from Altishofen and Vernier). See generallydiscussion of Zurich
cases in Siehr, supra note 373, at 171.
376. The new statute follows the lead of some prior case law in which Swiss courts accepted jurisdiction when
neither party was Swiss and the litigation had no connection with Switzerland. See Judgment of Sept. 25, 1987
(Chalkwell Inv. Co. v. Bolac Anstalt), Trib. fWdral, No. P 373/86 (S.,Ct. of Switz.), affgJudgment of Apr. 11, 1986,
Cour de justice de Gen~ve (litigation over a Zimbabwe chrome mine, opposing a Bermuda corporation with
Kentucky shareholders (Ashland Oil) against a Liechtenstein anstalt). The cantonal court accepted jurisdiction in
a decision upheld by Switzerland's Federal Supreme Court (Tribunalftd~ral).
377. See generally Swiss LDIP arts. 25-32; Paul Volken, Conflits de Juridictions Entraide Judiciaire
Reconnaissance et Ex4ction des Jugements AtrangerS, in LE NoUVEAu DROIT IN.TERNATIONAL PRIVt SUISSE, supra
note 352, at 233, 245-48; KNOEPPLER & SCHWEIZER, supra note 351, at 222-28.

378. Swiss LDIP art. 25.

379. "Violation dprincipesfondamentauxressortintsa la conceptionsuisse du droitdeprocldure,notammont
que ladite partie n'a pas la possibilitg de faire valoir ses moyens." [In violation of essential principles of Swiss
procedural law, notably in that the party was denied the right to be heard.] Swiss LDIP art. 27(2)(b).
380. See Volken, supra note 377, at 247.
381. See Circulairedu Dipartmentfdralde justice et police, Nov. 26, 1979, reprintedin 1980 JURISPRUDENCE
DES AUTORiTrAs ADMINISTRATIVES DE LA CON'ID19RATION 224.
382. For help with the German materials discussed below, special thanks are due to Dr. Christian BflhringUhle.

383. See generaliyAuDIT, supranote 146, at 323-24. Cf.PIRRE MAYER, DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 187-90

(1987); LOUsSoUAEN & BouREL, supra note 169, SS 454-455, 493-494 (1978).
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professional or commercial capacity.38 4 It is this distinction between commercial and
noncommercial contracts that forms the basis for the merit of French and German forum
selection law.
The French Civil Procedure Code restricts court selection by providing that "any
clause which ... derogates from territorial jurisdictional rules is to be considered void
[nonwritten] unless it was concluded between persons all of whom contracted in their

capacity as merchant (commerpant) and the derogation was specified in an obvious way in
the obligation of the party against whom it is invoked."' 5 When first enacted in 1972,
these provisions left some uncertainty about whether they covered international contracts,
and caused some commentators to speculate that they might allow forum selection clauses
in international business only between persons possessing the status of commer~ant3 86
Subsequent case law87 has made clear, however, that court selection clauses in international contracts between nonmerchantsS8 do not run afoul of a French court's mandatory territorial jurisdiction.389 Moreover, a French judge will generally have no discretion
90
to refuse jurisdiction under a prorogation agreement.3
German law generally prohibits choice-of-forum clauses except after the dispute has
arisen, when the contours of the controversy are known and the risk of abuse of bargaining
power would arguably be de minimis. Post-dispute prorogation justifies itself as a form of
settlement,391 with less risk of ill-informed waiver of jurisdiction when the controversy's
contours are delimited and the parties' respective rights have been identified.
Like the French, the Germans allow two important exceptions to this restriction. First,
pre-dispute forum selection clauses are permitted in contracts among merchants, a category

384. "CommerFant" in France; "kaufmann" (plural kauflkute) in Germany. Many civil law jurisdictions make
a dichotomy between civil and commercial acts, having a separate legal regime for contracts concluded between
or among persons contracting as merchants, or in the capacity of their trade or business. See ARTUR T. VoN
MEHREN & JAMES R. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 100-02, 129-30 (1977); GLENDON, supra note 312, at
112-14; ZWEIGERT & K"rz, supra note 312, at chs. 11-14.
385. C. PR. CIV. Art. 48 (Fr.):
Toute clause qui directement ou indirectement d#roge aux ragles de compitence territorialeest rdputke
non dcrite a moins qu'elle n'ait dt convenue entre des personnes ayant toutes contractd en qualtg de
commerjantet qu'elUe n'aitdti spdcifik defaon tr~s apparentedans l'engagementde la partiea qui elle
et opposk.
386. See LoussouARm & BouREL, supra note 169, S 454: "Faut-il en ddduire que les prorogations
conventionnelles de compdtence internationalesont ddsormais interdites sauf entre commerfants? Une tele solution

seraitregrettable... ." [Must we then conclude from this that contractual prorogations of international forum
selection are now forbidden, except as between merchants? Such a result would be regrettable .... ]
387. See Judgment of Dec. 17, 1985, Cass. civ. Ire, 1985 Bull. Civ. I,No. 84-16.338 (Fr.), discussed in AuDIT,
supra note 146, SS 387-388.
388. French law does not contain any explicit rejection of international forum-selection clauses involving
consumers. However, given that France is surrounded on all sides by countries that are party to either the Brussels
or the Lugano Conventions, which do contain consumer protection provisions, it is highly unlikely that an international consumer contract would not be covered by the convention restrictions discussed supratext accompanying
notes 334-37.
389. Known as "comptence territorialeimp6rative." For example, public policy would seem to dictate that
prorogation agreements are void or voidable in cases where it would conflict with a French court's exclusive
jurisdiction (eg., a bankruptcy court's determination of priorities among creditors) or would interfere with the
determination of personal status (eg., marriage, adoption, or divorce). See LoussouARN & BoURaI, supra note
169, S 454.
390. See discussion of Belle Vue Mauricia Harel Fr~res v. Canmaga Trade Corp., supratext accompanying note
349. (Contract between Liechtenstein entity and Mauritius corporation.)
391. ZPO art. 38 (Ger.).
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that includes all corporations, partnerships, and individuals carrying on business in one of
the "basic trades." 392 Second, predispute forum selection clauses may be contained in
international contracts, defined to include agreements in which at least one party has no
"jurisdictional residence" 393 in Germany.
V. WHENCE AND WHITHER
In cross-border transactions, forum selection clauses-both arbitration agreements and
court-selecting clauses-permit parties from different countries to reduce the prospect of
biased and inaccessible adjudication. In a non-international context, however, forum
selection agreements often appear in the fine print of a standard form contract that serves
to maneuver an ill-informed consumer into a court that may be neither accessible nor
neutral to the consumer. Thus, the values that justify forum selection clauses in
international business often condemn them in domestic transactions.
Western European legal systems generally have been more vigorous than the United
States in reconciling this tension between the business community's desire for adjudicatory
certainty and society's broader concern to protect its commercially weaker members. With
respect to court selection agreements, treaties and statutes in much of Western Europe give
jurisdiction clauses dispositive effect in international business transactions, while preserving
consumers' access to courts at their domicile.
The time has come to bring the European models of forum selection law across the
Atlantic. First, a federal court selection act should require American courts to honor
international prorogation agreements. Second, the United States should attempt to
negotiate a network of limited treaties for the enforcement of court decisions based on valid
jurisdiction clauses. Both the statute and the treaties should exclude consumer transactions
from their scope.
A.

A Court-Selection Statute

The special need for reliability in cross-border business adjudication calls for a federal
International Court Selection Act. 394 Jurisdiction clauses entirely between United States
citizens and/or residents could be excluded from the scope of the statute, given that such
arrangements normally do not raise the neutrality concerns present in an international
transaction 3 95 U.S. courts should be required to stay actions inconsistent with a valid
choice-of-court clause. The statute should preempt inconsistent state legislation in the
same fashion as the Federal Arbitration Act preempts more restrictive state arbitration law
in interstate commerce. Moreover, federal courts designated under such a court selection
agreement should be required to hear a case if one party to the agreement is a U.S.citizen

392. The term used for "merchant" is.Kaufinann, and for "basic trade" is Grundhandelsgeschaft.
393. Allgemeiner Gerichtsstand.
394. See appendix infra For a parallel initiative aimed at rationalizing domestic forum selection, see Patrick
J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the FederalCourts After CarnivalCruise, 67 WASH. L. REv. 55 (1992).
S395.
There would seem to be no need for a more expansive coverage of contracts only among Americans even
if they implicate international commerce. The other side's courts should not be that frightening when the other
party is American. Compare coverage of the New York Convention under 9 U.S.C. S 202 (1988).
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or the dispute raises a federal question. 396 Both of these criteria would supply a nexus
consistent with the requirements of Article III of the Constitution.
It is tempting to go further and to suggest that federal courts should hear cases
notwithstanding the absence of a federal question or an American party at least if the law
of a U.S. state applies to the controverted transaction. Judicial determination of state law
cases would enrich not only legal development, but also members of the bar called to
render opinions and argue cases. 397 A statute of such scope, however, might raise
constitutional difficulties related to subject matter jurisdiction in a suit between two aliens
not based on a federal question.398 While an argument could be made that a forum
selection act could in itself serve as a source of federal jurisdictional power, 399 there
would seem to be no compelling reason for the United States to push its court selection
mandates that far. The benefit derived from foreign fees for American lawyers would have
to be weighed against the cost of greater strain on judicial resources.
The statute should exclude predispute consumer transactions400 from its scope
unless the clause gives consumers an option to sue and to be sued at their residence.41
In the alternative, the statutory scope could be limited to contracts between merchants and
professionals acting in the capacity of their trade or business.40 2 The statute should also
subject court selection clauses to special judicial scrutiny when they operate in tandem with
choice-of-law clauses as a prospective waiver of mandatory norms of the country of contract
performance. Such legislation would enhance the values of predictability, reliability, and
neutrality, while reducing the danger that abusively imposed prorogation agreements would
40 3
impair fundamental rights of a party with little realistic bargaining power.

396. States could be left free to decide whether or not to follow the example of New York in likewise limiting
judicial discretion to refuse to hear a casi. See discussion supra part ll.B. An attempt by Congress to force state

courts to hear cases covered by such a statute might arouse Constitutional quibbles. Compare Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 386 (1947), holding that state courts may not decline enforcement of federal statutory rights on local policy
grounds.
397. For similar agreements made in England and New York, see discussion supra parts III.C.2.a and IL.B,
respectively.
398. Although the requirement of complete diversity may not rise to constitutional dimensions (see Ed &Fred
v. Puritan Marine Ins., 506 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir. 1975)), the presence of an alien as an indispensable party under
FED. R. Crv. P. 19 might defeat jurisdiction even as between citizens. See Faysoud v. United Coconut Chems., 878
F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1989). Cf Allendale Mut. Ins. v. Ball Data Sys., 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
399. See, eg., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (suit between Dutch and Nigerian

parties was based on federal question jurisdiction under the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); see also
Bergesen v. Muller, 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983) in which jurisdiction in a dispute between Norwegian and Swiss
companies was founded on chapter II of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. SS 203, 207 (1988)), implementing
the New York Convention. On the other hand, it has been held that S 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act does not
confer independent subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court asked to vacate an award. See Garrett v. Merrill
Lynch, 7 P.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1993); Harry Hoffnan Printing v. Graphic Communications, 912 F.2d 608, 611
(2d Cir. 1990). It should be noted that S 10 contains no explicit grant of jurisdiction to federal courts similar to
that of 9 U.S.C. S 203 and that contemplated for the federal international court-selection statute.
400. Consumer transactions would include agreements with individuals for the purchase or lease of property,

the provision of services not within the scope of the individual's trade or business.
401. Such a clause would at least meet one objective of the dominant party, by limiting forum-shopping
options. Forum selection would be rationalized to some extent, even if not perfectly. Compare UCC S 2A-106(2),
which states that if the forum chosen in a consumer lease "would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the lessee,
the choice is not enforceable."
402. Such a limitation would require the elaboration of a fairly wide concept of merchant, similar to that
prevailing in continental legal systems. See discussion supra part Il.C.
403. Consumer agreements with foreign suppliers will be relatively rare, and will usually be concluded with
the suppliers domestic branch or subsidiary, thus permitting the transaction to be characterized as domestic. For
example, a Massachusetts residents deposit with the Boston branch of a British bank should not be treated
differently than a deposit with a New England financial institution.
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The draft statute suggested in the appendix attempts to balance these rival objectives.
It could be suggested de legeferendathat similar limitations should be applied to arbitration
of consumer transactions covered by the Federal Arbitration Act. Perhaps, but as Rudyard
Kipling might have observed, "This is another story," or at least another article.
B.

Modest Treaties

To maximize the effectiveness of a federal court selection statute, the United States
should seek to negotiate a treaty network making judgments enforceable to the same extent
as arbitration awards. Sadly, the United States has been unsuccessful at concluding even
a single judgments treaty, principally because of foreign fears of U.S. tort judgments and
the extraterritorial application of U.S. economic regulation.
In the best of worlds, one might hope for American accession to a comprehensive
multilateral treaty on civil and commercial jurisdiction and judgments, along the lines of
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions discussed earlier. 404 However, a more realistic
approach would focus on a judgments treaty of modest scope, covering only court decisions
based on the parties! consent. Such a treaty would enhance confidence that court selection
clauses would be effective, and would raise fewer fears of unreasonable judgments against
non-American defendants unwillingly hauled before a civil jury in contingency-fee-driven
tort litigation.405
C.

Costs and Benefits

In a purely domestic context, judges arguably should have broad discretion to refuse
to enforce court selection clauses depending on the convenience of the chosen forum to
the particular case. Permitting courts to weigh multiple factors bearing on the appropriateness of a contractually stipulated court arguably fosters a fairer adjudicatory
process than does a rigid deference to a contraces prorogation clause.406 In consumer
transactions, the danger that a court selection clause could be imposed on a take-it-orleave-it basis might even justify voiding such clauses altogether on public policy grounds.
The right to present one's case in an accessible court arguably should be nonwaivable unless
0
bargained for freely.4 7
Arguments against abusive jurisdiction agreements in consumer transactions give way
in international transactions to a different policy concern: the prospect that economically
desirable ventures will be discouraged for want of a neutral enforcement procedure. In
international business, the diverse topography of different national legal systems raises the
price of ambiguity. A world divided into one hundred and seventy-five nation states
accentuates the commercially disagreeable effects of uncertainty in international relationships. A controverted event with a foreign dimension sometimes requires domestically

404. See supra part WV.A.See also discussion of the project of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law supra note 28.
405. See discussion of draft Anglo-American judgments treaty supra text 'accompanying note 168.
406. Relevant factors include convenience of witnesses, fairness to parties and applicable law, discussed supra
part II.A.5.c.
407. Some might even affirm that access to an otherwise competent court is an aspect of human dignity that
ought never to be alienable. See generallyMargaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REv.1849, 1877
(1987). A different policy should prevail, however, when a concrete dispute has arisen, and the sale of the right
to trial involves settlement of a defined and proimate claim.
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nurtured rules to yield to countervailing concerns that recognize the legal specificity of
international transactions. 408
Even in domestic transactions, sophisticated persons will want the freedom to contract

for the efficiency of a predetermined court. Normally one should be able to assume that
such private choices will maximize public welfare. This broad sensitivity to freedom of
contract, however, differs from the more practical concern with foreign bias that requires
rationalization of international forum selection. If a Boston seller must sue its buyer in
Atlanta (or vice versa), the dispute will take place within a relatively homogeneous linguistic
and procedural context. The same cannot always be said of litigation against a seller in a
part of the world that does not share the English language or the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or where court procedures raise questions of judicial independence and integrity
to an extent far greater than in the United States. Without the opportunity to bargain for
the relatively greater jurisdictional certainty that forum selection clauses bring, many
economic relationships either will not be consummated or will be concluded at a higher
CoSt.

4 9

From a different perspective, a federal court selection statute arguably is unnecessary,
insofar as the Federal Arbitration Act now gives contracting parties the option to select a
neutral adjudicator. If arbitration already gives international business managers the
neutrality they seek, why should the sovereignty of national courts be further eroded by
permitting ouster of the jurisdiction of states with a legitimate interest in adjudicating
disputes that affect their citizens and residents? The answer is that not all wealth-creating
ventures that rely on cross-border cooperation will go forward if arbitration clauses remain
the only dispositive dispute resolution mechanism. 410 Unfortunately, international
commercial actors cannot always obtain what they want from arbitration. While some
business managers may be willing to run the risk of having an arbitrator split the difference
between the parties, others will want their cases heard by trained national judges in
proceedings with constitutional safeguards and appellate review.41'

408. For example, foreign arbitral awards receive judicial confirmation in circumstances even when
confirmation of a domestic award would fail (see 9 U.S.C. S 207 (1988), granting a three-year limitation for
confirmation of awards under the New York Convention), and international arbitrators may decide matters
implicating sensitive public policies that would normallybe characterized as nonarbitrable in domestic transactions.
See Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974) and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985) discussed supranotes 38 and 7, respectively. See generallyWilliam W. Park, NationalLaw and
Commercial Justice, 63 Tu. L. Rav. 647, 699-705 (1989).
409. Trials in some places are said to resemble auctions, with judgments going to the highest bidder. In some
cases, of course, enforcing a forum selection clause may result in a less neutral forum. For example, Massachusetts
courts may be imposed on a weaker foreign party by an economically stronger Massachusetts party. However,
allowing freedom to make bad contract bargains among sophisticated business managers is the price for the type
of private choice that in the aggregate will maximize public welfare.
410. A preference for courts rather than arbitration sometimes results from an information gap and learning
costs linked to the legal profession's division of labor. The specialization of the legal profession means that the
corporate lawyers who negotiate and draft acquisition contracts or distributorship agreements generally are not
familiar with international arbitration matters such as the Act of State doctrine or the New York Convention.
Equally as important, designation of local courts means business for local litigators.
411. See Edward Brunet, Arbitrationand ConstitutionalRights, 71 N.C. L. Rav. 81 (1992).
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CONCLUSION

American lawyers sometimes see a contractual grant ofjurisdiction to American courts
as preferable (for the American party) to an agreement to arbitrate or to submit to the
jurisdiction of a third-country court. Hometown justice appears best for the hometown boy
or girl. Careful analysis of the realities of forum selection, however, reveals that an
American multinational's insistence on the home-court advantage can backfire, to reduce
rather than to enhance adjudicatory neutrality and predictability.
No treaty network exists by which Americans can enforce either jurisdiction
agreements or the resulting judgments. The United States is not party to a single convention on judicial jurisdiction or enforcement of foreign judgments. Moreover, American
courts might not always be willing or able to hear a dispute just because the parties earlier
agreed between themselves to thrust the case on the court. No American jurisdiction
except New York treats court-selecting clauses as dispositive. If a case does not raise a
federal question, federal courts generally will lack subject matter jurisdiction unless there
is complete diversity among the parties.
The matter of what law is applicable to jurisdiction clauses adds another layer of
uncertainty. Under principles of federalism announced more than fifty-five years ago in
Erie v. Tompkins, federal courts sitting in diversity cases may have to apply such state law
to determine the validity of the forum selection agreement. Yet, a number of states still
look unfavorably on court-designating forum selection agreements. When federal law does
apply, the standard for determining the validity of the court-designating clause calls for a
balancing of several malleable criteria, such as the location of the witnesses and fairness to
the parties. The parties' agreement is only one factor among many relevant to a court's
willingness to hear a case. The party-selected judge can usually refuse on forum non
conveniens grounds to honor the litigants' choice-of-court clause.
In arbitration, by contrast, the New York Convention requires courts to stay litigation
covered by an arbitration clause and to refer parties to arbitration. The Convention also
gives foreign arbitration awards res judicata effect, and calls for Convention states to
recognize and enforce the awards as binding. There is no balancing test of several factors,
and few troublesome questions of state law conflict with federal principles, since the New
York Convention will generally preempt state law. More importantly, perhaps, parties to
arbitration agreements do not have to worry about forum non conveniens or subject matter
jurisdiction. If able to cover the arbitrators' costs, the litigants can almost always find
412
arbitrators to hear a dispute.
From a policy perspective, values that justify forum selection clauses in an international context will often condemn them in domestic cases. In the typical cross-border
transaction, sophisticated business managers with access to competent counsel bargain for
a contract with a forum selection clause that permits the parties to reduce the prospect of

412. The practicing bar's preference for jurisdiction clauses designating their home courts rather than
arbitration agreements maybe due in part to the specialization of the legal profession. Corporate lawyers who draft
acquisition agreements or distributorships are rarely interested in the New York Convention; the same can be said
about the garden variety litigator whom the corporate lawyer calls for quick advice. The eyes of even the best
lawyers usually glaze over when mention is made of obscure international treaties. In addition, there may also be
a misguided perception that by providing for American courts, American lawyers are more likely to receive a piece
of the action. The opposite may be true. When the court-selection agreement backfires, the litigation may end
up in a foreign court where the American counsel will be excluded, rather than before an arbitral tribunal where
he or she could play a meaningful role. See discussion in part II concerning forum non conveniens, lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, and the absence of a treaty network.
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biased or inaccessible courts. In domestic transactions, however, forum selection clauses
are found frequently in standard form leases, loans, and installment sales, where the clauses
may designate courts of a jurisdiction which will be more accessible to, or predisposed in
favor of, the dominant party.
In the United States, neither case law nor statute has done a very good job at
distinguishing between forum selection agreements in domestic consumer contracts and
those found in international commercial agreements. By contrast, most Western European
countries generally protect consumers from ill-informed waivers of jurisdictional rights as
well as providing greater certainty that a court-selection clause will be honored. At the
same time, European countries ensuie that international business managers will obtain the
forum for which they bargained. For example, the Swiss federal conflicts-of-law code makes
court selection clauses unenforceable in consumer transactions. However, the code
provides that in international contracts contractually designated Swiss courts may not
decline to hear a case, as long as at least one party is Swiss or Swiss law applies to the
dispute. The Lugano and Brussels Conventions contain similarly clear-cut provisions giving
forum selection clauses dispositive effect in commercial but not consumer transactions.
To promote reliability in forum selection, the United States should enact a federal
court selection statute that makes prorogation clauses dispositive in international contracts.
A contract-designated federal court should be required to honor the forum clause by
hearing the case as long as at least one party is an American citizen or the dispute raises
a federal question. Consumers should be bound to pre-dispute court selection agreements
only if such agreements give the consumer the option to sue and to be sued in courts at
their residence. Moreover, courts should extend to court selection clauses the same judicial
scrutiny now applied to arbitration agreements that operate in tandem with choice-of-law
clauses in a way likely to defeat fundamental public norms of the place of contract
performance.
Codification in conflict of laws presumes that people are more likely to commit
themselves to productive enterprises when relatively confident that controversies arising
from their business ventures will be resolved according to their contract, rather than a
decision-maker's private sense of justice. Such a code, however, will run counter to parts
of the progressive dialogue in American conflicts scholarship that has emphasized flexible
methodologies facilitating a right result in the individual case, 41 3 even at the expense of
fidelity to the parties' shared expectations.

41

4

Whatever the benefits of flexible principles in the interstate context of our federal
system, a more rule-based approach justifies itself in international adjudication by the
special need to reduce bias in cross-border adjudication. Commercial dispute resolution
that seeks principally the right outcome in the particular case at hand will at some point
increase legal risks to the point that they chill productive economic cooperation. While an
absolutely determinate legal system is neither desirable nor possible, the intelligent
balancing of costs and benefits demands a relatively predictable and neutral dispute
resolution framework. If international transactions teach scholars anything, it should be
that certainty and neutrality remain vital aspirational models, and that when reasonable
measures of certainty and impartiality do not exist, they will need to be invented.

413. See generally the survey of scholarly conflicts methodologies in Joseph Singer, Real Conflict 69 B.U. L.
REv. 1, 6-32 (1989). For Singer's own eclectic methodology in contract cases, see id. at 110-27.
414. Some have suggested that a federal conflicts statute would be tantamount to scholasticide, the "truly
unpardonable sin." Michael H. Gottesman, Drainingthe Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law
Statutes, 80 GEo. LJ. 1, 51 (1991).
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APPENDIX

Model International Court Selection Act

Section 1.
This Act shall apply to an agreement not otherwise null or void which provides that
a dispute shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court, domestic or foreign, except
that it shall not apply to:
(a)

an agreement in a consumer contract unless
(i)

concluded after the dispute has arisen, or

(ii) at the consumer's option any action shall be brought in courts
located at the consumer's residence;
(b)

an agreement procured by fraud, coercion or duress;

(c)

an agreement linked to a choice-of-law clause that operates to defeat
mandatory policy norms of the place of contract performance; and

(d)

an agreement entirely between or among residents and/or citizens of
the United States.

Section 2.
In any action before a court within the United States, the court in which suit is
pending shall stay proceedings upon an issue referable to another court under a
jurisdiction agreement to which this Act applies.

Section 3.
In any action arising out of a jurisdiction agreement to which this Act applies, no
United States district court shall stay or dismiss any action on the ground of
inconvenient forum or lack of jurisdiction, nor transfer the venue of an action nor
dismiss an action for improper venue, except in a manner consistent with a
jurisdiction agreement covered by this Act, provided that:
(a)

at least one party is a citizen of the United States; or

(b)

the dispute raises a question arising under the laws or treaties of the
United States.

204
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Section 4.

As used in this Act:
(a)
(b)

a corporation shall be considered a citizen of the United States if
incorporated under the laws of the United States or of any State;
an individual shall be considered a resident of that country in which
the individual has a principal place of abode;

(c)

a consumer contract includes any agreement with an individual for
the purchase or lease of propert, the provision of services or the
extension of credit, unless within the scope of that individual's trade,
profession or business;

(d)

courts at a consumer's residence shall include both state and federal
courts of proper venue within the state.

